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iAbstract
This dissertation explores the moral and political assumptions contained within
the concept of humanitarian intervention in the three areas of political science, political
philosophy and politics itself.
It is argued that far from shedding light on the concept, many attempts at defini-
tion have been built on assumptions regarding the moral and the political, which cloud
the issue rather than clarify it. The political aspect of humanitarian intervention in par-
ticular has often been disregarded usually due to a tendency to approach the concept
from an almost entirely moral standpoint. In consequence, the tensions between the
moral and the political aspects in humanitarian intervention have been overlooked. The
thesis explores the problems presented by definitions which ignore this.
The thesis begins with a short history of the concept, which is traced back to the
late 19th century. Although ideas pertaining to the concept may certainly be traced back
beyond this, the thesis is only concerned with the term itself, which has no linguistic
existence in the English language earlier than the 1820s.
The thesis then proceeds to examine definitions of the concept in the literature of
political science, political philosophy, and politics. The final part of the thesis applies
the discussions from the preceding chapters to New Labour’s attempts to situate human-
itarian intervention within its broader ideal of an ethical dimension to foreign policy.
This results in a further confusion of the moral and the political.
The dissertation concludes by claiming that any discussion of the concept of hu-
manitarian intervention raises questions not only about the part played in it by the polit-
ical, but also about the academic study of politics from its beginnings as a distinct uni-
versity discipline until the present day.
Keywords: humanitarian intervention; definition; history of the concept; New
Labour; Robin Cook; ethical foreign policy; ethical dimension; political; morality; mor-
alism; tragedy; comedy
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Preface
The main theme of this thesis is the concept of humanitarian intervention. The
emphasis, that is, is on theory rather than on concrete examples. My interest in the con-
cept emerged after the 1990s, and the academic path I have taken, from philosophy at
Aberdeen University via jurisprudence at Erfurt University to political philosophy at
Hull University, makes it almost inevitable that it is the theory that puzzles me rather
than actual cases of humanitarian intervention. However, in looking at the literature I
became increasingly aware of a lack of consensus on what the various authors took the
term to mean. This led to frustration as many of the arguments appeared not to function
on account of these various interpretations of what humanitarian intervention was.
The subject of humanitarian intervention has been claimed as their own by an ar-
ray of academic and non-academic authors. Politicians and philosophers, jurists and po-
litical scientists, the military and NGOs have all defined humanitarian intervention in
their own ways. I should emphasise that I do not wish to contest the right of these au-
thors to define the concept according to their own subject area or expertise. Their ef-
forts, however, by no means lessen the confusion surrounding the notion. Indeed, so dif-
ferent were the definitions that it was not always clear to me that the authors were dis-
cussing the same topic. This led to further questions: Was there more than one type of
humanitarian intervention? And, regardless of whether or not there was, how was it to
be justified? Were the reasons moral, legal, political, military, or a combination of some
or all of these? It is this confusion about what humanitarian intervention might be which
is central to this dissertation. Hence, the question that was the catalyst and remains the
touchstone to this dissertation is: What is humanitarian intervention?
It may appear, at first glance, that there is no shortage of literature attempting to
answer this question as so many books have appeared on the subject of humanitarian
intervention since the end of the Cold War. However, as indicated above these answers
are mostly shaped by the authors’ particular interests and concerns and, as such, con-
fused the issue for me more than they clarified it.
As I pondered on this situation, something I had not expected occurred. During
the examination of the various definitions I was struck by the almost complete absence
of any discussion of the political in them. In investigating this, my examination of the
concept of humanitarian intervention broadened out into an assessment of the underly-
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ing assumptions about the nature of politics made by those authors writing on the sub-
ject.
What became apparent is that each area of expertise appears to disregard the polit-
ical, albeit often tacitly, then assumes that their viewpoint is the most valid one, and it is
little wonder the discussion of humanitarian intervention is so confused. The jurist as-
sumes a legal definition, but an argument with an NGO with a moral perspective, or the
General with a military stance, or the political scientist with an ideological position is
unlikely to generate consensus.
Once aware of the lack of a distinct political discussion on the subject of humani-
tarian intervention, I became increasingly struck by the lack of consideration of a politi-
cal viewpoint in general. Once persuaded that humanitarian intervention was intricately
connected to notions of the political, and that the displacement of the political by some
other value is often reflected in the definitions generated, it became necessary to incor-
porate a discussion of the political into the dissertation, which led me to the contempo-
rary debate on the nature of the political.
This debate has seemed, in recent times, to congregate around two ideas.
The first can, perhaps, be said to have been triggered by the work of Carl Schmitt,
who is concerned with the tendency to reject the political in favour of the moral and his
conclusions seem particularly relevant to the notion of humanitarian intervention.
The second is the ancient concept of tragedy being applied to politics in an at-
tempt to explain the disjunction of what may be deemed ‘politics as practised’ from
‘politics as intended’. Furthermore, as rejection of the political happens in several areas
of discussion, it was necessary to link these together, and New Labour’s ‘ethical dimen-
sion’ to foreign policy, being based on what could be concluded to be a non-political
theory, and the starting point for any New Labour humanitarian intervention seemed to
be an ideal subject to combine and illustrate the analysis.
Thus, the catalyst question ‘what is humanitarian intervention?’ goes hand in hand
with the question ‘what is the political?’ and it is these two questions which form the
basis of this dissertation, and which link the three problem areas of questioning togeth-
er.
What conclusions did I reach at the end of my thesis?
Firstly, the discussion regarding what humanitarian intervention actually is and
how it should be defined has been around as long as the term itself.
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Secondly, a political dimension is inextricably linked to any act which may be
called humanitarian intervention.
Thirdly, the rejection or lack of awareness of the political aspect of humanitarian
intervention seems to occur in every sphere of debate. However, this dismissal is not
always knowingly carried out and can be for a variety of reasons. Moreover, politicians
are as guilty of this as political scientists are.
Fourthly, there are several areas of discussion, and there is much argument that
overlaps, but there seem to be few instances of thought or conclusions from one prob-
lem area of discussion having an effect on any other.
Chapter 1 Introduction
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1 Introduction: Humanitarian Intervention as a Concept
The collapse of Communism and the end of the Cold War appeared to herald the
beginning of a new era in Western society. A defining characteristic of this new era was
a mood of political optimism famously expressed in Francis Fukuyama’s The End of
History and the Last Man. Published in 1992, this book was enthusiastically received
and Steven Lukes, writing in the New Statesman, claimed that it ‘captures the prevailing
spirit of our times’ (Lukes 1992: 44). Very briefly, Fukuyama’s message was that:
despite the powerful reasons for pessimism given us by our ex-
perience in the first half of this century, events in the second half
have been pointing in a very different and unexpected direction.
As we reach the 1990s, the world as a whole has not revealed
new evils, but has gotten better in certain distinct ways (Fuku-
yama 1992: 12).
What has happened, according to Fukuyama, is that ‘one of the clearest manifesta-
tions of our pessimism’, which was the ‘almost universal belief in the permanence of a
vigorous, communist-totalitarian alternative to Western liberal democracy’ (Fukuyama
1992: 7–8) has now disappeared. It is not simply that Fukuyama believes that one polit-
ical system has been replaced by another, but rather that one political system has been
replaced by a better one. He claims that ‘liberal democracy may constitute the “end
point of mankind’s ideological evolution” and the “final form of human government”’
(Fukuyama 1992: xi). The one political system has not simply lost the ideological battle,
but has virtually disappeared and is no longer a legitimate alternative. This state of af-
fairs and its progression is expressed in the idea of the end of history where Fukuyama
claims that:
if we are now at a point where we cannot imagine a world sub-
stantially different from our own, in which there is no apparent
or obvious way in which the future will represent a fundamental
improvement over our current order, then we must also take into
consideration the possibility that History itself might be at an
end (Fukuyama 1992: 51).
The rising tide of optimism concerning international relations expressed itself in
the hope that the new, post-Cold War era would not only mean the departure of totalitar-
ian states, but would also mean the emergence of stable, democratic ones, almost as a
default position. The precise implications of optimistic talk about the end of history may
not at once be clear, but Fukuyama does give a very clear explanation of them:
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if war is fundamentally driven by the desire for recognition, it
stands to reason that the liberal revolution which abolishes the
relationship of lordship and bondage by making former slaves
into their own masters should have a similar effect on the rela-
tionship between states. Liberal democracy replaces the irration-
al desire to be recognized as greater than others with a rational
desire to be recognized as equal. A world made up of liberal
democracies, then, should have much less incentive for war,
since all nations would reciprocally recognize one another’s le-
gitimacy (Fukuyama 1992: xx).
Broadly, then, what Fukuyama is putting forward is the idea that human history
has what might be called a direction, or a goal, or a telos, which consists of increasing,
stable democratisation, leading finally to an end to international conflict.
A similar mood of optimism permeates the thought of John Rawls, who believes
that liberal societies are moving towards an era of democratic peace, in which all are:
less likely to engage in war with nonliberal outlaw states, except
on grounds of legitimate self-defense (or in the defense of their
legitimate allies), or in intervention in severe cases to protect
human rights (Rawls 1999: 49).
The idea of democratic peace, Rawls explains:
implies that, when liberal peoples do go to war, it is only with
unsatisfied societies, or outlaw states (as I have called them).
This they do when such a state’s policies threaten their security
and safety, since they must defend the freedom and independ-
ence of their liberal culture and oppose states that strive to sub-
ject and dominate them (Rawls 1999: 48).
What, therefore, becomes possible in the new era of democratic peace is an ethi-
cally based foreign policy which aims at the promotion of human rights. This aim
should in fact ‘be a fixed concern of the foreign policy of all just and decent regimes’
(Rawls 1999: 48).
It could be argued at this point that this initial optimism lasted only until the
events of 11th September 2001. However, in order to dispel any impression that the op-
timism which inspired the rhetoric of humanitarian intervention was abandoned after
this point, it is worth mentioning a speech by Hillary Rodham Clinton in 2006. Given at
Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs
Clinton said that history:
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can be like a yoke around a people’s neck. History can blind you
to the possibilities that lie ahead if you’re just able to break free
and take that step. […] It can get better, just get over it. Make a
decision for hope, make a decision for peace. Create a new reali-
ty (Clinton 2006).
Clinton went on to speak of the ‘dream of democracy’ as something which
‘should belong to all people in the Middle East and across the world’ (Clinton 2006).
Clinton’s speech indicates, then, that the moralistic approach to politics is alive and well
in the United States. In fact, both these examples indicate that this optimism was not
confined to party lines, as Clinton is a Democrat and at this point in time Fukuyama was
a declared neo-conservative, more closely aligned to the Republican Party. Although,
that said, it remains a matter of contention to what extent the foreign policy of the Bush
administration was actually based on neo-conservatism (for a discussion of neo-
conservative thought see Stelzer 2004). It is not my concern, however, to decide how
much influence political moralism, that is, putting the moral prior to the political regard-
less of circumstance, has had either on the Bush administration at large or on American
neo-conservative attitudes towards Iraq and Afghanistan – issues with which the USA is
still grappling. In the present context, it is sufficient merely to note that what Bernard
Williams has termed ‘political moralism’ (Williams 2005: 2) persists, and it is not nec-
essarily aligned with one party or another in the USA.
This persisting political moralism still exists in Western European governments.
In the French case, for example, the contemporary relevance of the issue is evident from
the appointment of Bernard Kouchner to the post of Foreign Minister in President Sar-
kozy’s government in 2007. Much of the discussion of humanitarian intervention in
France in the past has involved Kouchner’s views, and he has been referred to by
Boutros Boutros-Ghali as ‘an unguided missile’ (Sciolino 2007a). The Economist refers
to Kouchner as ‘[t]his free-wheeling, plain-talking humanitarian campaigner’ who has
‘little time for diplomatic niceties, stiff formality or professional caution’, but admit that
‘his frank, sleeves-rolled-up approach is helping to define a new French diplomacy’
(The Economist 2007: 45). This new diplomacy is, nevertheless, a shift:
to a values-based diplomacy. First marked by his experience as a
volunteer doctor in the Biafran war, Mr Kouchner went on to
develop the theory of a humanitarian ‘right to intervene’ in other
states’ affairs. French foreign policy, he argues now, is not only
about defending France’s interests and guaranteeing its security,
but also about ‘the image we have of ourselves’, and the promo-
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tion of human rights. […] This is not a foreign minister who is
happy at banquets. Like other idealistic foreign ministers before
him (eg [sic], Robin Cook in Britain), he sees himself as a healer
to the world: no conflicts, no oppressed people, leave him indif-
ferent (The Economist 2007: 45).
In the German case, the topic of humanitarian intervention remains important on
account of the continuing desire of Germans to balance their foreign policy with the les-
sons from Germany’s militaristic history. Speaking of Germany’s foreign policy role,
Hans Maull describes it as being:
shaped by Germany’s traumatic past: the lessons of history led
to aversion, or at least profound scepticism, vis-à-vis any use of
military force; a fierce determination never again to allow Ger-
man militarism and nationalism to threaten European stability; a
desire never again to break ranks with Western democracies;
and, later on, also to a strong commitment to projecting univer-
sal democratic values in foreign policy (Maull 2000: 56)
The former German Foreign Minister, Joseph (Joschka) Fischer has explained this
situation thus:
my generation was brought up with two experiences. The first is
‘Never Again War.’ And the second is ‘Never Again Ausch-
witz.’ It means standing up against genocide. It’s a contradic-
tion, but we have to live with it (Weymouth 1999).
In a speech to the German Bundestag on the decision to send troops to the Bal-
kans, Fischer explains his party’s predicament in more detail:
[t]he question which is to be decided upon today […] has threat-
ened to rip my party and my faction apart. Why? We derive
from the peace movement. […] Now we are in a genuine con-
flict of basic values: on the one hand a vision of the world which
rejects violence, in which conflicts are solved by reason, law,
majority votes, by constitutional state and not once more by
crude violence, […] on the other hand, the doomed dilemma of
only being able to help people to survive by sending the mili-
tary. Between the solidarity owed to survival and the duty to
pacifism – that is our contradiction (Fischer 1995. Own transla-
tion).
For present purposes, those aspects of this new mood of optimism which are par-
ticularly relevant to the conduct of foreign policy will be focussed upon. The first point
to note is the adoption of an intensely moralistic rhetoric within both academia and
practical politics. Rawls in particular does not assume that the need for violence will
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disappear from the international stage; indeed, Rawls makes clear that violence may le-
gitimately be used to further the spread of stable democracies and protect human rights.
Moreover, this use of violence can be taken further, as Rawls indicates in the following
discussion on outlaw states in a footnote in his The Law of Peoples:
Some states are not well-ordered and violate human rights, but
are not aggressive and do not harbor plans to attack their neigh-
bors. They do not suffer from unfavorable conditions, but simp-
ly have a state policy that violates the human rights of certain
minorities among them. They are therefore outlaw states be-
cause they violate what are recognized as rights by the Society
of reasonably just and decent Peoples, and they may be subject
to some kind of intervention in severe cases (Rawls 1999: 90).
Paradoxically, then, although, according to Rawls, interstate war will become re-
dundant, violence may remain necessary to achieve and sustain this programme. A se-
cond point, stemming from the moralistic rhetoric, and relevant for foreign policy, is
that the foreign policy generated by this growth of international optimism has a tenden-
cy to envisage the possibility of an ethically based foreign policy in general, as the work
of Fukuyama makes clear. Thirdly, leading directly from this, there is an increase in the
importance attached to humanitarian intervention as a means to achieve the human
rights necessary for the spread of democracy throughout the world.
The growing commitment to humanitarian intervention will be illustrated later in
this thesis, in Section III: Practical Politics, by considering four notable international
organisations which have taken a stance on the issue, and this tendency will be exam-
ined in more depth in the chapters devoted to New Labour’s foreign policy.
Since this thesis will focus in particular upon the concept of humanitarian inter-
vention, it should be stated again that there is no intention of taking issue with specific
instances of political action which claim to be humanitarian intervention. Nor is there
any intention of examining every kind of moral argument that may be used to defend
the concept of humanitarian intervention. Rather, the thesis examines defences of the
concept of humanitarian intervention, or foreign policies that promote it, which are vul-
nerable to the charge of being no more than political moralism.
The first step must be to give the concept of political moralism more precision.
For Williams, political moralism is defined as a way of thinking about politics
which makes the ‘moral prior to the political’ and ‘political theory […] something like
applied morality’ (Williams 2005: 2). Williams’ principal target is contemporary liberal
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thinkers such as Ronald Dworkin, Thomas Nagel, and Rawls. Rawls’ attempt to avoid
the charge of political moralism by attempting to distinguish between a moral and a po-
litical concept of justice in Political Liberalism is rejected by Williams as unsuccessful.
For Williams the political account Rawls provides still collapses into a moral concep-
tion (Williams 2005: 77n); his critique of Rawls, however, is less relevant to this study
than his reasons for objecting to political moralism.
One of Williams’ objections to political moralism is that it implies that political
conflict is evidence of moral deficiency. As Williams remarks, however:
a political decision – the conclusion of a political deliberation
which brings all sorts of considerations, considerations of prin-
ciple along with others, to one focus of decision – is that such a
decision does not in itself announce that the other party was
morally wrong or, indeed, wrong at all (Williams 2005: 13).
As Williams quite rightly notes, to characterise a political decision in moralistic
terms, that is, identifying what is essentially a political decision as being morally right
and those who oppose it as morally wrong, makes it very difficult to pursue a politics of
compromise. Putting this on the international level, political moralism is a tendency to
make negotiation difficult by applying moral criticism to regimes and thereby denying
their legitimacy. In its extreme form, this manifests itself in the demonisation of the op-
ponent. An example of this danger can be seen in Rawls’ division of the world into de-
cent and, by implication, non-decent peoples; democracies and rogue or outlaw states in
his The Law of Peoples. This propensity to demonise has been identified by Reinhart
Koselleck, who realised that morality will regard politics as:
not only incomplete, limited, or unstable but also immoral, un-
natural and foolish. The abstract and unpolitical starting point
allows a forceful, total attack on a reality in need of reform
(Koselleck 1988: 152).
Demonisation of this kind leads, Koselleck continues, to a situation in which the:
[m]oral totality deprives all who do not subject themselves to it
of their right to exist (Koselleck 1988: 152).
The danger of a purely moralistic view of humanitarian intervention, it may be
noted, had already been implicitly commented on by Carl Schmitt in 1932 in his discus-
sion of the term ‘humanity’, in the course of which he wrote that:
to invoke and monopolize such a term [viz. humanity] probably
has certain incalculable effects, such as denying the enemy the
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quality of being human and declaring him to be an outlaw of
humanity; and a war can thereby be driven to the most extreme
inhumanity (Schmitt 1976: 54).
Schmitt’s conclusion is that any political consideration at a foreign policy level,
regardless of whether it relates to state borders, the balance of power, or implementation
of international law, is rendered superfluous on this view.
The conclusion we can draw from Koselleck and Schmitt, of great consequence to
any discussion of humanitarian intervention, is that placing the moral above the political
does not guarantee either moral means (the end justifying any extreme means) or moral
ends (as long as another morality is possible, it invariably runs the risk of not being
deemed moral by all). All that is certain is that a political solution is less likely while the
moral is first.
A second, closely related, objection of Williams’ is that political moralism tends
to favour a view of politics which ignores the historically specific context in which eve-
ry concrete political issue is necessarily located. Focussing on moralistic liberalism in
particular, Williams notes that it has no answer:
to the question why what it takes to be the true moral solution to
the questions of politics, liberalism, should for the first time
(roughly) become evident in European culture from the late sev-
enteenth century onward, and why these truths have been con-
cealed from other people. […]. The explanations of the various
historical steps that have led to the liberal state do not show very
persuasively why or how they involved an increase in moral
knowledge (Williams 2005: 9).
The nature of this criticism is taken up again by Williams in the essay Human
Rights and Relativism where he discusses what he terms the ‘“first” political question’,
and the relevance of his above criticism becomes clear. Williams explains that he identi-
fies the:
‘first’ political question (in the manner of Thomas Hobbes) as
the securing of order, protection, safety, trust, and the conditions
of co-operation. It is the ‘first’ political question because solving
it is the condition of solving, indeed posing, any other political
question. It is not (unhappily) first in the sense that once solved
it never has to be solved again. Because a solution to the first
political question is required all the time, the character of the so-
lution is affected by historical circumstances: it is not a matter of
arriving at a solution to the first question at the level of state-of-
nature theory and then going on to the rest of the agenda. It is
easy to think of the political in those terms, especially in coun-
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tries which have been long settled and whose history is has not
been disrupted by revolution or civil war […].
But it is important to remember the elementary truth that even in
settled circumstances the political order does rest on the legiti-
mated direction of violence; and also that even in settled states,
the nature of the legitimating, and what exactly it will legiti-
mate, is constantly, if not violently, contested (Williams 2005:
62-3).
Hence, for Williams, the approach of political moralism is too abstract. The con-
text is not simply ignored, but underlying, Hobbesian, state-of-nature issues are believed
to have been solved for all time, and can have little bearing on specifics, ensuring that
theoretical fallacies work their way into concrete issues.
A third characteristic of political moralism implicit in Williams’ characterisation
is the underlying instrumentalist perspective that it involves. The difficulties posed by
instrumentalism are explicitly theorised by Anthony de Jasay The State (1985). The
dominant tendency of modern western political thought from the contract theories of the
seventeenth century onwards, to assume that the state is no more than a neutral and po-
tentially benign instrument for serving the moral ends of individuals and communities
comes in for particular criticism from de Jasay. De Jasay rejects this viewpoint on the
ground that it takes the state to be ‘an inanimate tool, a machine’ that ‘has no ends and
no will; only persons have ends’ (de Jasay 1995: 266). He castigates Rawls in particular
for instrumentalising politics and rejects Rawls’:
bland view of the redistributive process as painless and costless,
and of the state as an automatic machine which dispenses ‘social
decisions’ when we feed out wishes into it (de Jasay 1995: 10).
For de Jasay, the instrumentalist mode of thought naïvely ignores the fact that po-
litical power tends to have a logic of its own which can only be arrested by checks and
balances upon those who exercise it, quite regardless of their personal integrity and
claims on behalf of the good intentions behind the policies they pursue. The danger of
ignoring the fact that the state cannot simply be reduced to an instrument for those in-
tentions is that we cease to be aware that politics of this kind has ‘a latent propensity for
totalitarian transformation’ (de Jasay 1995: 273).
Although de Jasay does not mention Hume in this connection, his critique of polit-
ical moralism recalls David Hume’s cautionary remark that:
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[p]olitical writers have establish’d it as a maxim, that, in con-
triving any system of government, as fixing the several checks
and controuls of the constitution, every man ought to be sup-
pos’d a knave, and to have no other end, in all his actions, but
private interest. By this interest we must govern him, and by
means of it, make him co-operate to public good, notwithstand-
ing his insatiable avarice and ambitions. Without this, say they,
we shall in vain boast of the advantages of any constitution, and
shall find, in the end, that we have no security for our liberties or
possessions, except the good-will of our rulers; that is, we shall
have no security at all (Hume 1742: Essay VIII, 84-85).
Although Hume was thinking in the first instance of municipal politics, the per-
spective behind his sentiments is not limited to that context: it can be readily extended
to the international one. Hume himself perhaps took this idea from Niccolò Machiavelli,
who states in blunt terms in the Discourses that:
he who frames a Commonwealth, and ordains Laws in it, should
presuppose that all men are bent to mischief, and that they have
a will to put in practice the wickedness of their minds, so oft as
occasion shall serve (Machiavelli 1674: 16-17).
The final characteristic of political moralism to be considered in this dissertation
is a systematic depoliticisation of politics. This aspect has already been alluded to in the
discussion of de Jasay above. Glen Newey has claimed that in liberal political philoso-
phy:
few words of modern liberal political philosophy attempt to ad-
dress the real world of politics, often applying inappropriate
theoretical models to it when they do and liberal political phi-
losophers aim at the supersession of the ostensible subject-
matter of their discipline – that is, politics, they aim at a post-
political world (Newey 2001: 2).
The strategy which Newey regards as the most common mode of depoliticisation,
similar to de Jasay, seeks to establish the neutrality of the state. According to this strate-
gy, neutrality rests on belief in the state as ‘a referee, holding the ring between vying
particularisms, systems of belief, and so on, while itself remaining uncommitted to any
substantive moral outlook’ (Newey 2001: 137). For Newey, the quest for such a per-
spective is a wild goose chase.
An excellent example of the depoliticising tendency Newey has in mind is provid-
ed by the methodological standpoint adopted by Rawls in A Theory of Justice. The es-
sence of his methodology is the adoption of a homogeneous conception of individuality
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whereby all particularity is stripped away from those placed behind the veil of igno-
rance. Rawls writes that:
it is clear that since the differences among the parties are un-
known to them, and everyone is equally rational and similarly
situated, each is convinced by the same arguments. Therefore,
we can view the choice in the original position from the stand-
point of one person selected at random (Rawls 1999: 139).
He goes on to remark that ‘[w]hatever his temporal position, each is forced to
choose for everyone’ (Rawls 1999: 140) and footnotes Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s remark
contained in The Social Contract book II, chapter 4 under the heading ‘The Limits of
the Sovereign Power’ that:
in fulfilling them [engagements] we cannot labour for others
without labouring at the same time for ourselves (Rousseau
1848: 28),
which does not, however, seem to add up to the same point as Rawls. While
Rousseau appears to be claiming that no man is an island, Rawls appears to be claiming
that behind the veil of ignorance any person is, to all intents and purposes, identical with
any other person.
As Noël O’Sullivan remarks:
[t]he result of this procedure is that the precondition for the po-
litical – difference – is automatically eliminated at the very out-
set of Rawls’ thought (O’Sullivan 1997: 741).
These are some principal characteristics of political moralism. For the purposes of
this thesis, it is not necessary to pursue in greater depth any of the criticisms of it men-
tioned above: all that is necessary is to take seriously the criticism that political moral-
ism fails to acknowledge adequately the difference between moral and political perspec-
tives and this will have implications when it is used to defend humanitarian interven-
tion.
So far, the meaning of political moralism has only been characterised in general
terms, without any attempt to do justice to the complexity of the phenomenon. In order
to remedy this shortcoming it is convenient to distinguish three problem areas which
approach the issue. The first problem area, which may be termed political science, is a
reflective field, but still fails to make a decisive advance beyond the political moralism
which has shaped much of the thinking surrounding humanitarian intervention. In this
field, explicit attempts are certainly made to define humanitarian intervention, to clarify
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the principles on which it is based and specify the circumstances under which it may
properly be undertaken. However, no sustained attempt is made to move beyond the
moralist perspective by clarifying the relationship between morality and politics. While
I call this problem area ‘political science’ for convenience, it should be noted that it
concerns itself with the academic study of politics and is therefore not limited to de-
partments of political science in universities. Insofar as academics in law, philosophy
and sociology, amongst others, research humanitarian intervention they fall into the ‘po-
litical science’ grouping. Indeed, the comparative newness of the study of politics at UK
universities resulted in professors of the subject writing inaugural lectures asking what
the study of politics actually is. This question of politics and its relationship to morality
lies at the root of humanitarian intervention yet is often sidestepped in political science
accounts. Hence, these lectures will be examined on account of the questions they ask
and the issues they raise being fundamental to the issue of humanitarian intervention.
In the second problem area, which may be termed that of political philosophy, as
above, this is a convenient shorthand and those investigated need not be in academic
departments of philosophy nor known as philosophers. In this area the wider assump-
tions about politics and morality implicit in humanitarian intervention and in the related
idea of an ethical foreign policy, are made fully explicit and explored. However, in do-
ing so the notion of humanitarian intervention seems to disappear as a problem in this
area, as the discussion occurs on a rather abstract plane. The relationship between the
moral and the political is examined and its implications for the other areas of debate an-
alysed, but seldom with a specific example of the convergence of these terms in the
concept of humanitarian intervention. As in problem area one, it is those authors fo-
cussed on the questions which lie at the root of humanitarian intervention who are ex-
amined. Carl Schmitt’s tenacious grasp on the question of the political along with a re-
surgence and rehabilitation of his thought mark him out as the obvious candidate for
this, if not for humanitarian intervention. Less obvious, perhaps, is the discussion of
tragedy which has resurfaced in political philosophy circles. However, once again, it is
the questions which are asked in this area which are of interest and use, with humanitar-
ian intervention simply one of several possible applications.
The third problem area, which may be termed that of practical politics, is one at
which the rhetoric of political moralism is deployed with relatively little critical reflec-
tion. In this area, in fact, theoretical reflection may be deliberately avoided since the
concern is primarily with rhetorical attempts to convince others and implement an agen-
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da. This area three debate on humanitarian intervention will subsequently be illustrated
in Section III: Practical Politics, and more specifically in chapters six to eight by a de-
tailed examination of the rhetoric used by publicists and politicians to defend New La-
bour’s foreign policy. This example has been chosen for a number of reasons. The New
Labour government was so long out of power that there was little experience left
amongst its ranks, and its foreign policy was based more on theory than praxis. Moreo-
ver, this theoretical basis is more likely to be an optimistic ideology of applying ethics
to foreign relations, and it is this basis which provides the justification for humanitarian
interventions to be carried out.
However, before these fields of analysis are to be applied, and the literature within
these areas reviewed, a short history of the concept of humanitarian intervention will be
carried out.
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2 A Short Political & Intellectual History of the Concept
As it is the concept of humanitarian intervention which is being examined in this
thesis, and as political moralism tends to ignore the historically specific context in
which every concrete political issue is necessarily located, we will be well advised to
look at the history of the term ‘humanitarian intervention’ itself. Humanitarian interven-
tion is not a tangible object: it is a concept created by humans. As such, it is a contin-
gent, unstable, and historical phenomenon. Friedrich Nietzsche puts this well in the Ge-
nealogy of Morals when he writes that we are ‘unknown to ourselves’ (Nietzsche 2000:
451[1]), and goes on to say that:
we have no right to isolated acts of any kind: we may not make
isolated errors or hit upon isolated truths. Rather do our ideas,
our values, our yeas and nays, our ifs and buts, grow out of us
with the necessity with which a tree bears fruit (Nietzsche 2000:
452[2]).
This acknowledgement of the historicity of concepts, however, does not seem to
characterise many of the authors who have recently written on the subject of humanitar-
ian intervention. Yet it will obviously affect our knowledge and treatment of the concept
of humanitarian intervention if we discover that it is a post-Cold War phenomenon in-
spired by the collapse of Soviet communism. It is also relevant to know whether there
have been previous manifestations of the concept prior to the Cold War, and if the post-
1989 version is simply its most recent incarnation. As Wendy Brown remarks, in order
to:
question the value of certain values, one must know the condi-
tions under which they emerged, changed, and took hold, how
they converged with or displaced other values, what their emer-
gence fought off, valorized, and served. This is the history that
is buried by the naturalization of values as universal and
transhistorical. This is also the history that conviction operates
within and hence cannot articulate, let alone challenge (Brown
2001: 97).
As a first step towards implementing Brown’s call for a historical approach to
avoid the ‘naturalization of values as universal and transhistorical’ (Brown 2001: 97), it
will be useful to note briefly the lexical history of the two terms, the noun ‘intervention’
and the adjective ‘humanitarian’. This will be followed by tracing the term ‘humanitari-
an intervention’ backwards through the literature, with a starting point of as late a claim
to invention as possible; this is for a number of reasons. Firstly one of investigative
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ease: later usages can always refer back to older usages, but, obviously, not vice versa.
Secondly, to avoid confusion, any discussion analysed will have to be using the term
‘humanitarian intervention’, that is, the term must be present in the debate. This is not to
assume that the concept did not appear earlier, however, the discussion will be limited
to discussions where the term is contemporaneously applied. A linguistic analysis will
provide a cut-off date before which the term cannot occur, and the literature will aid in
getting as close to this date as is relevant and possible.
Thirdly, working backwards through the definitions and usage should illustrate
the problems of the term itself. Disinformation, misusage, change, and, indeed, political
moralism itself will all have contrived to, if not warp, then, confuse the history of the
term even more.
2.1 A LEXICAL HISTORY OF THE TERMS
The origins of the word ‘intervention’ are of considerable interest for several rea-
sons. Firstly, according to the Oxford English Dictionary (OED) its earliest practice was
religious and denoted God’s intervention in the affairs of man – this is first recorded in
circa 1425 and carries this meaning for some considerable time. It can be claimed that it
has since lost any vestige of religious connotation; however, its early link to notions of
good and evil is at least worthy of note. The first non-religious based usage appears to
be in 1831 where a reference is made to a Whig policy of ‘non-intervention’, so the first
occasion of its being used is also the first occasion of it being used in its negative form
(OED).
Secondly, a word which appears to be a derivative of intervention appears before
the supposed primary word: ‘interventional’ appears to be in use in 1829 (OED). Either
way, according to the Oxford English Dictionary we are unlikely to meet with a case of
humanitarian intervention called as such prior to 1829 simply on the basis of the word
intervention.
Thirdly, the person who uses this term is someone who introduced several Latin
based words into the English language, but is better known for his philosophising: Jer-
emy Bentham, it seems, was the first to use interventional in his 1829 pamphlet Justice
and Codification in the sentence below:
[u]nder every system, appeal is for cause assigned, namely, on
the part of the judge of the originating judiciary, either misdeci-
sion, or non-decision productive of the same effect as misdeci-
sion: misdecision, either ultimate or interlocutory, or say inter-
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ventional: in any case misconduct (Bentham 1843: 526 [202. –
VII]).
Thus, even at its introduction as a political term in the English language, interven-
tion is not appearing as a neutral term. It is already courting controversy merely by ap-
pearing in a pamphlet by Bentham with the term justice in the title – it seems there is
little about the term which is, if not notorious then at least, somehow, blemish free.
According to the Oxford English Dictionary the term ‘humanitarian’ was first not-
ed in the English language in 1855 contained within the phrase ‘open to criticism upon
broad humanitarian grounds’ (OED). However, this term was not necessarily positive,
with the word often being used contemptuously.
This would place it slightly later than the OED’s notion of when intervention en-
tered the language. But, interestingly, and as above with interventional, the word hu-
manitarianism, which one would assume was a later invention, actually occurred in
1833, twenty-two years earlier.
Put bluntly, the chances of finding an English reference to a ‘humanitarian inter-
vention’, where it is called a ‘humanitarian intervention’ are, simply in terms of lan-
guage, not going to occur before 1833. Indeed, most helpfully, references to a political
usage of the word intervention alone are not going to appear before 1829: not a huge
separation in time from one another.
The linguistic history of the terms is obviously not the full extent of the history of
humanitarian intervention. However, any attempt to apply the terms before they are in
use in the English language risks anachronisms or accusations of, if not propaganda,
then misrepresentation. I do not wish to label actions humanitarian intervention if no
contemporaneous source could have done so; nor do I wish to argue whether specific
actions in the past were humanitarian intervention or not. Thus, the linguistic or etymo-
logical approach provides a convenient point beyond which it is meaningless, for this
dissertation, to use the terms. The following sections will follow definitions and usage
as far back as possible, and, strangely, which is perhaps to be expected with the term,
many references to humanitarian intervention allude to the Peace of Westphalia, an
event approximately 200 years prior to the first possible usage of the term ‘humanitarian
intervention’. Nevertheless, this is the starting point for much of the discussion, humani-
tarian intervention is almost invariably set within the bigger picture, and, it is often ar-
gued that the Westphaian Peace is what set in place the very possibility of humanitarian
intervention.
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2.2 THE PEACE OF WESTPHALIA AND HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
The Thirty Years War was brought to an end by the Peace of Westphalia in 1648.
This is of note as it ‘was the peace treaty that formalised what is called the international
system or nation-state system’ (Dower 1998: 49), which is to say it is better known as a
beginning than an end. Nigel Dower also points out that the:
central principle in the new system was that Europe should be
divided up into discrete geographical areas over which secular
powers should exercise absolute control and authority (Dower
1998: 49).
This story is continued with Robert Jackson and Patricia Owens claiming that the
Peace of Westphalia:
formally recognized the existence of separate sovereignties in
one international society. […] The settlement thus created a new
international covenant based on state sovereignty […]. The
seeds of state sovereignty and non-intervention that those seven-
teenth-century statespeople planted would eventually evolve in-
to the Charter of the United Nations, the Geneva Conventions,
and other contemporary bodies of international law (Jackson &
Owens 2005: 54).
This explains its importance in the history of international relations and interna-
tional law, but as Dower goes on to say, this:
way of understanding the division of control has broadly re-
mained until the present day (though various forces such as
globalisation are now challenging it in the late twentieth centu-
ry) (Dower 1998: 49).
The Peace of Westphalia, therefore, is not simply a historical incident or docu-
ment – it has ramifications for today insofar as it can be argued that it has stayed in
place until if not now, then recently. Authors such as Anthony McGrew agree with
Dower that the Peace of Westphalia ‘established the legal basis of modern statehood
and by implication the fundamental rules or constitution of modern world politics’
which had as its heart ‘agreement amongst Europe’s rulers to recognize each other’s
right to rule their own territory free from outside interference’ (McGrew 2005: 29).
McGrew does not think the Peace of Westphalia has remained completely unchanged,
albeit his possible reformers are relatively recent, namely, the UN and globalisation. For
although:
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the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration on Human Rights
modified aspects of the Westphalian Constitution, in qualifying
aspects of state sovereignty, it remains the founding covenant of
world politics. However many argue that contemporary globali-
zation presents a fundamental challenge to the Westphalian ideal
of sovereign statehood and in so doing is transforming world or-
der (McGrew 2005: 30).
Fukuyama seems to agree that the Westphalian System stayed in place, but be-
lieves it remained in place until the humanitarian interventions of the 1990s eroded it.
Thus, it was the end of the Cold War and the discussions over humanitarian intervention
which has made the Westphalian System no longer relevant (Fukuyama 2004: 130-131).
It this is the case, then this would go a long way to explaining the great upsurge of in-
terest in and the importance of humanitarian intervention.
The argument thus far might seem rather clear-cut: the Peace of Westphalia was
established in 1648, laid down the notion of non-intervention and sovereignty and only
recent developments have challenged this. But Chris Brown suggests otherwise:
far from being a major feature of the Westphalia System as
such, a strong general norm forbidding intervention on humani-
tarian grounds was actually only established in the mid-
twentieth century. In the nineteenth century and earlier such in-
terventions had been commonplace, but always in the context of
a world in which a sharp division was made between the core
Westphalia System with its European members, and the rest of
the world, where humanitarian concerns were certainly present,
but tied up with ethnocentric, racist assumptions about non-
Europeans and the justifications for empire (Brown 2002b: 135).
This view is supported by Fernando R. Tesón who states that there is ‘authority
for the proposition that the doctrine of humanitarian intervention was accepted before
1945’ (Tesón 1988: 157). Hence, we have a problem. On the one hand, there is a view
which says that humanitarian intervention and the Westphalian System were incompati-
ble and only recent challenges to the system have allowed such actions to occur. On the
other hand, an opposing view suggests that this interpretation of the Peace of Westpha-
lia is a modern invention and that there have always been interventions. Little wonder
there is such confusion in knowing what humanitarian intervention is.
Thus, as already intimated, the most recent claims of when humanitarian interven-
tion first surfaced will be looked at and, almost invariably, prior claims highlighted and
examined. One of the most erroneous claims points to humanitarian intervention being
of very recent origin.
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In the July/August 1999 issue of the UNESCO Courier, Olivier Corten, lecturer at
the Centre for International Law and for Sociology applied to International Law, at the
Free University of Brussels, claims that:
the term “right” or “duty” of “intervention” – to which the word
“humanitarian” was soon added – was coined in the late 1980s
by Mario Bettati, Professor of International Public Law at the
University of Paris II, and by the French politician Bernard
Kouchner, one of the founders of the aid organization Médecins
sans frontiers [sic] (Corten 1999).
This assertion seems to have been accepted without question in some circles and
quoted, unchanged, in a number of articles, at least in the English language, indeed, The
Economist quote above mirrors a version of this, although it seems to be more prolific in
the French language (cf. Richemond 2003; Teodosijević 2003; Pellet 2000 [right or duty 
to intervene]; Kioko 2003; Abbott 2005; Liu, Fu-Kuo and Wu, Linjun 2000). The claim
of Corten’s will be examined and followed up, as he is one of the few to attempt an ex-
act date of the term, although there is another level of confusion as this is an English
language translation of a paper quoting French origins. Nonetheless, Bettati, Kouchner,
and Médecins Sans Frontières are well-known enough for Corten’s claim to be feasible
if one has never considered the history of the term.
The work which Corten is referring to in the above paragraph is Le devoir
d’ingérence: peut-on les laisser mourir? (The duty of interference: can we leave them to
die? own translation.), which appeared in 1987, a year before Tesón’s Humanitarian
Intervention: an Inquiry into Law and Morality.
This was certainly no bad time to be discussing the issue, for within a few years
the events of 1989 caused a re-think of the international status quo, and by 1990 the
Economic Organisation of West African States had intervened in Liberia following the
complete breakdown of the government, while an international action which attracted
more attention, at the very least in the UK, was the 1991 military action in Iraq. In fact,
in the ten years following the events of 1989 there was only one year, namely 1998,
where there was no military intervention of any kind claiming status as a humanitarian
intervention (Weiss et al 2001: I.B.4).
From the end of the Second World War until 1989 there were a small number of
international actions which could, perhaps, and not without disagreement, be argued to
be termed humanitarian interventions, namely, in 1971, India’s intervention in East Pa-
kistan/Bangladesh; Vietnam’s intervention in Cambodia in 1978 to topple Pol Pot;
Chapter 2: A Short Political & Intellectual History of the Concept 2.2
22
France’s intervention in Central Africa in 1979, and Tanzania’s intervention in Uganda
in the same year to overthrow Idi Amin (see Tesón and Michael Walzer for some dis-
cussion of these interventions). All these actions were successful, and all would seem to
be rather clear examples of the phenomenon normally referred to as humanitarian inter-
vention, although it is not proven that all protagonists were claiming this label at the
time, yet we have a mere four, fairly clear-cut, examples compared to the 1990s.
It might be expected that more such actions would or could have taken place: it
certainly cannot be argued that there were not enough corrupt or brutal states during the
time of the Cold War to justify similar actions. As just one example, South Africa with a
government which to most other states was, at the very least, highly distasteful, and
which oppressed the majority of its citizens, was not the object of such actions. Further
examples can be found easily and might include Tibet and East Timor. Yet once the
Cold War was over, we see a veritable stampede of, if not humanitarian interventions,
then actions which are at any rate wishing to be regarded as such: Liberia in 1990, Iraq
in 1991, Operation Restore Hope in Somalia in 1992; Operation Turquoise in Rwanda
in 1994; Bosnia and Herzegovina 1994; Albania in 1997; in Kosovo and East Timor in
1999, Sierra Leone in 2000, to name only some of the most well-known before the turn
of the century. It would be quite a feat for this discussion and subsequent international
actions to be down to, according to Corten, an academic paper published in French.
The claims of Corten generate a plethora of questions: was this 1987 paper the
source of the idiom ‘the right to intervene’? Was humanitarian merely added en passant
by others? Where does the term come from – did Kouchner and Bettati simply pluck it
from the air? Was this paper the catalyst which generated the first mention of humani-
tarian intervention, which is what Corten seems to be implying?
The question of where the phrases humanitarian intervention and duty to intervene
originally come from is not merely of historical interest; the notion of humanitarian in-
tervention seems to be so tied up in abstract notions of sovereignty, ideology, and inter-
national public law, that placing the notions within the time which generated them
might allow us to strip away some of the more recent additions to their hyperbole.
If Corten were correct, and he is certainly not, then the talk of humanitarian inter-
vention and the right, or duty, to intervene appeared at the tail end of the Cold War in
the time of glasnost. Earlier than this and we are in the midst of the Cold War, perhaps
even an only just post-war period. Prior to the Cold War and the roots of these actions
could lie in such things as empire or the First World War: such situations could make
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the world of difference and possibly explain something of the idea without the ideology,
or with the ideology at a far enough distance in time to be able to separate it from the
words it uses. Moreover, an event which can only happen after the Berlin Wall came
down, could be fundamentally different to an event which can happen post Second
World War. At what stage in the United Nations are we at when a humanitarian inter-
vention can first take place? The 1990s differ from the 1980s, which bear little resem-
blance to the 1950s, and what about the League of Nations?
Thus, the temporal location of a, or indeed the, first humanitarian intervention
might prevent some lazy generalisations. However, and here is the danger, we risk fall-
ing into the situation of retrospectively naming events as such if we merely look at the
situation itself – the reinterpretation of history is not quite what is to be sought. Hence,
the humanitarian intervention which is to be located must be called such by contempo-
rary sources.
At least we can be sure that post 1989 actions can be argued to be justified or un-
justified, legal or illegal, but at the very least it cannot be claimed that the term humani-
tarian intervention is being applied retrospectively: Tesón, Bettati, Kouchner, and Cor-
ten allow us that.
However, Corten is not implying that the sudden increase in humanitarian inter-
vention is due to Kouchner and Bettati’s giving it a name. The concept and theory of
humanitarian intervention has been of increasing interest since 1989 with the increase in
actual humanitarian interventions taking place. The end of the Cold War resulted in a
rethink of norms, theories, and actions on the international stage, no mere naming of a
phenomenon could have generated this result. Nonetheless, with actions during the
1970s, mentioned above, which could be deemed as falling under the umbrella of hu-
manitarian intervention, it would seem odd if the notion of the right or duty to intervene
should only come into being at the tail end of the Cold War. Are these cases simply
those of new terminology being applied retrospectively?
It might be argued from the quote above that Corten is speaking of the notion of
duty or right to intervene and not of humanitarian intervention at all, and that the hu-
manitarian is added to the phrase to make the right or duty to intervention clearer. It is
painless enough to afford him the benefit of the doubt, and, while it may be supposed
that the discussion of intervention will be logically prior to the discussion of humanitar-
ian intervention, should either be proven to have been discussed before the publication
of the Bettati and Kouchner text, Corten’s argument will falter.
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That said, the use of words such as duty or right in relation to intervene where this
intervention is of a humanitarian nature is already suggesting a moral dilemma, indicat-
ing that a conflict between two sets of practises or beliefs has arisen. The use of the ad-
jective humanitarian in this idiom is a form of positing the plea for a right or duty or re-
quirement to intervene: it is not a value neutral term. However, if one finds an early us-
age of the term humanitarian intervention then one is also apt to meet with arguments
for it being a right or a duty, the ‘humanitarian’ aspect belonging to the justification as
much as any notion of ‘right’ or ‘duty’.
It is quite easy to assume that Corten is correctly fixing the term in history, and
proceed with the discussion, and it is entirely possible that authors who quote his article
might, in fact, be holding two contradictory thoughts at the same time. For any discus-
sion beyond the bare facts on humanitarian intervention involves referring to some of
the classics of the genre, and it should be clear that the discussion does predate Tesón,
Kouchner, and Bettati, regardless of Corten’s claims to the contrary.
If we choose to ignore the logical point, namely, that in speaking of humanitarian
intervention we will, ergo, be positing questions of rights and duties, and remain simply
with his conjecture that 1987 was the year that Bettati and Kouchner coined the phrase
‘right to intervene’, then the mere title of Lloyd N. Cutler’s essay in a 1985 issue of
Foreign Affairs, viz. ‘The Right to Intervene’ does seem to disprove his claim.
In fact it seems odd that this claim can be so often quoted when classics of the
genre including Stanley Hoffmann's ‘The Problem of Intervention’, and Michael Ake-
hurst's ‘Humanitarian Intervention’ appeared in Intervention in World Politics edited by
Hedley Bull, a collection which appeared in 1984. The mainstream philosophy journal
Ethics published an essay ‘On Dilemmas of Intervention’ by Gerard Elfstrom a year
previous to this, so even on rather quick perusal Corten is at least three years out. In-
deed, Elfstrom speaks on the very first page of his article of ‘the duty to take action to
combat these serious abuses’ (Elfstrom 1983: 709). Furthermore, prior even to all of
these is the Walzer classic Just and Unjust Wars, published in 1977, with a sub-chapter
all of its own entitled ‘Humanitarian Intervention’.
While we have proven that Corten is wrong, not by any great academic feat, but
by the mere location of other academic texts, we are still not any nearer recognising a
relevant start date for the term. Twelve years is significant but maybe not damning –
Bettati, Kouchner, and Tesón were perhaps just lucky that events took place when they
did, otherwise they might be suffering the relative obscurity of Cutler and Elfstrom.
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Walzer is the big name, most obviously linked to the notion of just war but just as
applicable to humanitarian intervention, who has written on the subject and did not suf-
fer obscurity, and, indeed, remains an authority on the subject. Again, the date is im-
portant, 1977 – during the 1970s when the four interventions mentioned above, Bangla-
desh, Cambodia, Central Africa, and Uganda took place. The latter three took place fol-
lowing the publication of the book, hence they could not be included, but the text re-
mained applicable. Walzer uses the Bangladesh intervention as his ‘better example of
humanitarian intervention’ (Walzer 1992: 105) when compared to the Cuba intervention
of 1898, which he deems ‘an example of benevolent imperialism, given the “piratical
times”, but it is not an example of humanitarian intervention’ (Walzer, 1991: 104).
This is interesting as it places not simply the theoretical discussion, but also the
possibility of actual actions being deemed such, firmly in the 1970s. Tesón’s discus-
sions of Bangladesh, Uganda, and Central Africa, while perhaps putting them on the
map, are not contemporary discussions of the issues, but Walzer has been using the term
previous to Tesón so the possibility that they were called such at the time certainly ex-
ists, it is of no consequence to this thesis whether they were or not. The importance of
this discussion lies in the fact that this point in time cannot be said to be taking place
towards the end of the Cold War, glasnost did not exist, and none of these international
actions took place under a UN mandate.
Walzer can perhaps be excused for his few examples of humanitarian interven-
tion, as they are contained in a small sub-chapter within the chapter entitled ‘Interven-
tions’ (Walzer, 1991: 86), and of the two he brings forth it is fascinating to see a 19th
century example. In the first part of his general intervention discussion he mentions
John Stuart Mill’s 1859 text A Few Words on Non-Intervention and discusses this in the
context of self-determination (Walzer, 1991: 87). Tesón also mentions Mill, but argues
with him based on Walzer’s interpretation, and remains fixed on the subject on self-
determination (Tesón, 1988: 26ff).
It is strange that Walzer and Tesón concentrate on the notion of self-determination
within the Mill text when Mill’s discussion of intervention itself would be, one would
assume, of interest or use. Mill discusses the issues of a protracted civil war where:
there is no probability of a speedy issue; or, if there is, the victo-
rious side cannot hope to keep down the vanquished but by se-
verities repugnant to humanity, and injurious to the permanent
welfare of the country. In this exceptional case it seems not to be
an admitted doctrine, that the neighbouring nations, or one pow-
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erful neighbour with the acquiescence of the rest, are warranted
in demanding that the contest shall cease, and a reconciliation
take place on equitable terms of compromise. Intervention of
this description has been repeatedly practised during the present
generation, with such general approval, that its legitimacy may
be considered to have passed into a maxim of what is called in-
ternational law (Mill, 1867: 172).
This is not, of course, Mill condoning intervention, he is simply stating the fact
that post-Westphalia, pre-League of Nations, it was legitimate to engage in intervention
to redress situations where there were ‘severities repugnant to humanity’ (Mill, 1867:
172). Again of interest is a statement a few pages on where he expressed his opinion
that:
[i]ntervention to enforce non-intervention is always rightful, al-
ways moral, if not always prudent. Though it be a mistake to
give freedom to a people who do not value the boon, it cannot
be but right to insist, that, if they do value it, they shall not be
hindered from the pursuit of it by foreign coercion (Mill, 1867:
176-177).
This is important on a number of points. It is a nineteenth century discussion of
the issues of intervention, and although humanitarian is missing, intervention is alive
and well. The claim that certain forms of intervention can be called norms of interna-
tional law certainly undermines those arguing for the Westphalian Peace to have been in
force up until recently.
In a paragraph which is somewhat controversial Tesón states:
[t]he survey of state practise in this chapter will be limited to the
post-1945 period. There are two reasons for focusing on the
post-United Nations era. The first is that there is considerable
authority for the proposition that the right of humanitarian inter-
vention was a rule of customary law prior to the adoption of the
United Nations Charter. At the same time, it is commonly
acknowledged that the prohibition of the use of force enshrined
in article 2(4) of the Charter had a dramatic impact upon classic
international law (Tesón, 1988: 155).
There are two points to note here, firstly, that the UN Charter had a dramatic ef-
fect on international law and thus the period from 1945 onwards is of the most interest
to those researching this area. This is unproblematic: in any contemporary discussion of
humanitarian intervention, the UN is likely to appear. Moreover, as the Charter is the
starting point of the UN era and post-1945 we see the beginnings of the Cold War this
explains the significance of this date in many analyses. The second point, however, is of
Chapter 2: A Short Political & Intellectual History of the Concept 2.2
27
far more interest and is worthy of more notice than it seems to have garnered. Namely,
that prior to the UN Charter humanitarian intervention was the norm and the establish-
ment of the UN appears to have prohibited this norm. The entire discussion of the no-
tion of sovereignty, which some authors deem so important for the discussion of hu-
manitarian intervention and non-intervention, which some authors claim has always
been the case in international relations since the Treaty of Westphalia, are not, accord-
ing to this, the problem at all. On the contrary, Tesón is suggesting that the real problem
with modern discussion of humanitarian intervention is the effect of the UN Charter.
Tesón’s arguments are, and Mill’s discussion might well support this, that prior to
the United Nations there was a rule of customary law regarding the right to humanitari-
an intervention. This customary law was not a norm against humanitarian intervention.
Furthermore, the prohibition of the rule of force in the Charter had a dramatic effect on
this norm by reversing it. Finally, prior to 1945 one could not talk of a law of human
rights that had any meaning (Tesón 1988: 155). This is to say that a state can only hang
a humanitarian intervention on human rights post-1945; prior to this one might have al-
lowed for a humanitarian intervention, but post-1945 it appears that a human rights
based intervention may be the only option.
It would be a bitter irony if the United Nations Charter was the grounds for suffer-
ing which might have been prevented by a humanitarian intervention that the Charter
itself has prevented. Yet, this would seem to make sense. If it is the case that the West-
phalian Peace put the international system in place and nothing has yet appeared to an-
nul it, then it must be assumed to be still in place. Hence, the League of Nations and yet
older legislation on international affairs are only of interest to historians: such systems
were in place but have been superseded by newer legislation or organisations. There-
fore, it is international law as it stands which will get the attention: hence the much dis-
cussion on the Charter, and hence the focus on the Cold War that directly followed, the
repercussions of which are still being analysed.
It would seem that the only way forward is to test Tesón’s claims regarding post-
1945, but also those which claim that there was no norm of humanitarian intervention
prior to 1945. Thus, it is necessary to look at the older, outdated legislation and see
where it leads to, what it quotes, and how it changes. Only once this is clear will it be
possible to say how the situation has changed.
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2.3 HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
Walzer and Tesón both mention L. Oppenheim’s International Law, although they
use different editions and quote different parts. A trawl thought the various editions of
International Law: A Treatise Vol. 1 Peace reveal telling differences at telling times. Of
course, international law is open to interpretation, and no one author can be taken to
have more authority than the international law documents themselves, however, Oppen-
heim is an oft quoted resource, and proof not only that certain interpretations are possi-
ble, but also not immutable. If we look at the Oppenheim editions either side of the Se-
cond World War then any changes (and there should be many) incurred by the war, the
founding of the United Nations, and the beginnings of the Cold War should be apparent.
It should be made clear that one commentator’s interpretation of international law does
not mean that that interpretation is indisputable, indeed, at no point will I be arguing
that such a position exists. All that we can draw from these commentators is that their
position was possible at that time.
Limiting ourselves to volume 1 Peace and paragraph 137 we have an interesting
development from the fifth edition published in 1937 to the sixth edition from 1947.
The most noticeable is the change of this paragraphs title from ‘Intervention in the In-
terest of Humanity’ to ‘Humanitarian Intervention’, once again moving this term back
in time and further discrediting Corten’s claim. However, it is the content of this para-
graph from the fifth to the sixth editions which is most fascinating. In 1937, i.e. post-
World War One, during the League of Nations, pre-World War Two, and pre-Cold War
the first sentence of this paragraph states:
[m]any jurists maintain that intervention is likewise admissible,
or even has a basis of right, when exercised in the interest of
humanity for the purpose of stopping religious persecution and
endless cruelties in time of peace and war. That the Powers have
in the past exercised intervention on these grounds, there is no
doubt (Oppenheim 1937: §137).
Moving to 1947, post-League of Nations, post-World War Two, founding of the
UN but, arguably, not quite recognised as Cold War era, the same paragraph, that is,
§137, has changed substantially. The re-worked paragraph is worth quoting extensively:
[t]here is general agreement that, by virtue of its personal and
territorial supremacy, a State can treat its own nationals accord-
ing to discretion. But there is a substantial body of opinion and
of practise in support of the view that there are limits to that dis-
cretion and that when a State renders itself guilty of cruelties
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against and persecution of its nationals, in such a way as to deny
their fundamental human rights and to shock the conscience of
mankind, intervention in the interest of humanity is legally per-
missible. […] The fact that, when resorted to by individual
States, it may be – and has been – abused for selfish purposes
tended to weaken its standing as a rule of International Law.
That objection does not apply to collective intervention. The
Charter of the United Nations, in recognising the promotion of
respect for fundamental human rights and freedoms as one of
the principal objects of the Organisation, marks a further step in
the direction of elevating the principle of humanitarian interven-
tion to a basic rule of organised international society (Oppen-
heim 1947: §137).
Interestingly, this does not back up the assumption made above, that the UN
would be the start of the neo-Westphalian rule of non-intervention: on the contrary, this
paragraph now deals explicitly with humanitarian intervention, mentions human rights
and the Charter, but claims that these elevate the already existing principle of humani-
tarian intervention to international law. Moreover, this is not a blip, which one might
expect with a speedy change to international law legislation which might make it diffi-
cult for legal authors to keep step with, this paragraph remains unchanged in the 1955
eighth edition. This might also change the argument that post-Cold War was excessively
optimistic: the general optimism might be ongoing and the Cold War was simply a
longstanding glitch which suppressed this.
Going further back in time again, William Hall speaks of a ‘right or a duty to in-
tervene’ (Hall 1924: 345) and in a footnote in the page previous to that refers to ‘hu-
manitarian intervention’ and speaks of an author ‘denying the right to intervention’
(Hall 1924: 344n), while Edward Creasy speaks in a footnote of ‘a State’s right to inter-
fere’ (Creasy, 1876: 306n) and of ‘an intervention justifiable on behalf of the interests
of humanity’ (Creasy, 1876: 300).
Thus far, we can see that the term humanitarian intervention stretches back to at
least the beginning of the twentieth century, the discussion of the subject even longer,
certainly into the nineteenth, but so far without that use of humanitarian intervention in
the nineteenth century which would be so useful.
2.4 HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION IN THE 19TH CENTURY
While unable to yet find contemporary accounts of the situation which uses the
term, many of the authors cited class the Anglo-Russian-French alliance and interven-
tion in the Greek War against Turkey in 1827 as intervention, and the conferences of
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Troppau and Laibach in 1820-1821 as splitting the Concert of Europe on the issue of the
‘right to intervene’ (c.f. Blanning, 2000: 260-261). This could also be confused on ac-
count of French involvement where the word intervention was already in use. As Ellery
Stowell points out, the 1827 intervention in support of Greek insurgents:
was mainly upon the ground of humanity. […] Almost every
writer on intervention law or European history discusses this in-
cident (Stowell 1921: 489).
However, Stowell does not mention a contemporary account, and the text to
which he refers the reader was written 70 years after the event. Moreover, I do not wish
to examine individual examples of humanitarian intervention, being more concerned
with the concept itself: for a fuller examination of actual humanitarian interventions in
the nineteenth century, see Gary J. Bass Freedom’s Battle: the Origins of Humanitarian
Intervention.
Nonetheless, in the British Year Book of International Law 1922-23 we find an in-
teresting article that might do the work for us. Entitled The History of Intervention in
International Law P.H. Winfield’s article is well worth reading, and the title alone sug-
gests the problems of intervention are longstanding and unlikely to change anytime
soon. The assumption is confirmed with his first paragraph:
[t]he subject of intervention is one of the vaguest branches of in-
ternational law. We are told that intervention is a right; that it is
a crime; that it is the rule; that it is the exception; that it is never
permissible at all (Winfield 1923: 130).
It seems that change happens slowly in international law. Of interest is his claim
that the very word intervention is of ‘comparatively recent origin’ (Winfield 123: 132)
pointing out that it is not to be found in Grotius or Vattel and without:
tediously entering into detail, it may be said that ‘intervention’
did not become a technical phrase till the dozen or so years
bounded by 1817-1830 (Winfield 1923: 134).
This timeframe fits onto the OED generated linguistic one, supporting its claims.
Interestingly, Winfield looks at other languages and notes it slowly coming into use in
German and French during this period. According to Winfield, the German language
seems to have used the term first, while the French language used a great many terms
(‘s’ingérer’, ‘s’immiscer’, ‘se mêler’) which were not entirely replaced by ‘intervenir’.
Winfield further that claims the usage of intervention becomes common so much earlier
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than in the UK that it is a foreign import from these languages during the timeframe in-
dicated (Winfield 1923: 135).
Stowell also consults widely and, alas for Corten, cites as sources an anonymous
piece published in Paris in 1823 entitled Traité sur le droit d’intervention (Stowell
1921: 466), and should that not be enough, then ‘la théorie de l’intervention
d’humanité’ in the journal Revue générale du droit international public from 1910 by
Anton Rougier ought to finally put Corten’s claims to rest (Stowell 1921: 526). Whether
in French or English, the words, discussion, and problems are older than Bettati,
Kouchner, and Médecins Sans Frontières.
Also perhaps worthy of note is Winfield’s claim that:
[s]tatesmen have naturally lagged far behind publicists, both in
adopting any specific word and in attaching any definite mean-
ing thereto. Castlereagh, Canning and Palmerston, whose politi-
cal experience included a sufficient acquaintance with interven-
tion, almost invariably talk of it as ‘interference.’ The Spanish
‘intervencion’ is translated by ‘interference’ in a despatch of
1822 (Winfield 1923: 135).
This is remarkable simply as an example of political rhetoric – Winfield also men-
tions that ‘meddling’, ‘intermeddling’, and ‘interposition’ are other favoured terms in-
stead of ‘intervention’ (Winfield 1923: 135-136). Surprisingly, considering the option in
the above quote of ‘meddling’, there might have been an argument of using a simpler,
or more Anglo-Saxon choice of word, but to reject this and not use ‘intervention’ in fa-
vour of the not entirely dissimilar ‘interposition’ or ‘interference’ hints at something
else. Even in its, relatively speaking, rather short life in political usage in the English
language, the word ‘intervention’ seems to have politicians resorting to rhetoric.
Turning from Winfield to someone writing in the nineteenth century, one of the
‘Topics of the Day’ in the 3 July 1847 edition of The Spectator is ‘Nonintervention a
Humbug’. This article begins:
of all delusions the supposititious doctrine of nonintervention is
the greatest. We say the suppositious doctrine because practical-
ly it cannot be said to have existed. It has been talked to (Specta-
tor 1847: 637).
It then goes on to list exclusively inter-European interventions before claiming:
[w]hen politicians have so sweepingly condemned intervention,
the idea present to their minds evidently was improper interven-
tion. We have seen that the doctrine of nonintervention has no
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more than a bare verbal existence. In fact, however, it is not only
impossible, but theoretically absurd. Intervention must result be-
tween nations, as between individuals, not only from the tempta-
tions to mutual aggression, but also from the impulses to mutual
aid. The nation which could fulfil the doctrine of noninterven-
tion would not be happy, because it could have neither feeling
nor virtuous solicitude for the welfare of others. […]
Nonintervention is as pure a phantasy [sic] as the ‘ocean stream’
that was supposed to encircle the disc of the earth. Intervention
is often a duty. […] Bad intervention, bigoted propagandism, are
to be eschewed; but we only keep up a delusion which helps to
obscure the truth, if we neglect to put away the fallacy of nonin-
tervention (Spectator 1847: 638).
This is a familiar argument to anyone studying the concept in the 21st century and
yet it occurs in the early half of the nineteenth century, a good twelve years prior to
John Stuart Mill’s A Few Words on Non-Intervention from 1859. Even this far in the
past, the word is linked not only to doctrines, nations, aggression, aid, and virtuousness,
but also to delusions, humbug, absurdity, fallacy, and fantasy.
One of the earliest texts Stowell is able to look at in English, but which I have
been unable to locate, was Intervention and its fruits; a letter addressed to Her Majes-
ty’s secretary of State for Foreign Affairs published under the pseudonym ‘Decimus’ in
1841 (Stowell 1921: 483). We are now approaching nearer to the point where Winfield
felt the word ‘intervention’ entered the English language in its political form, and this
era seems to be confirmed by the Oxford English Dictionary examination at the start of
this section as the beginning of the term in English.
This history or genealogy has proved useful – while we cannot know decisively
when the concept of humanitarian intervention first appeared, we have seen roughly
when it appears. Relative to other political terminology, the first half of the nineteenth
century is a fairly recent addition, but this does not make unpacking the concept any
easier. We may not have to consider any intervention prior to this date, except in an
anachronistic attempt to apply concepts not available at the time, but there is still over
170 years of interpretation to confuse the issue.
During this time it would seem that many of the issues have not been resolved at
all. The very term seems to have entered the language fighting: there are still arguments
as to whether there is a general Westphalian concept of non-intervention; it has been
associated with political rhetoric, its entry into the language perhaps even slowed on this
account; its first usage in the English language was as ‘non-intervention’; ‘humanitari-
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an’ was often used negatively; it is applied retrospectively; it is believed by some to
have been created in the 1980s; it is said it was impossible during the Cold War while
some of the cases which are regarded as clearest cut took place during this time. In
short, there is little that has been said of humanitarian intervention which has not been
contradicted at some other point in time.
I have claimed that the notion of the political is to be central to this examination,
and from the following quote, it can be seen how this can be useful. In discussing ‘es-
sentially contested concepts’ William Connolly talks of what he conceives of as ‘poli-
tics’:
[c]entral to politics, as I understand it, is the ambiguous and
relatively open-ended interaction of persons and groups who
share a range of concepts, but share them imperfectly and in-
completely. Politics involves a form of interaction in which
agents adjust, extend, resolve, accommodate, and transcend ini-
tial differences within a context of partly shared assumptions,
concepts and commitments (Connolly 1993: 6).
Humanitarian intervention as a concept from the discussion above might be
claimed to be imperfect, incomplete, ambiguous, and open-ended. Politics may be able
to deal with humanitarian intervention in a way that others cannot. However, to investi-
gate the concept fully it will be useful at this point to characterise each of the three areas
of approach to humanitarian intervention to be distinguished in the thesis in more depth.
The following three chapters will examine area one: political science, area two: political
philosophy and area three: politics and the literature which appears within them.
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Section I: Political Science
3 Approaches to the Concept in Political Science Literature
This section will be concerned with academic works on humanitarian intervention
– works, that is, which are not directly tied to practical political agendas, unlike the
proclamations and documents which will be considered later. In many area one (politi-
cal science) discussions a definition of humanitarian intervention is posited and its im-
plications often explored with impressive intellectual rigour. However, the vast array of
definitions given in this field ultimately tends to promote intellectual confusion rather
than clarity.
This situation, it will be suggested, results from the fact that the moralistic per-
spective permeates area one despite this area’s sophisticated form, indeed, I argue that
this viewpoint is found in all three fields of enquiry. This does not mean that the defini-
tions found displaying this standpoint are worthless, but only that major assumptions
about the relationship between morality and politics implicit in the concept of humani-
tarian intervention are not made fully explicit. It is only when we turn to area two
(which I have called the Political Philosophy area) that they become a central topic of
concern.
3.1 PROBLEM AREA ONE: POLITICAL SCIENCE
Turning now to the definitions of humanitarian intervention found in area one lit-
erature, it will be instructive to begin by considering those shaped primarily by a juridi-
cal perspective since this has exerted particular influence on the debate in this area and
as seen in the previous chapter, international law has closely tracked the changes, be-
liefs, and problems in humanitarian intervention. A good example is provided by the
work of Ian Brownlie, a leading jurist in international law, who has provided two differ-
ent definitions: one from 1974 and the other from 2003. Brownlie’s 1974 definition
reads as follows:
[u]nless the context clearly requires a different interpretation,
‘humanitarian intervention’ in my usage is the threat or use of
armed force by a state, a belligerent community, or an interna-
tional organisation, with the object of protecting human rights
(Brownlie 1974: 217).
Brownlie’s more recent definition, by contrast, characterises humanitarian inter-
vention as ‘[t]he use of force to prevent or curtail humanitarian catastrophes’ (Brownlie
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2003: 710). An interesting point to note before an analysis of the two meanings is made,
is the disclaimer Brownlie attaches to the 1974 definition, which allows for a complete
re-working of the given meaning if circumstances require. This makes a great deal of
sense when thinking of humanitarian intervention in terms of international public law,
grounded as it is on normative state behaviour, while the states themselves are also the
subjects of international public law. As a norm changes, so too does the description of
it, and the interpretation of it. This means, however, that by its very nature international
public law is at a disadvantage in attempting to create a watertight definition, since it is
continually playing catch up with changing state behaviour.
Looking at the content of Brownlie’s two definitions, there is only one word
which remains unchanged, and that is ‘force’. Interestingly, this changes from being ra-
ther specific in the first definition where it refers to both the threat and the use of armed
force, to merely force in the second, with no reference to the threat of force. Although
Brownlie limits the use of armed force to states in the first definition, no mention at all
is made of the agent entitled to use force in the second. Moreover, the more basic ques-
tion of where this action is to be carried out is not mentioned in either definition, alt-
hough the value-laden question of why the action is undertaken is considered in the
1974 definition: its aim is to protect human rights. This aim, which could be expressed
in terms of international law, charters, and resolutions alone, is transformed in the 2003
version into the non-juridical aim of ‘prevent[ing] or curtailing of humanitarian catas-
trophes’ (Brownlie 2003: 710).
The reason for this major change in definition can be stated in the form of a para-
dox: although the broadened, less juridical concept of humanitarian intervention in the
second definition seems to create more scope for interventionist action, in practice it
makes clear-cut policy commitments much easier to avoid since they no longer have
legal clarity. Two further conflicting difficulties created by the less juridical concept of
humanitarian intervention used in the second definition should be noticed. On the one
hand, it inevitably introduces greater intellectual ambiguity; on the other, the use of the
word ‘prevent’ seems to allow for pre-emptive action, especially when used in conjunc-
tion with the rather bombastic ‘catastrophe’. At the very least pre-emptive force could
not be ruled out by the 2003 definition.
Another notable jurist, Antonio Cassese, has approached humanitarian interven-
tion with a less sympathetic point of view than Brownlie’s fairly neutral viewpoint.
Cassese is more careful, does not provide a definition of the term humanitarian interven-
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tion, and appears minded to avoid using the expression. In the quote below, Cassese on-
ly uses the term ‘humanitarian intervention’ once, in italics, and prefers to use the
phrase ‘humanitarian crises’. ‘Humanitarian crises’ seem to be a direct translation of
‘humanitarian intervention’, and do not seem to be merely natural disasters as Cassese
refers to them previously as being under domestic jurisdiction. This quote below is not
only as near as Cassese approaches to a definition, but indicates why exactly he is so
mistrustful of the idiom. Referring to the United Nations Security Council (SC),
Cassese states that:
[t]he SC has also authorized States to use force when faced with
a threat to the peace. This has in particular occurred with hu-
manitarian intervention. Indeed, the SC has gradually estab-
lished a direct link between humanitarian crises and threats to
the peace, one of the three possible conditions that could trigger
SC action under Chapter VII. The SC has thus considerably en-
larged the concept of threat to the peace laid down in Article 39
of the UN Charter, so as to include humanitarian crises within
one State, which once were deemed to fall primarily within do-
mestic jurisdiction. […]
However, this practice of elevating humanitarian crises to
threats to the peace is not without its dangers. The SC is eager to
retain discretionary power in this matter and tends to avoid ex-
plaining the nature of the link and the reasons for its action. As a
result its practice lacks consistency and turns out to be selective
(Cassese 2005: 347).
In a slightly older article in response to Bruno Simma (1999), in arguing against
there being a right to unilateral humanitarian intervention Cassese does admit of there
being an emerging doctrine which might allow for humanitarian action in very specific
circumstances (Cassese 1999). However, in both cases the issue is, rather unsurprising-
ly, one of law. This statement is neither vacuous nor tautologous, rather it leads us to-
wards a better understanding of the entire discussion of humanitarian intervention, best
illustrated by the last sentence in Cassese’s 2005 quote. Cassese complains that the
problems with the ‘practice of elevating humanitarian crises to threats to the peace’ are
that the Security Council is ‘eager to retain discretionary power’ and ‘tends to avoid ex-
plaining the nature of the link and the reasons for its action’ leading to a practice which
‘lacks consistency’ and is ‘selective’ (Cassese 2005: 347). While these accusations
might be pertinent for a law, they are inappropriate for a political situation. A responsi-
ble politician will not wish to relinquish their grasp on any discretionary power and be-
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ing able to be selective where armed intervention is concerned. However, as Cassese is
at pains to point out: it does not make good law.
It is not the object of this dissertation to go into the limitations of the juridical ap-
proach to humanitarian intervention in great depth. What is relevant is that problems of
consistency in the characterisation of humanitarian intervention cannot be avoided by
restricting the analysis to this approach. In particular, insofar as the issues at stake are
frequently large and controversial ones, the juridical method risks oversimplifying and
depoliticising the issue.
I want to turn now from juridical approaches towards humanitarian intervention to
stipulative definitions of a non-juridical kind, to which the main objection is their arbi-
trary nature. By non-juridical in this context, I mean those definitions outwith interna-
tional law textbooks. This type of definition is perhaps best illustrated by Tesón’s intro-
duction to Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality. Tesón writes
that:
I define humanitarian intervention as the proportionate trans-
boundary help, including forcible help, provided by govern-
ments to individuals in another state who are being denied basic
human rights and who themselves would be rationally willing to
revolt against their oppressive government (Tesón 1988: 5).
This definition, which is at variance in a number of significant aspects with other
definitions that will be examined later, is posited without any explanation of whence it
might have sprung. There is no critical examination of other definitions, no explanation
of why this particular definition has been chosen, nor even an acknowledgement that
other definitions might exist, yet this dogmatic definition is the starting point upon
which the entire discussion that follows it is based. All the arguments delivered after
this point are therefore dependent upon the initial uncritical acceptance of a definition
adopted with no reference to academia, law or even to dictionary definitions. As was
just said, what is offered is simply a dogmatic statement from an individual author who
seems unconcerned with the intrinsically contentious nature of the concept he purports
to clarify.
An especially noteworthy feature of Tesón’s definition is that it posits boundaries
which are to be crossed, and although force is not ruled out, it need not belong to the
action; the state is mentioned, but the help provided by intervention bypasses the state in
order to promote directly the basic human rights of individuals. Interestingly, Tesón
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does not say that the oppressed people must be willing to revolt before humanitarian
intervention is legitimate; he only says that they must be rationally willing to revolt – a
clear example of the gulf between good intentions and actual situations in politics.
In another thoughtful academic work dealing with humanitarian intervention, Sav-
ing Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society, Nicholas Wheeler
consigns his definition of the term to a footnote, despite the prominence given to hu-
manitarian intervention in the subtitle of his book. Unlike Tesón, Wheeler does not even
think the problem of definition is sufficiently important to deserve an entry in the index.
His definition is interesting enough to be quoted in full:
[a]lthough humanitarian intervention can be defined to encom-
pass non-military forms of intervention such as the activities of
humanitarian non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such as
Médicins sans Frontières (MSF) and Oxfam, this book focuses
on the legitimacy of using force to end appalling abuses of hu-
man rights. I agree with Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Wood-
house that the traditional state-centric approach to humanitarian
intervention is too limited because it provides no framework for
accommodating the non-military humanitarian activities of
states and humanitarian NGOs, but my point of departure is that
force is sometimes the right means to avert or stop a greater evil
(Wheeler 2002: 2).
What is particularly interesting is that Wheeler points to another definition of hu-
manitarian intervention which he acknowledges as valid, although it would not involve
the military intervention invoked in his notion of force. The idea that humanitarian in-
tervention can be either military or non-military and yet remain the same action is prob-
lematic, yet the possibility of several different equally legitimate kinds of humanitarian
intervention existing is merely set to one side.
There are, however, still further difficulties created by Wheeler’s treatment of
humanitarian intervention. For example, he sympathises with Ramsbotham and Wood-
house’s critique on the ground that the state-centric approach fails to account for non-
military action, yet he does not make clear why he must then remain with this account.
If a state-centric approach cannot account for non-military state humanitarian activities
then it may be argued that Wheeler has not fully dealt with humanitarian intervention as
a concept. Wheeler might argue that force is sometimes the right means to avert or stop
a greater evil, but he has not proved that force thereby necessarily belongs to humanitar-
ian intervention.
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Another difficulty posed by Wheeler’s approach to humanitarian intervention is
that although he wishes to restrict his attention to instances that involve armed force, he
also rejects the state-centric model as too narrow. He fails to explain, however, what
bodies other than the state would be entitled to use armed force. If only states are able to
use military power for the reasons he proposes (i.e. to end appalling abuses of human
rights) then the state-centric approach he rejects is, in fact, perfectly compatible with the
conception of humanitarian intervention he is advocating.
Furthermore, Wheeler’s definition of humanitarian intervention, unlike Tesón’s,
allows for humanitarian intervention by non-governmental organisations: Tesón, by
contrast, only allows governments to deal with individuals and argues that borders may
be crossed in the process. Whereas Wheeler’s definition permits force to be applied
when there are appalling abuses of human rights, Tesón’s definition does not require
force (although the use of force is covered) and only permits humanitarian intervention
when a denial of basic human rights has occurred. Human rights can be basic, or allow
rather more extensive rights to be in place – this stipulation does not clear up any uncer-
tainties. With only two definitions, the species of problem is already apparent.
Wheeler’s formulation ‘force is sometimes right to avert or stop a greater evil’ (Wheeler
2002: 2) displays a similar political moralism to Tesón’s insofar as his reasoning is
based not only on human rights, but also, more importantly, on the judgment made by
the intervener concerning the need for intervention. It is the intervener, more precisely,
who must decide whether the people ‘would be rationally willing to revolt’ (Tesón
1988: 5), as well as what constitutes the ‘greater evil’ (Wheeler 2002: 2). The trouble
with Wheeler’s somewhat sketchy and confused account of humanitarian intervention,
in short, is that it creates more problems than it solves. Although his definition differs
from Tesón’s they have in common a tendency to evade the difficulties it presents by
falling back on a moralistic framework of thought underpinned by a relatively uncritical
concept of human rights.
The next definition to be considered is provided by Walzer in his study of Just
and Unjust Wars. There, Walzer writes that:
[h]umanitarian intervention involves military action on behalf of
oppressed people, and it requires that the intervening state enter,
to some degree, into the purposes of those people. It need not set
itself to achieve those purposes, but it cannot stand in the way of
their achievement (Walzer 1992: 104).
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This is quite specifically military action; worthy of note when compared with
Brownlie’s 2003 characterisation referring merely to force: for while military action
implies force: force does not necessarily imply military action. Wheeler hinted at the
type of force being military, Tesón does not specify, and Brownlie does, and does not
depending on definition used.
Again more specifically than Brownlie or Tesón, Walzer denotes the state as the
actor in a humanitarian intervention and, unlike Wheeler, has no apparent wish to go
beyond the state. However, as in Brownlie’s case, it is not made clear where the inter-
vention is to take place: in another state? Is it internally? Against a Brownlien belliger-
ent community? What is clear, however, is that humanitarian intervention assumes that
we are in the presence of oppressed people and acting on their behalf – so much so, in-
deed, that Walzer issues a warning that the intervening state must not be allowed to pre-
vent the oppressed people from wanting to stop its oppression. The implication of this
qualification is made clearer by Walzer’s insistence that ‘[o]ne cannot intervene on their
behalf and against their ends’ (Walzer 1992: 104). This does not make clear, however,
whether the oppressed people need to ask for help, or whether they must explicitly set
out their purposes, or whether the interveners must adopt those purposes if they have
been set out. Once again, the ambiguities inherent in a politics of good intentions are
apparent.
A definition which differs significantly from those above must now be considered.
This is given by Karen Mingst and Margaret Karns, who define humanitarian interven-
tion as:
UN or individual states’ actions to alleviate human suffering
during violent conflicts without necessarily obtaining the con-
sent of the host country (Mingst & Karns 2000: 255).
It may be noted, first of all, that the possibility of an individual state intervening is
not specified: only the UN and a grouping of states is mentioned as possible interveners.
Secondly, the ‘when’ is made very explicit and very narrow: only during violent con-
flicts. Thirdly, the ‘where’ is also addressed in the somewhat bizarre notion of the host
country, although whether they are hosting a war or hosting a non-consensual interven-
tion is not made entirely clear. Fourthly, for the first time the concept of consent is in-
voked, despite it being so fundamental within any conception of force. This link to force
is neglected by Mingst and Karns themselves and is not raised; in fact, humanitarian
interventions are mere actions with no hint of force at all. The alleviation of human suf-
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fering is the rather vague political moralism point here. All the pitfalls of the subjective
definition of humanitarian intervention are present here.
Allen Buchanan’s definition of 2004 mentions some of the points above, but,
again, further features are added. Buchanan defines humanitarian intervention as:
the use of force across state borders by a state (or group of
states) aimed at ending widespread and grave violations of the
human rights of persons other than its own citizens, without the
permission of the government of the state within whose territory
force is applied (Buchanan 2004: 442).
We have the notion of force invoked (although there is no mention of military)
and its necessary parallel, consent. The ‘who’ is state-centric, with a state or grouping
thereof able to intervene, and the ‘where’ is another state. The ‘why’ is once again the
defence of human rights, although the disclaimer of the violation of these rights being
grave and widespread is added. The proviso that an action which classes as a humanitar-
ian intervention cannot include a state’s own citizens as the target population is given
and a territorial aspect is brought forward: to be a humanitarian intervention a state (or
group of states) must be within the territory of the state being intervened upon, ergo,
borders must be crossed. So far only Tesón and Buchanan mention this explicitly.
A type of definition not yet considered involves an attempt to escape from the ar-
bitrariness of stipulative definition by trying to create consensus about the definition
amongst several authors. Although the definition remains stipulative, this mode of ap-
proach at least ensures that the discussion is about the same subject. A review of authors
adopting this approach – some of those mentioned above also attempt this – indicates,
however, that agreement about the meaning of humanitarian intervention brings them no
closer to agreement on the issues it poses. Consider, for example, Mathias Koenig-
Archibugi (2002: 49), David Rodin (2002: 130) and Simon Chesterman (2002: 1), who
try to create a common definition by linking their own to one given by Adam Roberts.
According to Roberts, humanitarian intervention consists of:
military intervention in a [s]tate, without the approval of the au-
thorities, and with the purpose of preventing widespread suffer-
ing or death among the inhabitants (Roberts 1999).
Other authors, such as, once again, Chesterman (2002: 1) and Buchanan (1999:
71), adopt Tesón’s definition (already given above), according to which humanitarian
intervention consists of:
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the proportionate transboundary help, including forcible help,
provided by governments to individuals in another state who are
being denied basic human rights and who themselves would be
rationally willing to revolt against their oppressive government
(Tesón 1988: 5).
Still others, including Buchanan (1999: 71), and Nick Lewer and Oliver Ramsbo-
tham (1993: 26), adopt Jack Donnelly’s definition, according to which humanitarian
intervention is:
intervention (in the narrow sense of coercive interference in the
internal affairs of another state) in order to remedy mass and
flagrant violations of the basic human rights of foreign nationals
by their government (Donnelly 1984: 313).
Lewer and Ramsbotham do not limit themselves to Donnelly, however, and use
the Brownlie (1974: 217) definition analysed above.
Finally, a large group of authors have linked their definitions to that of R. J. Vin-
cent’s definition in his 1974 volume Nonintervention and International Order. What is
particularly striking in this particular example is that Vincent does not actually discuss
humanitarian intervention, but only intervention. In spite of this fact, his definition is
widespread and in it he declares it to be:
that activity undertaken by a state, a group within a state, a
group of states or an international organization which interferes
coercively in the domestic affairs of another state. It is a discrete
event having a beginning and an end, and it is aimed at the au-
thority structure of the target state. It is not necessarily lawful or
unlawful, but it does break a conventional pattern of internation-
al relations (Vincent 1974: 13)
Vincent also insists that intervention, in his sense of this term, is a discrete event
with a beginning and an end – that is to say, it is not something which becomes a state
of affairs. Furthermore, although Vincent avows that a state is the proper target, the per-
petrating agent need not be one but may instead be ‘a group within a state, a group of
states or an international organization’ (Vincent 1974: 13). Authors attracted or influ-
enced by Vincent’s definition include John Baylis & Steve Smith (2001: 557), Lewer &
Ramsbotham (1993: 26), Adam Roberts (1993: 431), Charles R. Beitz (1979: 72),
Wheeler (2000: 27), and others.
What then is to be made of this consensualist approach, as it may be termed, to
stipulative definition? Unfortunately, although almost all the definitions overlap in sig-
nificant respects, major issues divide the authors. While Roberts characterises humani-
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tarian intervention in military terms, for example, Donnelly and Tesón do not make mil-
itary action part of the definition although they accept that it may, on occasion, be nec-
essary. In addition, Tesón inserts the ius in bello concept of proportionality into the def-
inition, whereas Donnelly does not. Roberts, in turn, requires that humanitarian inter-
vention should prevent widespread suffering or death, which allows for pre-emptive ac-
tion, as does Brownlie, whereas Donnelly rules out pre-emptive intervention. Although
almost all agree that the entity being intervened upon is a state, there is no agreement
about whether this means that the government of the state is the object. Donnelly and
Tesón, for example, make clear that it is the government of the state which is the object
of the intervention, whereas Vincent insists that the intervention must be aimed at the
authority structure in general, and while Roberts does not have the approval of the au-
thorities it is ambiguous as to whether or not they are the targets. Finally, as in the lit-
erature of humanitarian intervention at large, the references to human rights conceal
disagreement about what they are and what they require. Tesón, as just one example,
wishes to help people whose basic human rights are being denied, but leaves it unclear
whether humanitarian intervention should be confined to remedial action to protect
rights within the existing political framework, or should aim to protect those rights by
changing the framework itself.
The weakness of the consensualist approach to the problem of definition, then, is
that it fails to overcome the ultimate arbitrariness of all stipulative definitions. In addi-
tion, what is a necessary inclusion in the definition for one author is only a possible in-
clusion for another.
There are, of course, many more definitions of humanitarian intervention to be
found in the literature of political science, but unfortunately many of them serve only to
muddy the waters still further. Examples include Thomas G. Weiss’ clearly military in-
tervention:
coercive measures by outside military forces to ensure access to
civilians or the protection of rights without the consent of local
political authorities (Weiss 1999: 3);
Don Hubert and Michael Bonser’s emphasis on wilfully committed atrocities:
[h]umanitarian military intervention can be defined as the use of
nonconsensual military means to fulfil humanitarian objectives,
including the provision of physical protection and/or bringing
and end to wilfully committed atrocities within the borders of a
sovereign state (Hubert and Bonser 2001: 111);
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and Wheeler and Alex J. Bellamy’s intervention which hints at outside considera-
tions with its emphasis on ‘primary’:
[f]orcible humanitarian intervention: military intervention which
breaches the principle of state sovereignty where the primary
purpose is to alleviate the human suffering of some or all within
a state’s borders (Wheeler and Bellamy 2005: 773).
In looking at more thoughtful analysis of the term in area one, attention will there-
fore be confined to the work of two scholars who seem at first sight to raise the study of
humanitarian intervention to a more coherent intellectual level. The first scholar whose
work deserves special attention is Gordon Graham. While Graham takes pains to ex-
plain that intervention takes many forms and draws attention to the fact that the discus-
sion is often based on the tacit assumption that when one speaks of intervention what is
meant is armed invasion (1997: 106), a mere page later he states that:
[t]he definition of intervention rests upon purpose, not upon
method. An act, whether relatively mild, like representation, or
of great seriousness, like armed invasion, counts as intervention
if its purpose is the defence or well-being of the subjects of a
country other than that which does the intervening (1997: 107).
Although Graham’s distinction between purpose and method is useful, he seems
insensitive to the difficulties presented by the terms ‘intervention’ and ‘humanitarian
intervention’ in the above quote, since all his examples count as intervention when that
term is defined in the broad sense of involvement in the internal affairs of another state.
According to his own argument, the purpose of those examples renders them humanitar-
ian intervention, in which case he ought to have written that the definition of humanitar-
ian intervention rests upon purpose, and that an act counts as humanitarian intervention
if its purpose is the defence or well-being of the subjects of a country.
The problem at the core of Graham’s approach, then, is the imprecision of the
term ‘intervention’ in his usage of it. In particular, the term ‘intervention’ cannot be re-
stricted to actions where the motives are humanitarian. To do that entails the absurd
conclusion that war and empire-building are not acts of intervention.
The second scholar is Chris Brown, whose use of the word ‘intervention’ not only
links the previous definitions together but also addresses a few of the questions they
have not managed to answer. Humanitarian intervention, Brown writes, consists of:
the intervention (perhaps forcible) of one state or group of
states, in the internal affairs of another, conducted mainly or
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substantially, in the interests of the inhabitants of the latter
(Brown 2001b: 246).
Here the notion of force is used again, but this is not a necessary part of the inter-
vention. Above all, the problem remains, that in using the term ‘intervention’ to explain
humanitarian intervention, it is not clear, for example, whether intervention already im-
plies force, if only in the sense of the imposition of will. Nonetheless, Brown gives a
clear answer to the ‘who’ of the intervention, which is a state or group of states, and al-
so to the ‘where’ of the intervention, which is in the internal affairs of another state.
Whereas vague references have been made by other authors to the protection of human
rights, the prevention of humanitarian catastrophes, and the liberation of oppressed peo-
ple, this vagueness is now at least replaced by reference to a more specific object than
other attempts at definition have provided: it consists of the inhabitants of the state
which is being intervened upon. Despite the fact that the object is more exact, however,
Brown leaves the ‘why’ surprisingly vague. He describes it as being mainly the interests
of the citizens. While Walzer rules out an action which would oppose the ends of the
people involved, it is not clear whether Brown would do so, and his ambivalence on this
crucial issue could make for uncomfortable politics since one might well claim to have
the best interests of the citizens at heart, even as one opposed their actual ends. There is
an obvious echo here of Rousseau’s well-known difficulty of differentiating between
the actual and real will of the people.
Brown’s definition is of interest on account of the fact that in the later edition of
the same book Understanding International Relations Brown changes his definition
again. Unlike Brownlie’s 24 year difference, there is only four years between the two
definitions. The edition in question is written in conjunction with Kirsten Ainley, who is
responsible for writing this chapter, and. while substantially new, the chapter in ques-
tion does contain material contained in the first two editions of the book (Brown & Ain-
ley 2005: viii). The 2005 definition defines humanitarian intervention as the
forcible invasion of sovereign territory by one or more states,
with or without the backing of international bodies, motivated
supposedly by the intension [sic] to alleviate suffering within
that state (Brown & Ainley 2005: 222).
This is prefaced by the remark that the norm of non-intervention was ‘radically
unsettled’ by the ‘birth of humanitarian intervention’ in the 1990s, and states that hu-
manitarian intervention ‘appears to be entirely in contradiction to the principles of the
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sovereign state system’ (Brown & Ainley 2005: 222). While this is the more recent def-
inition, from the updated edition of the book it is not the better for it. Theoretical prem-
ises generated outside area one are intended to be applied back into area one. Hence, the
usage of the somewhat partial term of invasion instead of intervention alongside the
now no longer ‘perhaps’ forcible (Brown 2001b: 246), although this could be consid-
ered redundant as an invasion contains connotations of force. The implication of the no-
tion of sovereignty will be considered in Section II: Political Philosophy, while the sup-
posed motivation indicates what Anatol Lieven and John Hulsman deem ‘pseudo-
realism’ (Lieven & Hulsman 2006: xiv), a term which will be explored in more depth in
the next chapter. The claims regarding the birth of humanitarian intervention as being in
the 1990s have been discredited in the previous chapter.
What then emerges from the review of the definitions of humanitarian interven-
tion in area one? Two main conclusions emerge. In the first place, it is evident that all
the definitions involve essentialist and stipulative approaches that are open to the charge
of ultimate arbitrariness, despite their usefulness in specific instances. Secondly, the tac-
it assumption behind political moralism is retained – the assumption, that is, that a mor-
ally objective and incontestable legitimating standpoint is attainable at the expense of a
political standpoint. The resulting situation is aptly summarised in a book review by
Gábor Sulyok:
[a]ny analysis of humanitarian intervention inevitably raises dif-
ficult definitional issues. In the absence of a generally accepted
definition of the term, a given approach – within reasonable lim-
its – is probably just as suitable as any other one (Sulyok 2004:
1059).
3.2 SOCIAL SCIENCES, HUMANITIES AND CHAIRS
The debate on the relationship between the moral and the political has several fac-
ets, which will be looked at later, but in area one the subtitle to ‘political science’ can
perhaps be referred to as ‘the academic orthodoxy’, which has shaped academic opin-
ion, amongst thinkers in the UK at least.
The problems associated with distinguishing, or not, the moral from the political
have been rooted in the study of politics since its inception as a distinct academic sub-
ject at British universities. The first chair in politics in the UK was only created in 1912
and the first professors of politics came from an array of different academic back-
grounds, and many saw their first task as delineating politics from other academic sub-
Chapter 3: Approaches to the Concept in Political Science Literature 3.2
47
jects. Hence, many used their inaugural speeches to specify exactly what the study of
politics involved and how this was different from, most notably moral philosophy, but
also economics, history, and law. The issues here have still not been resolved in the
study of politics, as can be seen from its classification as, depending on the institution in
question, belonging to the humanities or the social sciences, and the examination of the-
se public attempts to deal with the problems trace the issues from its beginnings to the
present day.
There was a time when anyone who gave a lecture on politics
and ethics would be expected to begin by saying what he meant
by ‘politics’ and ‘ethics’ (Cranston 1971: 279).
So said Professor Maurice Cranston in his inaugural speech entitled Politics and
Ethics at the LSE in 1971. He then immediately declares his intention to disappoint this
expectation: before going on to provide definitions of both. His definition of ethics is
that it is simply the theory of morals (Cranston 1971: 279), but his definition of politics
is expressed as frustration with others’ definitions of politics:
we may get worried if we look up the definitions provided in
books by academic theorists: in such places we read, for exam-
ple, that ‘politics is the authoritative allocation of values in a
community’ (David Easton), ‘politics is the struggle for power’
(Max Weber), ‘politics is a systematic effort to move other men
in the pursuit of some design’ (Bertrand de Jouvenel), or ‘poli-
tics is who gets what, when, how’ (Harold Lasswell). None of
these sounds right (Cranston 1971: 279).
Nonetheless, while sympathising with Cranston’s dissatisfaction, I maintain that
some clarification is necessary, although I regard the search for an authoritative defini-
tion as futile. Some definitions of politics and the political have already been looked at
in passing, in response to dissatisfaction with all attempts to define or clarify the con-
cept of humanitarian intervention. These definitions of humanitarian intervention all
appear to overlook the fact that regardless of how who is doing what where, when, and
why, the action has political aspects.
Similarly, the terms morality and ethics cause some confusion, not merely on ac-
count of disagreement on their content, but also on account of the fact that, strictly
speaking, the terminology is part of the language of philosophy which those outside of
the academic departments of philosophy may, or may not, adhere to. Within the realms
of academic philosophy, ethics is a branch of the subject called moral philosophy: one
of the main branches of philosophy. Ethics has morality, moral judgments, and moral
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problems as its subject, and in this sense terms such as morality, the moral etc are a sub-
set of ethics; however, very often they are used interchangeably with one another or as
synonyms for good or right, or to indicate that something concerns morality (c.f.
Frankena 1973: 4ff). To facilitate this investigation of the already complex subject of
what the political is, the terms ‘ethics’, ‘the ethical’, ‘the moral’, and ‘morality’ will be
used interchangeably and any author’s preference of one over the other will not be in-
vestigated.
Perhaps the question which is most pertinent is why then should ethics enter into
the discussion at all? It may seem odd that issues such as morality or ethics are suddenly
brought to bear on what we have declared a political action: why morality and why not,
for example, legality, culture, or the environment? If it is not a necessary part of the
clarification of humanitarian intervention is the discussion of any unnecessary aspect
not simply arbitrariness combined with a disregard for Ockham’s razor?
Casting an eye over some of the literature which discusses humanitarian interven-
tion indicates that it is at least a question with a good pedigree. Two of the most contro-
versial and oft discussed aspects of humanitarian intervention are whether or not it is
legal, and whether or not it is right (as mentioned above, the political is generally ig-
nored) and indeed Tesón’s classic text is subtitled An Inquiry Into Law And Morality.
Questioning the rightness or goodness of an action is verification that one is deep in the
field of ethics: good points to ethics like a compass to magnetic North.
Thus, while I have not argued that a moral aspect must necessarily be contained
within a notion of humanitarian intervention there are others who would disagree. The
following moral judgments contained within the selection of the definitions already in-
vestigated above, are quite clearly placing questions of the right or good at the heart of
the concept of humanitarian intervention:
force is sometimes the right means to avert or stop a greater evil
(Wheeler 2002: 2);
to alleviate the human suffering of some or all within a state’s
borders (Wheeler and Bellamy 2005: 773);
to alleviate human suffering during violent conflicts (Mingst &
Karns 2000: 255);
ending widespread and grave violations of the human rights of
persons other than its own citizens (Buchanan 2004: 442);
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to fulfil humanitarian objectives, including the provision of
physical protection and/or bringing an end to wilfully committed
atrocities (Hubert and Bonser 2001: 111);
preventing widespread suffering or death among the inhabitants
(Roberts 1999);
to remedy mass and flagrant violations of the basic human rights
of foreign nationals by their government (Donnelly 1984: 313).
These examples possess explicit, moral goals. It might be argued that any moral
aspirations contained within any given definition leave it open to assaults from those
who do not agree with that particular moral judgment. It might further be argued that
adherence to a particular school of thought advocating scepticism towards any idea of
there being some form of morality between states, or entities functioning as such, will
automatically reject any definition which contains a moral goal.
Both these arguments contain truth, but as they stand they do not go deep enough
into the underlying problem at work, namely, the interconnections between politics and
the moral before this stage of ideology building has occurred. This issue is often inves-
tigated but frequently only once these ideological principles are already in place, and
seems to be regularly forgotten once specific subjects are investigated. A possible rea-
son for this seeming inability to progress beyond ideologies or schools of thought could
be contained in the history of the study of politics itself: that issues present within the
subject itself might be preventing it from examining certain aspects fully or at all.
Ernest Barker’s 1928 inaugural lecture The Study of Political Science set out his
definition of, and approach to, politics. Trained in the classics, Barker was made a pro-
fessor of political science, a title he was uncomfortable with:
I am not altogether happy about the term ‘science’. It has been
vindicated so largely, and almost exclusively, for the exact and
experimental study of natural phenomena, that its application to
politics may convey suggestions, and excite anticipations, which
cannot be justified (Barker 1928: 18).
Indeed, his chair, the first in politics at Cambridge, was based in the faculty of his-
tory, and a committee consisting of political philosophers and historians had been the
appointment committee (Kavanagh 2003: 597-598). However, his conception of the
study of politics went beyond mere semantics as he went on to say:
I come with a genuine feeling of modest stillness and humility,
to the great subject of which I conceive the subject of this chair
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to be a province, a border-province, if you will, but nonetheless
a province. That subject is philosophy, and especially moral phi-
losophy. […] Economics and politics thus run up together into
philosophy; and moral philosophy (or moral science) is the basis
or apex, common to both (Barker 1928: 30).
This is a rather interesting statement, as I suspect many modern authors within the
field of politics or international relations might be horrified to think of their subject as
being not simply deemed something as airy-fairy as philosophy, but moral philosophy: a
subject concerned with ethics and moral judgments.
If one were to accept this view, it would be as if morality were being pre-
programmed into the subject. Were this to be the case, it could be argued that any at-
tempt at a value neutral or at least non-moral account of humanitarian intervention
would be from well within the ivory tower: the ethical would be built in. Were this to be
the basis of the study of politics, humanitarian intervention might, by necessity of it be-
ing part of the study of politics, have a moral element almost by definition. However,
Barker’s rejection of science on account of it conveying suggestions and exciting ‘antic-
ipations, which cannot be justified’ (Barker 1928: 18) is also of interest. In rejecting the
tag of science Barker is explicitly rejecting the God’s eye view of politics, that there can
be a final, incontestable, privileged position of objectivity which allows the correct an-
swer to be found.
The dismissal of science applied to politics on account of the unjustified anticipa-
tions of which Barker spoke, could also be taken as the denial of ideology and schools
of international relations, as science has laws which, if applied correctly, allow future
events to be predicted and explained. In claiming that international relations follow a
specific school or theory one might be guilty of a category error and mistaking ones be-
lief for a state of affairs in the real world. A subject caught between these two poles of
morality and science whilst being unaware of them could generate some absurd conclu-
sions.
A view which ties this rejection of the science with a discussion of the moral is to
be found, perhaps surprisingly, in Hans Morgenthau’s Scientific Man vs. Power Politics
where he states:
[p]olitics is an art and not a science, and what is required for its
mastery is not the rationality of the engineer but the wisdom and
moral strength of the statesman. The social world, deaf to the
appeal to reason pure and simple, yields only to that intricate
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combination of moral and material pressures which the art of the
statesman creates and maintains.
Contemptuous of power politics and incapable of the statesman-
ship which alone is able to master it, the age has tried to make
politics a science. By doing so, it has demonstrated its intellec-
tual confusion, moral blindness, and political decay (Morgen-
thau 1947: 32).
Morgenthau not only rejects the idea of politics as a science, but manages to men-
tion the term moral on three occasions in a relatively short segment. Moreover, Morgen-
thau’s usage of this term is positive – the statesman requires moral strength to make the
social world yield to his moral pressures in our morally blind age (Morgenthau 1947:
32). Perhaps not what one expects from someone regarded as a realist of the first water.
However, the rejection of science forces a more subjective route, and the influence of
philosophy, and especially moral philosophy, in the history of the academic subject of
politics until present day is perhaps not adequately understood or acknowledged.
Nevertheless, while Barker might believe that the newly founded study of politics
sprang from philosophy, this was not the only opinion on offer. The Cambridge chair
was new, but two other chairs in the UK were older: Oxford has the oldest, created in
1912, and University of London (centred on the LSE) created a chair two years after
that (King 1977: xii). As Jack Hayward points out, not only had the study of politics not
fully cleaved itself from the actual practice of politics – experience of being a politician
was advantageous – it was not immediately clear where the subject fitted into the tradi-
tional unit of the university (Hayward 2003: 2). Politics was linked not only with phi-
losophy, but with law and history: all time-honoured subjects safe in their own identities
(Hayward 2003: 2).
This identity confusion is not merely a case of deciding which faculty or depart-
ment holds the budget, there are more deep-seated issues at stake. The lawyer, historian,
and philosopher all have a clear and distinctive methodology, something which the
study of politics lacked, and therefore the subject was, according to Dennis Kavanagh,
in no hurry to detach itself from either history or philosophy (Kavanagh 2003: 598).
This can also be seen in H.J. Laski’s inaugural speech to the chair in the LSE, although
not its first holder the subject is still young and Laski is at pains to explain how he sees
the subject:
[p]olitical science concerns itself with the life of men in relation
to organized states. We cannot omit from the field of relevant
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interest whatever may affect that life. We have kinship with the
studies of the economist […]. We are connected with the lawyer
[…]. We are concerned with the official […]. Nor is this all. The
results of ethics, of psychology, and of sociology, must obvious-
ly affect the conclusions at which we arrive; for whatever may
influence, or be practically useful in influencing, the habits of
civilized man, is clearly germane to our problem (Laski 1926:
2).
This might suggest that Laski was not wishing to link the subject with any one
discipline, however, two pages later he states that:
[a] true politics, in other words, is above all a philosophy of his-
tory (Laski 1926: 4).
I shall ignore the notion of true politics as mere rhetorical flair. His statement that
politics is a philosophy of history leads to his interest in the history of ideas and thereby
to a ‘history of political ideas’ (Laski 1926: 5), so despite a fairly impressive listing of
the scope of politics, we are back to history and philosophy, and variants of them both.
It should be borne in mind that the jump from philosophy of history to a history of polit-
ical ideas is neither as small nor as trouble-free as Laski appears to indicate.
However, this does indicate a divergence from Barker, for the philosophy of histo-
ry can be within the realms of epistemology (the study of knowledge) or metaphysics
(the study of reality) but is not inevitability contained by moral philosophy.
A history of ideas demands the ability to understand the philosophical notions
presented, but is deeply rooted in the subject of history – the historical influences and
the historical reasoning for specific theories appearing at specific times is very much the
work of the historian. Nevertheless, Laski feels it necessary to ‘insist upon the moral
value of this discipline’ (Laski 1926: 5) indicating that forays over the edge into the
sphere of ethics are entirely possible.
It would seem that this question of what the subject actually entailed, what its
methodology was, and where it was located, carried on well into the middle of the twen-
tieth century. As late as 1945 D.W. Brogan agreed with Barker (his predecessor) that
‘the theme of politics is closely connected with ethics’ (Brogan 1945: 36), and he ends
his paper with the wish that the university teaches that:
more permanent victories are won by cleaner heads and cleaner
hands that the world, left to itself, will suggest to the practising
politician that he should use (Brogan 1945: 45).
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To have dirty hands in politics is to have done something wrong or bad for the
normal citizen and the ethical is once again defining the political. G.D.H. Cole ponders
that if he:
were made to choose between calling my subject ‘Philosophy’
and calling it ‘Science’ I should unhesitatingly choose ‘Philoso-
phy’; but I am very much happier in being allowed to call it
simply ‘Theory’ (Cole 1945: 47).
This could be seen only as acknowledging a heritage, although striving towards
some sort of moral neutrality, but a quote further on puts paid to any such notion:
I have to make, throughout, judgements of value. I have to pro-
claim certain ends as good, and to denounce others as evil. I
have to make for myself a certain picture of man as a social an-
imal, not only as he is but also as he is capable of becoming: and
this capacity of becoming has to be conceived, not as undiffer-
entiated capacity for good and evil, but as capacity for good
(Cole 1945: 51).
This statement places politics firmly within moral philosophy, deeply within eth-
ics, and is almost an admission that politics is a subject for applied ethics, such as medi-
cal ethics might be considered. His emphasis on good and evil even threatens to wander
into the domain of religion, although it is possible that the Second World War may have
had an influence here – he mentions Hitler and evils later on (Cole 1945: 53) – and Cole
shall accordingly be given the benefit of the doubt. Nonetheless, the very strong influ-
ence of moral philosophy at the beginnings of the discipline is clear and, perhaps nowa-
days, hidden.
It may be thought that a historical overview of UK political thought during the
first half of the twentieth century is not particularly relevant to the subject of humanitar-
ian intervention. However, it appears to me that confusions regarding where the study of
politics is located has led to further assumptions in the thought following on from this.
One assumption, hinted at above, is that any difference between the theory of politics
and politics as practiced by politicians, and others, is ignored: while the three areas used
in this thesis cannot be expected to be applied, the confusion of doing politics with
studying politics seems prevalent. Michael Oakeshott outlines this split, in his introduc-
tion to Hobbes’ Leviathan where he parts the study of politics into two:
at all other levels of reflection on political life we have before us
the single world of political activity, and what we are interested
in is the internal coherence of that world; but in political philos-
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ophy we have in our minds that world and another world, and
our endeavour is to explore the coherence of the two worlds to-
gether (Oakeshott 1946: ix).
This split will be of interest later on as Chantal Mouffe uses a similar two-way
split in her thoughts on Schmitt, At the moment it need not worry anyone within the ac-
ademic subject whether ‘true politics’, to use Laski’s term and ignoring the question of
whether or not such a thing as true politics actually exists, comprises the history of po-
litical ideas (the study of the political), UK government (Oakeshottian political activity),
or political theory (the study of the political). Indeed the idea of one of these aspects
being more politics than any other is slightly ludicrous. The real issue here, and the one
which is being examined, is the problem of the confusion of these two areas, a confu-
sion which it is easier to make than it may first appear.
This is an area in which Michael Freeden is interested and he agrees with some of
the findings above in his 2005 article What Should the ‘Political’ in Political Theory
Explore where he states that:
the fact is that most political theory employs methodological
paradigms ‘imported’ from disciplines external to politics: phi-
losophy and history (Freeden 2005: 114).
This, as we have seen above, is a fact of the history of the subject and, as such, is
liable to be difficult to exorcise from the subject. Moreover, Freeden’s analysis of the
impact of political philosophy seems to hint that morality, perhaps, does not belong in
the political realm, that political philosophy:
brings to the study of political theory an overriding concern with
either or both of the following: the logical validity and argumen-
tative coherence of the political philosophy in question, or the
moral rightness of the prescriptions it contains. Many of its ver-
sions display a flight from the political, the crowding out of di-
versity and the shrinking of the political to an area of construct-
ed consensus guided by a vision of the good life; while its meth-
ods rely heavily on thought experiments and frequently inappli-
cable modelling (Freeden 2005: 113).
It should be made clear at this point, that Freeden does not seem to differentiate
between the areas one and two as they stand in this thesis. For Freeden there is politics
and political theory, and it is not always clear whether he means by political theory, the
study of political science, or political philosophy. This distinction and its importance
will become clearer in the course of this thesis. Area two, as will be seen from Section
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II: Political Philosophy, is more aware of the issues of morality and politics, and certain-
ly more aware of the possibility and problems of a rejection, or flight from the political.
Moreover, it is not at all clear that area three politics is not guided by a vision of the
good life, while it can certainly be argued that party politics are prone to crowding out
diversity. These aspects will be investigated in more depth in Section III: Practical Poli-
tics.
Freeden is criticising the state of political theory or political philosophy as it
stands, and is suggesting a new approach to the subject, an approach which will better
appreciate the political and be less inclined to flee from it. He is also keen to indicate
that political theory has already provided useful tools in the form of essential contesta-
bility and mentions its forms of ‘ambiguity, indeterminacy, inconclusiveness and
vagueness’ (Freeden 2005: 117). However, it is not clear how these ‘tools’ can be used
in area three, nor that area three would consider these to have arrived on the scene via
political theory. The methodology Freeden is endorsing is outlined in the quote below:
This article puts the case for a fourth approach to the study of
political theory: the political theory of politics. It is not intended
to replace its illustrious and central predecessors […] And it is
not, as many alternative attempts to reconnect theory and prac-
tice have been, primarily another form of normative political
theory. Instead, while recognizing the fundamental ethical con-
cerns of political theorists, it points out that the scholarly study
of politics – as is common among political scientists – engages
notably in understanding and in interpretative mapping. That
task should not be abandoned by political theorists (Freeden
2005: 114).
That there are issues with politics being sacrificed to the moral, or the religious, or
the economic, is not in doubt. Where the problems with Freeden’s suggestions lie, are in
the relations between the areas which Freeden posits. Firstly, it is not at all clear that
ethical concerns are for politics theorists alone. This will be examined in some depth in
the section on Schmitt. Secondly, it may simply be a looseness of language, but the
suggestion is that political theory lies outside the ‘scholarly study of politics’ (Freeden
2005: 114), furthermore, the ‘scholarly study of politics’ seems to be understanding and
mapping, there is no mention of interpretation. Thirdly, it is not clear how area three
practical politics is to fit in here – certainly, from the quote above, Freeden does not
seem to think that ethical concerns are of interest to area three practical politics. Nor is
it clear why area two ought to change, as will be seen in the next chapter, it is area two
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political philosophy which seems to be most able to differentiate between the political
and all other comers. It seems only to be area two which appreciates the power of ‘am-
biguity, indeterminacy, inconclusiveness and vagueness’ (Freeden 2005: 117). Moreo-
ver, Freeden makes a rather surprising suggestion:
The approach advocated here regards ideologies as synonymous
with the political thinking actually occurring in a society, inas-
much as the product is identifiable in patterns (or morphological
arrangements) and is produced and consumed by politically sig-
nificant collectivities. That is not to suggest that the meaning of
‘ideology’ can now be stretched to take over as the preponderant
object of political theory, but rather that political theory must
avail itself of the methods and techniques that recent analyses of
ideology have developed, in order to gain access to the vast
realm of concrete and politically relevant thinking that exists at
the heart of the political. It also suggests, as noted above, that
we almost always encounter political thought in the form of ide-
ological discourses (Freeden 2005: 124).
This is an unexpected conclusion, that it is via the study of ideologies that the
realm of the ‘concrete’ and ‘politically relevant thinking’ can be opened up. As we have
seen in the definitions studied and the beginnings of the subject, some of the ideas and
ideologies that permeate political science are so deep seated to be almost imperceptible.
Of course, Freeden is speaking of the methods and techniques that have come from ide-
ologies, but nevertheless, it seems odd that a branch of moral philosophy that claims to
be a science might be able, via ideology, to better understand the concrete. Moreover, an
ideology, or even the tools or study of an ideology will involve simplification and gen-
eralisation. Indeed, as Freeden himself says, political science ‘engages notably in under-
standing and in interpretative mapping’ (Freeden 2005: 114), which is laudable, but in
no way clear that this gives a political scientist better access to the concrete.
Freeden seems to want that politics as a subject cleaves itself away from all other
subjects and becomes a free-floating science, independent of history, law and philoso-
phy. Arguably, doing that which Wendy Brown is attempting to prevent, namely, avoid-
ing the ‘naturalization of values as universal and transhistorical’ (Brown 2001: 97). As
Nietzsche pointed out at the start of the previous chapter, ‘we have no right to isolated
acts of any kind: we may not make isolated errors or hit upon isolated truths’ (Nietzsche
2000: 452[2]). Moreover, in analysing concepts such as humanitarian intervention,
which are contingent, unstable, and historical, well-suited, perhaps, to Freeden’s clarion
call to the tools of ‘ambiguity, indeterminacy, inconclusiveness and vagueness’
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(Freeden 2005: 117), it seems peculiar to reject the ‘methodological paradigms “import-
ed” from disciplines external to politics: philosophy and history’ (Freeden 2005: 114)
right from the outset.
An ideology need not contain the political, an ideology need not be at all concrete.
and if an ideology is based on morality then how will this affect political theory? In
short, Freeden’s attempts to reform political theory seem flawed from the outset and risk
themselves turning into a flight from the political. Glen Newey is of the opinion, not
only that the area one and two difference is important, but that the focus on ideology
may be erroneous, as he claims:
[w]hat is needed in my view, is more political philosophy, and
less political theory. The contrast is intentional. It countenances
the possibility that philosophy may be practised without purvey-
ing theory, where ‘theory’ is interpreted as a rational construc-
tion intended to guide practise or provide a more systemised un-
derstanding of it (Newey 2001: 14).
Departments of politics may not be particularly old, and dissatisfaction with the
study of politics seems to have pre-dated them, as Graham Wallas seems to suggest in
1908, when he says that ‘[t]he study of politics is just now in a curiously unsatisfactory
position’ (Wallas 1948: 1). However, building a new branch of the study of politics, as
Freeden seems to be suggesting, is not necessarily the way forward, despite Alexis de
Tocqueville’s claims, roughly at the time that humanitarian intervention entered the
English language, to the contrary that: ‘[a] new science of politics is indispensable to a
new world’ (de Tocqueville 1838: xvi).
Having examined some of the area one attempts at definition, and examined the
underlying problems of the study of politics as political science, the next chapter will
examine area two, political philosophy attempts to clarify the situation. This section
leads on from the issues in area one, to looking at the theory of what politics actually is.
This will then allow the concept of humanitarian intervention to be examined from a
standpoint focussed on the political.
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Section II: Political Philosophy
4 Approaches to the Concept in Political Philosophy Literature
This section on political philosophy is the section where it is perhaps most neces-
sary to make clear the connection between the debates and humanitarian intervention. In
pursuing this subject, issues may be raised which, at first, do not appear relevant to the
subject of humanitarian intervention at all. However, the failure to raise such subjects
risks simply repeating the intellectual faults which have been outlined and illustrated in
the introductory chapters and which, I argue, all three areas are wont to exhibit. While
area one does directly deal with humanitarian intervention, it is unaware of the problems
of politics or their influence on the concept of humanitarian intervention. If there is an
awareness of the issue, as Freeden demonstrates, then despite claims of understanding
the nature of essential contestability and ambiguity, the solution is to aim towards some
objective, scientific ideal, which will purge the non-political from the political. As will
be seen, this is simply to misunderstand the nature of the political.
Humanitarian intervention in the area of political philosophy is simply one possi-
ble starting point amongst many, a theme which generates the deeper and more complex
issues at stake, and as such useful as an example, perhaps, but of no more interest than
any of the other possible catalysts to the debate. In short, in area two the problem of
humanitarian intervention tends to disappear and be reduced to discussions on the polit-
ical. These discussions are directly relevant to the concept of humanitarian intervention,
but seldom directly applied.
This chapter is divided into three subsections. The first section is that of ‘the polit-
ical’ or ‘the political and the moral’. In this section attempts are made to explain the
concept of the political but also its interactions with morality and moralism. The main
tensions will be pointed out and this will form the basis for the two remaining sections
of the chapter.
The second section is influenced by the work of Schmitt, and consists of the major
challenge to both the academic orthodoxy of area one, and the political philosophy of
area two posed by the work of Schmitt and those political theorists for whom the ques-
tion of the political is paramount. This section will attempt to clarify the relationship
between the political and the moral which will be examined is the literature on the con-
cept of the political. The main proponent of this theory is Schmitt, a philosopher and
jurist notorious for his complicity in Nazi Germany, but whose thought
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on the idea of politics and the political has recently found favour again. Schmitt’s ideas
on the political have been taken up and modified by authors such as Chantal Mouffe and
Claude Lefort, and some of these adaptations of Schmittian thought will be examined.
The third heading consists of various contemporary attempts to integrate the au-
tonomous nature of the political, given such prominence in Schmitt’s thought, into area
two discussion. This encompasses a wide variety of authors and ideas, but many have
been brought together by the recent exchanges on the idea of tragedy and the tragic in
politics and hence it is under the heading of ‘tragedy and the tragic’ that these authors
will be examined. This attempt to come to terms with the tensions between the political
and the moral is to be found in the work of scholars such as Lebow and Frost who have
endeavoured to revive the concept of the tragic within the political. Such thought ac-
cepts that there are conflicts between the concepts of the political and the moral which
may not be reconcilable and an acknowledgement of this fact is more likely to aid in
avoiding hubris.
The relationship of the moral to the political has recently become central in con-
temporary debate, although its relevance to area one and area three debate appears to be
taking longer to emerge. As was mentioned previously, the concept of humanitarian in-
tervention is often the catalyst for area two scrutiny of the ideas, but the conclusions
drawn are left in the abstract and the consequences for humanitarian intervention in area
one and three is not often touched upon in area two. Such a complex area two subject
entrenched in both area one and area three discussions of humanitarian intervention en-
sures that incoherence, inconsistencies, and conflicts which might occur in this field are
then carried forward into the further discussion of humanitarian intervention.
4.1 PROBLEM AREA TWO: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
J.D.B. Miller hints in the quote below at where the problem of definition of poli-
tics coming into conflict with the ideal of morality in politics might be:
[p]olitics, then, is about disagreement or conflict; and political
activity is that which is intended to bring about or resist change,
in the face of possible resistance. It is not necessary to suggest
that people engaged in politics never agree, or that open and fla-
grant disagreement is necessary before we can see politics going
on; what is important is that we should recognise that conflict
lies at the heart of politics. In a world of universal agreement,
there would be no room for it (Miller 1962: 14).
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Miller’s point at the end of his explanation, that politics would not exist in a per-
fect world (Miller 1962: 14), seems to be the point upon which a notion of politics will
hinge. The conflict need not be as hostile as some authors would have it – one does not
necessarily need an enemy or foe, as Schmitt has (in)famously put it, and as will be dis-
cussed in the next subsection, for there to be politics, but there must be disagreement, or
at least the possibility of disagreement. It would be wrong to attribute this view to Mil-
ler alone; there are several expressions of this view in the literature. Oakeshott, for ex-
ample, in the Harvard Lectures states that:
[p]olitics is an activity, not of governing, but of determining the
manner and the matter of government, and where these are pre-
determined and are regarded as immune from choice or change,
there is no room for ‘politics’ (Oakeshott 1993: 8).
Along with Miller, an outline – I would be loathe to call this a definition – of poli-
tics is given and at the same time an, or more exactly, the outline of non- or anti-politics
is given as its opposite, as Miller, too, posited. This appears to occur surprisingly often
in the literature: an outline of politics is given based on an analysis of what politics is
not. This may be due to the beginnings of the subject where the demarcation of the sub-
ject from other subjects relied on pointing out what it was not. Alternatively, it could be
an embodiment of the nature of conflict in politics itself that polar opposites are intro-
duced. Nevertheless, while this can be a fruitful exercise, it is open to problems. If one
considers love and hate as concepts, one person might have these as opposites of each
other, whilst another would have these as different expressions of the same thing, and
instead posit indifference as the antithesis of both; what one put forwards as the oppo-
site can fundamentally affect the understanding of the concept itself. This method will
be looked at as, regardless of the opposite in question, the mere conceiving of an oppo-
site may well clarify an author’s view on politics more than they intended. Moreover,
the notion of anti-politics is also utilised to explain the situation whereby the political is
dispensed with in favour of another concept such as morality, and as such is of great
utility in the concept of humanitarian intervention where this displacement frequently
occurs.
In the second area of political philosophy, this wider issue about the nature of the
political and its relation to the moral which underlies the discussion of humanitarian in-
tervention is made explicit. Humanitarian intervention itself does not appear as a topic
in much area two discussion, despite Rosenau’s claim that:
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[p]olitics is about the way in which actors seek to modify each
other’s behaviour across wide functional distances and, in this
sense, given the extent of the modification attempted and the
functional distances spanned through intervention, no situation
is more purely political than the attempt of one nation to inter-
vene in the affairs of another (Rosenau 1969: 156).
The most dramatic view of the divergence between the moral and political per-
spectives is that given by Carl Schmitt in The Concept of the Political (Schmitt 1976),
where he maintains that the moral is characterised by the opposition between right and
wrong and the political by the opposition between friend and foe. For Schmitt it is not
simply one criterion amongst several, it is the criterion, as can be seen when Schmitt
declares that the:
specific political distinction to which political actions and mo-
tives can be reduced is that between friend and enemy. This
provides a definition in the sense of a criterion and not as an ex-
haustive definition or one indicative of substantial content
(Schmitt 1976: 26).
That there is, as Newey explains, an ‘inescapability of politics […] any society in
which politics exists at all, is one in which the possibility of disagreement exists’ (New-
ey 2001: 50) means that one need not take as extreme a position as Schmitt to come to
the conclusion that there will be a problem between opposing viewpoints. Whether one
deems this opponent the other, the foe, or thou, is, for the purposes of this thesis, unim-
portant, all that this antagonist needs to be in this case is to represent the possibility of
disagreement. However, Schmitt is attuned to many of the confusions in all three areas
which are still not apparent to contemporary authors.
‘The concept of the state presupposes the concept of the political,’ writes Schmitt
(Schmitt 1976: 19), voicing the intuition that a stage, or a process, or even merely a
thought is being missed in much of the discussion concerning international relations.
One page later he states:
[o]ne seldom finds a clear definition of the political […] [i]n one
way or another ‘political’ is generally juxtaposed to ‘state’ or at
least is brought into relation with it. The state thus appears as
something political, the political as something pertaining to the
state – obviously an unsatisfactory circle (Schmitt 1976: 20).
Schmitt is of the opinion that defining the political in terms of the state is, none-
theless, perfectly reasonable ‘for as long as the state possesses the monopoly on politics’
(Schmitt 1976: 20), which is one of the notions which the concept of humanitarian in-
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tervention can challenge. However, he is also aware of the repercussions when the polit-
ical is not in place in a theory, as all the:
characteristics of this image of entity and people [his definition
of the state] receive their meaning from the further distinctive
trait of the political and become incomprehensible when the na-
ture of the political is misunderstood (Schmitt 1976: 26).
Any theory of international relations which places the state at its centre risks accu-
sations of question begging as other aspects of the political are thereby ruled out, or at
the very least consigned to the periphery. For if the political can, and does, include non-
state actors (which few would deny), and if it can be shown that the political is con-
tained within any action which can be called humanitarian intervention, then there are at
least two conclusions. First, by concentrating on the state rather than the political, dis-
cussion in all three problem areas can become caught up in abstract notions of sover-
eignty. Second, if the political, and not necessarily the state, is the issue in cases of hu-
manitarian intervention then the failure of area one and two discussion of humanitarian
intervention to account for the political renders their conclusions suspect.
In area one and two discussion it often looks as though questions of a political na-
ture are replaced by questions of sovereignty, the nature of the state, who can intervene
and so on. As Carl Schmitt points out, once this step of replacing the political with the
state has been taken, one risks all social issues becoming political, that is, the state is not
specifically political and everything contains the makings of the political (Schmitt 1976:
22): ‘[i]n actuality it is the total state which no longer knows anything absolutely non-
political’ (Schmitt 1976: 25).
The strengths and weaknesses of Schmitt’s position will be considered more fully
at a later stage. For present purposes, a less contentious distinction between the moral
and the political will serve the purpose. This distinction may be made by drawing on
two authors.
The first author is Stuart Hampshire, for whom the most obvious difference be-
tween the moral and political perspective is that in moral disputes there is no sovereign
authority to which disagreements may be referred, whereas in political disputes there is.
No less obviously, a political agent who is a ruler occupies a public office, and is there-
fore not free to follow his own conscience. This is to say that, unlike a moral agent, he
acts as the representative of a political body. As Hampshire remarks, this representative
status carries with it ‘duties of careful and responsible calculation’, as well as the duty
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to cultivate the virtue of prudence (Hampshire 1978: 52). The outcome, noted long ago
by Machiavelli, is the possibility that a political actor may be justified in acquiring dirty
hands through the use of force and deceit in ways which would be unacceptable in pri-
vate morality. Whether Machiavelli was right to defend ruthless princes may of course
be questioned, but simply to neglect the difference between private and public morality
to which he pointed, as political moralism does, is unacceptable.
The second author whose work is valuable for this distinction is Chantal Mouffe,
whose attempts to make Schmitt’s thought more palatable are illuminating. Mouffe
draws a clear distinction between politics and the political and writes that:
by ‘the political’ I mean the dimension of antagonism which I
take to be constitutive of human society, while by ‘politics’ I
mean the set of practices and institutions through which an order
is created, organizing human coexistence in the context of con-
flictuality provided by the political (Mouffe 2005: 9).
With this distinction in mind, Mouffe distinguishes between political science and
political theory in a way which corresponds roughly to the distinction made in the thesis
between area one and area two approaches, and which mirrors somewhat, Oakeshott’s
distinction already quoted above. According to Mouffe’s distinction:
political science […] deals with the empirical field of ‘politics’,
and political theory […] is the domain of philosophers who en-
quire not about facts of ‘politics’ but about the essence of ‘the
political’. If we wanted to express such a distinction in a philo-
sophical way, we could, borrowing the vocabulary of Heidegger,
say that politics refers to the ‘ontic’ level while ‘the political’
has to do with the ‘ontological’ one. This means that the ontic
has to do with the manifold practices of conventional politics,
while the ontological concerns the very way in which society is
instituted (Mouffe 2005: 8-9).
Mouffe utilises Schmitt’s arguments concerning friend/foe, Schmitt’s dichotomies
will be covered in more depth in the following section, and criticises political moralism
as consisting:
in securing one’s goodness, through the condemnation of the
evil in others. Denouncing others has always been a powerful
and easy way to obtain a high idea of one’s moral worth
(Mouffe 2005: 74).
Following on from this, Mouffe criticises the ‘increasing role played by the mor-
alistic discourse in our post-political societies’ (Mouffe 2005: 75) and posits a:
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direct link between the weakening of the political frontier char-
acteristic of the adversarial model and the ‘moralization’ of poli-
tics (Mouffe 2005: 75).
The blurring of the political and the moral – the main issue at stake in humanitari-
an intervention in area two (although the connection is seldom made in this field) – is of
major concern to Mouffe and the crux of the issue is this moralisation of politics is that:
I do not mean, of course, that now people act in the field of poli-
tics in search of the common good, according to motives that
would be more disinterested or impartial. What I want to indi-
cate is that, instead of being constructed in political terms, the
‘we’/’they’ opposition constitutive of politics is now constructed
according to moral categories of ‘good’ versus ‘evil’ (Mouffe
2005: 75).
When the differences between the moral and the political drawn by thinkers like
Hampshire and Mouffe is borne in mind, what are the implications for the study of hu-
manitarian intervention? That study is altered in several crucial respects. In the first
place there is no longer the possibility of a morally or politically privileged position,
immune from legitimate contestation, from which legitimate or illegitimate instance of
humanitarian intervention can be identified. The second is that although a case can still
be made for humanitarian intervention, this will be in terms of a concept of practical
reason which allows for the complexities and limitations of discrete political action ra-
ther than in terms of abstract, general appeals to human rights or a universal morality.
Hence, the virtues of prudence and responsibility will weigh more heavily than abstract
considerations of justice. Thirdly, what emerges is not a panacea which can be taken to
area three with a view to giving definitive answers to what constitutes legitimate hu-
manitarian intervention in all cases, but an acceptance that not only are political initia-
tives always contestable but that political outcomes are always uncertain. In short, the
implications are that humanitarian intervention contains a political aspect which cannot
be eradicated and must be taken into account. In order to illustrate what these changes
amount to in more concrete terms, it will be useful to consider briefly the work of some
recent authors who exemplify the kind of approach towards which the thesis points.
A recent, and in the UK somewhat neglected, text is Ethical Realism: a Vision for
America’s Role in the World by Anatol Lieven and John Hulsman. While essentially
dealing with issues in recent US foreign policy, they put forward suggestions which are
applicable to the topic of humanitarian intervention in general.
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In the introduction to their book Lieven and Hulsman outline the problem which
their book addresses, namely, an undifferentiated approach to foreign policy from both
the Democratic and Republican parties. The problem, they claim, is that both Republi-
cans and Democrats maintain that:
we should not let facts get in the way of our daydreams. It’s so
much easier to fantasize about an alternative and ideal world, ra-
ther than making the hard and unpopular decisions that are nec-
essary to deal with the complicated and frustrating one in which
we live. It is so much easier to imagine that world as a blank
slate on which American can draw as it wishes, rather than to
recognize the limits on American power (Lieven & Hulsman
2006: xii).
It may be thought that this is an attack on political idealism and it could be a call
to take up the banner of political realism, however, Lieven and Hulsman see both ideal-
ism and realism as having made the same fundamental mistakes. As they outline in their
introduction, any real threat:
demands a realistic response. Any approach to foreign policy
that hopes to create an intellectual consensus in the United
States must embrace elements of both realism and morality. […]
Neoconservatives and liberal hawks do try to balance realism
and morality. […] They are correct that a classically realist ap-
proach isn’t sufficient to deal with this situation. […]
Their answers, however, go much too far in the contradictory di-
rections of both hard-line realism and utopian morality – or ra-
ther, as we shall argue, pseudo-realism and pseudo-morality
(Lieven & Hulsman 2006: xiv).
Lieven and Hulsman name their approach ‘ethical realism’, a somewhat unfortu-
nate term, which seems to indicate a confusion of the concepts. However, it is an at-
tempt to ‘provide a basis for the harsh action’ (Lieven & Hulsman 2006: 53) which the
USA may have to take, but is not ‘cynical, indifferent to the long-term interests of hu-
manity, or attracted to ruthlessness for its own sake’ (Lieven & Hulsman 2006: 53). The
expression ethical realism, therefore, indicates the intention of Lieven and Hulsman to
bridge the gap between the extremes of moralism and the extremes of realism. Notwith-
standing its regrettable name, the rejection of both these extremes and an attempt to find
the middle ground is of interest here and the tenets of the theory, namely, prudence,
humility, study, responsibility, patriotism are worthy of attention.
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The first tenet which they posit in this theory is that of prudence which is of use in
‘shaping goals and deciding on actions’ (Lieven & Hulsman 2006: 67). Lieven & Huls-
man cite the Iraq War, with its lack of a plan B and no idea of how to replace the gov-
ernment it toppled, as a case of the violation of prudence. The inclusion of prudence is
unsurprising, as prudence, also known as phronesis, or practical wisdom has been
linked with politics since the Ancient Greeks. Aristotle, in his Ethics, discusses the no-
tion of prudence and says that:
[w]e call people prudent in particular respects when they have
calculated successfully to some serious end (outside the sphere
of art); so that in general also the man who is capable of deliber-
ation will be prudent. But nobody deliberates about things that
are invariable (Aristotle 1976: Bk6 chap. v, 209).
It is this identification of politics with the problem of choosing between ever-
moving variables which seems to necessitate prudence. Aristotle goes on to state that:
prudence is not concerned with universals only; it must also take
cognizance of particulars, because it is concerned with conduct,
and conduct has its sphere in particular circumstances (Aristotle
1976: Bk6 chap vii, 213).
This Aristotelian notion of prudence seems to be the one at work in Beiner’s Po-
litical Judgment where in he states that in politics:
I am faced with particulars; that is to say, I do not deliberate
about rules, which are general or universal, but about application
of rules (Beiner 1983: 132).
Moreover, he states that political judgment, which one can replace with the terms
prudence, phronesis or practical wisdom, is:
the comprehensive faculty by which we come to terms with par-
ticulars in the political world (Beiner 1983: 157).
Thus far prudence has only been mentioned in conjunction with politics, but
Lieven and Hulsman wish to find a place for ethics in prudential politics: failure to do
so is to risk the swing towards pseudo-realism. The one author who ties prudence, poli-
tics and morals up together without falling into the traps Lieven and Hulsman mention
is Hans J. Morgenthau. Morgenthau states in his article The Problem of National Inter-
est that there can be:
no political morality without prudence, that is, without consider-
ation of the political consequences of moral actions. Classical
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and medieval philosophy knew this and so did Lincoln when he
said: ‘I do the very best I know how, the very best I can, and I
mean to keep doing so until the end. If the end brings me out all
right, what is against me won’t amount to anything. If the end
brings me out wrong, ten angels swearing I was right would
make no difference.’ (Morgenthau 1962a: 109).
The problem of both the extremes of realism and moralism, which Lieven and
Hulsman speak of, is that one extracts the morality from politics and the other the poli-
tics from morality, thereby both making the same mistake of rejecting prudence and
creating dogmas. In The Demands of Prudence Morgenthau goes into the issues in
slightly more depth and states that the:
moral strategy of politics is, then, to try to choose the lesser evil
[…].
Yet, as to choose the lesser evil is the best the moral politician
can do, so it is also the best moral man at large can do (Morgen-
thau 1962b: 16).
This is reminiscent of Machiavelli, who states in The Prince, under the heading
‘How a Ruler Should Act in Order to Gain Reputation’ that:
it should be realised that all courses of action involve risks; for it
is in the nature of things that when one tries to avoid one danger
another is always encountered. But prudence consists in know-
ing how to assess the dangers, and to choose the least bad course
of action as being the right one to follow (Machiavelli 1988: Ch
21: 79).
And Morgenthau goes beyond Machiavelli and states that it is at the:
point of choosing the lesser evil that moral evaluation and polit-
ical calculation merge (Morgenthau 1962b: 17).
It is hopefully clear that prudence within politics is better than politics without
prudence, indeed, according to Aristotle, ‘[p]olitical science and prudence are the same
state of mind, but their essence is not the same’ (Aristotle 1976: Bk6 chap viii, 213).
Thus it might be the case that the rejection of prudence within politics could be con-
strued as a rejection of politics. This is perhaps why Tredennick, in a footnote to the
quote above states that ‘politics is the fullest realisation of prudence’ (Tredennick 1976:
213n). The choice of authors traditionally cast as realist in this argument should not be
taken to be a condoning of realism, it should be noted that all the authors quoted here
who might be taken as such are cited in relation to their balance of ethics in politics. Ex-
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tremes of realism and idealism can often result in seemingly wilful misreadings and
Morgenthau and Machiavelli especially seem to suffer this fate.
The second virtue named by Lieven and Hulsman as necessary to a rethinking of
foreign policy is humility, the virtue which keeps any notion of we can do no wrong in
check, Lieven and Hulsman believe that this virtue will also generate tolerance and pa-
tience as the demand for perfection in others will be lifted. Once again we can turn to
Morgenthau to explain the necessity for humility in politics. In the article The Moral
Dilemmas of Political Action Morgenthau again links back to Ancient Greek thought
when he remarks that:
the political actor is particularly tempted to blind himself to the
limits of his power and thereby to overstep the boundaries of
both prudence and morality.
It is not ignorance or misjudgment, that is, intellectual errors,
against which the Greek tragedians and biblical prophets warn
the powerful of the world but hubris and pride. The self-esteem
engendered by power, which equates power with virtue, in the
process loses all sense of moral and political proportion (Mor-
genthau 1962c: 325-6).
Thus, it could be argued that humility is a subspecies of prudence – a prudent eth-
ical realism would not allow hubris to enter politics. However, turning again to Aristo-
tle, who, in criticising Socrates, makes clear why this distinction can be made. Aristotle
claims that:
some people maintain that all the virtues are forms of prudence;
and why Socrates, though partly right, was also partly wrong in
his inquiries, because he was mistaken in thinking that all the
virtues are forms of prudence, but he was quite right in asserting
that that they imply prudence (Aristotle 1976: Book 6 Chapter
xiii, 224).
Humility implies prudence, but, as Lieven and Hulsman hope, this humility would
‘replace the hectoring and bullying of other nations with a genuine respect for their
views and interests’ (Lieven & Hulsman 2006: 66). A strong nation could be prudential
in its actions and still not respect the prudential actions of a weaker nation – humility, it
could be claimed, tempers prudence, or perhaps could be deemed diplomacy. A humani-
tarian intervention carried out with prudence in mind but not humility is entirely possi-
ble and it could be argued that the invasion of Iraq suffered from this problem. The is-
sue of hubris has not disappeared and it is in grappling with this notion that the recent
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discussions on tragedy and the tragic in political thought seem to have emerged, but this
debate will be examined in full in the section on tragedy.
Perhaps less expected than prudence or humility is Lieven and Hulsman’s third
virtue: that of study. Study, they claim is an underrated virtue, the lack of which is inex-
cusable in the area of practical politics. As examples, the authors point out that the US
administration of Iraq had only one member of staff with any background in the Middle
East, while the military planners of the Vietnam War could not have passed a basic ex-
am in modern Vietnamese history (Lieven & Hulsman 2006: 74).
Beiner also writes of this element as a part of political judgment, but does not call
it study. Linking it into his discussion of particulars mentioned above, Beiner states that
judgment:
always operates within an institutionally defined structure of
opportunities and possibilities. Men never judge in a vacuum
[…] political judgment must take account of ‘givens’ (Beiner
1983: 148).
Discussing an article by Conor Cruise O’Brien on peace, Beiner agrees that:
many proposed resolutions of political conflict in Northern Ire-
land and the Middle East contribute nothing whatever to the
search for peace because they are founded upon the condition
that Ulster Protestant Unionists will cease to be Unionists, and
that Israeli Zionists will cease to be Zionists. In Judging, we
must address ourselves to what is already given, to what the
judging subject confronts as given (Beiner 1983: 149).
In short, we cannot judge in a political vacuum: one can only make prudent deci-
sions based on facts – if the facts are not known then the judgment risks being flawed. A
course of action in the world of politics based not on facts but on what ought to be the
case, or the ideal situation is a course of action based on theory alone, and the attempt at
prudence based on it is more likely to be theoretical prudence than a prudence that
works in the world. This is a rather astute point of Lieven and Hulsman, and one which
seems to have been overlooked by some authors. This is not simply to have an under-
standing of the problems which one might face, but, linked into prudence, guards
against the possibilities, always present, of ‘unconscious self-deception, deliberate ma-
nipulation and misinformation by governments, intelligence services, and the media’
(Lieven & Hulsman 2006: 75). In short, without study there can be no prudence as one
is, at the very least, at the whim of other’s information.
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The fourth virtue is that of responsibility. This is a potent virtue, as it focuses up-
on the notion of good intentions. Moreover, responsibility allows for failure and mis-
takes (linked to the virtue of humility) to be considered – notions which good intentions
can ignore. Beiner goes into this point in more depth than Lieven and Hulsman, but he
too ties it into Weber’s notion of an ethic of responsibility. Beiner declares that perhaps
it is:
Weber’s famous lecture on the political vocation that furnishes
us with a genuine articulation of the two-sided demand of politi-
cal judgment – neither abstracting from the existing realities
with which political man must contend, nor failing to distance
oneself from merely contingent institutional and existential giv-
ens. As Weber says, political life demands both distance and
passion, both detachment and involvement. To judge a political
world responsibly is both to accept and to reject, to say ‘Yea’
and ‘Nay’, to face realities that confront one and to ‘reach out
for the impossible’ (Beiner 1983: 150).
It is perhaps the yea and nay aspect that is most intriguing, it seems to be illogical,
but Lieven and Hulsman provide an example which makes it clearer when they point
out that:
neither in statecraft nor in common sense can good intentions be
a valid excuse if – as in the decision to go to war in Iraq – they
are accompanies by gross recklessness, carelessness, and indif-
ference to the range of possible consequences.
Among the range of questions to be studied is whether your
country, its forces, and its resources are really strong enough to
achieve the aim in view; whether your government and military
are competent enough to achieve it; and whether your own peo-
ple really have the will to remain committed to a given country
or conflict for the time that will be necessary to stabilize it –
which in turn reflects the question of whether their vital interests
are truly engaged there (Lieven & Hulsman 2006: 77).
In short, it could be prudent to carry out a war, one might have the humility and
have studied the situation, but if this study were to prove that one’s military or govern-
ment were not up to carrying out the action then while one might say yea to the action in
theory or if the circumstances were other than they are, ultimately, if one is acting re-
sponsibly, then nay can be the only answer, as one would not be able to carry the action
out in the required way. The good intention cannot validate gross negligence.
The fifth virtue mooted by Lieven and Hulsman is that of patriotism. This might
at first seem a rather strange key virtue, especially to British sensibilities, but is set up,
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perhaps surprisingly, as a counterweight to the tendency towards nationalism. Patriot-
ism, claim Lieven and Hulsman is to love your country as it is, warts and all, while Na-
tionalism looks to an idealised past and an ideal future which can be indifferent or even
hostile to the country as it actually exists (Lieven & Hulsman 2006: 81). Much area two
discussion focusses on the differences between nations and states, which can often be
seen as a sidestepping of the issue of politics and turning the focus from nations to
states: as Fred Halliday points out Morgenthau’s Politics Among Nations and the United
Nations are ‘symptomatically mistitled’ (Halliday 1994: 81). Dunn recognises that
states and nations, nationalism and patriotism can be at work within the same actor
when he declares that:
[w]hatever else it may be, every modern state, at every point in
its history, is both a strenuous ideological fiction and an emi-
nently practical reality (Dunn 1990: 1).
The virtue of patriotism, again linked to humility, allows you to respect the patri-
otism of other nations and rules out, so claim Lieven and Hulsman, extremes of interna-
tional behaviour. In pointing out Nationalism as being potentially problematic in inter-
national relations, and envisaging methods to deal with it, Lieven and Hulsman appear
to be unique amongst contemporary authors in this area in linking back to a problem in
area three, and not remaining in the more abstract field of areas one or two.
While these virtues neither carry guarantees nor generate answers, reference to
them could perhaps prevent the confusing of politics and morality which has occurred in
this area. In order to investigate this relationship between the political and moral further,
it is necessary to examine the thought of the one author who seems to have grasped this
relationship so clearly.
4.2 SCHMITT AND ANTI-POLITICS
The generation of an opposite of politics is mainstream enough to have garnered a
name for itself: anti-politics. It is this concept which will now be considered. The idea
of any sort of anti-politics will be built into, visible only in conjunction with, and de-
pendent upon the initial idea of politics – for otherwise it would be impossible to even
attempt to guess an opposite of something which one did not know. This use of anti-
politics is remarkable on another level, namely that in initiating a discussion of anti-
politics, the authors are, from the outset, engendering politics with something very simi-
lar to the friend/foe distinction of Schmitt, albeit in another guise, be that conflict, deci-
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sion, or, put another way, conciliation. Schmitt has war as the ultimate friend/foe dis-
tinction, in which any:
world in which the possibility of war is utterly eliminated, a
completely pacified globe, would be a world without the distinc-
tion of friend and enemy and hence a world without politics
(Schmitt 1976: 35).
This is not hugely different from the above quotes from Oakeshott and Miller, in
content at least, if not tone. Twentieth century Schmitt makes no great leap of imagina-
tion from the linkage of politics to war if the nineteenth century oft-quoted maxim orig-
inating from von Clausewitz be considered:
war is merely the continuation of policy by other means
(Clausewitz 1984: Ch1 §24).
It can certainly be argued that war is also a rejection or at least failure of politics,
but the existence of war certainly underlines the existence of opposing viewpoints. Less
dramatic, but no less similar, albeit in thick disguise, is Crick’s rather soothing explana-
tion of what politics is and how this conflict is to be reconciled:
[i]f the argument is, then, that politics is simply the activity by
which government is made possible when differing interests in
an area to be governed grow powerful enough to need to be con-
ciliated, the obvious objection will be: ‘why do certain interests
have to be conciliated?’ And the answer is, of course, that they
do not have to be. Other paths are always open. Politics is simp-
ly when they are conciliated – that solution to the problem of
order which chooses conciliation rather than violence and coer-
cion, and chooses it as an effective way by which varying inter-
ests can discover that level of compromise best suited to their
common interest in survival (Crick 2005: 14f).
All very well, and the notion of conflict is integrated into the description, but
where does the moral come into this? Certainly our other paths are open. Crick does not
explicitly make these other paths into anti-politics but insofar as they may be construed
as a rejection of politics we are close to this notion. If one is to take the notion of anti-
politics seriously then anti-politics, whatever that may be, will, by definition, negate
politics: one loses politics. The Schmittian loss would be of the concept of friend/foe
and the possibility of war, along with the gain of a completely pacified globe, a surpris-
ingly cheery result one might think (Schmitt would not agree), and so perhaps may not
be mourned. Oakeshott’s negation, however, would be a situation where all choice
would be predetermined, the loss being that of choice or change: a more serious pass-
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ing; while Crick’s loss would be one of the possibility of conciliation. These three loss-
es, while expressed differently, are essentially the same thing, namely, the loss of con-
flict (and consequently choice and politics). This is the very crux of the matter: the loss
of conflict resolution.
This argument can appear, it must be admitted, as a self-fulfilling prophesy, rather
odd or at the very least somewhat circular. A notion of politics is posited, which re-
solves conflicts. A loss of conflicts would result in the loss of politics and a loss of con-
flicts is not something politics could wish for. This does not seem to make much sense,
but then again, this is not quite a correct account. A premise is missing, namely some-
thing along the lines of ‘humans live in an imperfect world’. This premise results in the
conclusion being of the form ‘living in an imperfect world, man would lose the ability
to deal with its imperfections’, and this, I argue, is the conclusion which alarms Schmitt.
Thus, for Schmitt, his anti-political nightmare would be a Kantian perpetual peace
and this is where, for Schmitt at least, the issues of morality in the guise of anti-politics
can appear. It must be pointed out that one cannot claim that morality is always a form
of anti-politics, nor that politics and morality are incompatible, but if the possibility of
decisions being made has been ruled out, if morality is providing an answer ‘immune
from choice or change’ (Oakeshott 1993: 8) then it has displaced politics and is func-
tioning as anti-politics. Miller tells us that:
[p]olitical action is not evidence of moral excellence; nor is it
the absence of political action. Politics is, in fact, non-moral
(Miller 1962: 22).
Miller thereby separates the two areas off from each other: morality will not enter
into politics at all. For him, morality and politics are two separate arenas. However, as
we have seen in the discussion above, it was not at all clear to some newly fledged pro-
fessors of politics that politics and morality were, in fact, separate. How is it possible to
come to two such contradictory conclusions? Looking at the underlying problems of the
academic subject above, we have seen that the two poles of morality and science have
pulled at the field since its beginning. In the case of humanitarian intervention, these
two aspects seem to mix, as one sees the subject attempting to make a science of the
morality. Hence. the political science aspect wishes to make a law that will hold regard-
less of historical context or circumstance, while the background of moral philosophy
does not allow the ethics of the situation to be ignored, thus morality must always or
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never be a part of politics, for what good is an exception to the law? Here we are most
certainly in the realms of anti-politics.
The problem area two acknowledgement of the autonomy of the political – its ir-
reducibility to another field, and its not being the conflict itself, but rather the relation-
ship between conflicting parties, renders these attempts to deal with humanitarian inter-
vention by problem area one somewhat meaningless. If politics were the same as moral-
ity or vice versa, then the once concept would collapse into the other and there would be
no need for the separate concept. Furthermore, if politics adhered to universal laws of
nature as the natural sciences do then these claims could be proved in the field of actual
politics and the conundrum resolved once and for all time. Both these approaches deny
the political by attempting to impose constraints upon a fixed relationship between un-
knowns, and are therefore themselves examples of anti-politics.
Cranston, in his above-mentioned lecture accepts a Schmittian imperfect world,
but brings the notion of values into play, and posits a perhaps rather un-Schmittian con-
ception of certain understandings already being in place to facilitate in politics:
[t]here is no politics in heaven because everybody is perfectly
good and perfectly wise. There is politics on earth because men
have a partial but not a perfect moral insight and a partial but not
a perfect understanding. Politics is in part an argument about
values between men who agree about some values but disagree
about others. If they did not agree about some – about the desir-
ability of truth and justice, for example – they could not engage
in a dialogue at all; there could be no politics (Cranston 1971:
293).
The above quote also, although indirectly, puts forward the idea of morality as an-
ti-politics: moral perfection would result in the disappearance of politics therefore, poli-
tics is only necessary on account of our imperfections which result in conflict. He men-
tions the moral values which must be in place for politics to occur, which raises the
question of the moral being logically prior to politics. This would seem to be correct
insofar as for politics to occur there must be agreement that the conflict can be resolved
without resorting to arms, that the state of nature has been left behind. However, this
prior moral basis to politics does not render morality superior to politics. Moreover, that
there is disagreement concerning values does not mean that politics need adopt any of
the values in question, although that said, nor does it, obviously, rule out the moral
completely from the political – it is not forbidden.
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Wendy Brown points at the difference between morality and moralism in politics
but points out that either of these can transform into a variety whereby ‘moral truths’ act
as a substitute for political struggle (Brown 2001: 22), thus these ‘moral truths’ take on
the semblance of Oakshottian predetermined choice. It is perhaps the confusion of mo-
rality and moralism, a distinction Brown is keen to keep, which is problematic. Accord-
ing to Brown:
[a]t the extreme, moralism may be seen as a kind of posture or
pose taken up in the ruins of morality by its faithful adherents; it
is thus at once a ‘fall’ from morality, a ‘reversal’ of morality,
and an impoverished substitute for, or reaction to, the eviscera-
tion of a sustaining moral vision. As an ‘addiction,’ the compul-
sive quality of moralism stands opposed to measured, difficult,
and deliberate action that implicates rather than simply enacts
the self (Brown 2001: 23).
Brown goes on to deem moralism ‘ritualistic’ and ‘often punitive’ (Brown 2001:
23) and enlightens these claims with reference to Machiavelli (Brown 2001: 27), who,
in chapter 18 of The Prince claims that:
[a] ruler, then, need not actually possess all the above-mentioned
qualities [those classified as good], but he must certainly seem
to. Indeed, I shall be so bold as to say that having and always
cultivating them is harmful, whereas seeming to have them is
useful; for instance, to seem merciful, trustworthy, humane, up-
right and devout, and also to be so. But if it becomes necessary
to refrain, you must be prepared to act in the opposite way, and
be capable of doing it (Machiavelli 1988: 62).
Brown argues that when the limits and problems of a moral politics (when it is set
above politics) become apparent to those in government, and means that their moral vi-
sion cannot match up to the political situation, then they can no longer act in good faith
and the moral becomes the moralising. Hence, Machiavelli’s ‘seemingly good’ states-
man will be less likely to veer towards moralism than the ‘actually good’ statesman
(Brown 2001: 23). Brown draws from this that moralism demonstrates:
analytic impotence and political aimlessness – a misrecognition
of the political logics now organising the world, a concomitant
failure to discern any direction for action, and the loss of a clear
object of political desire […] a symptom of political paralysis in
the face of radical political disorientation (Brown 2001: 29).
This seems like it could have real world applications. If a political situation is par-
ticularly fraught, as might well be the case in situations of potential humanitarian inter-
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vention, or a government’s position precarious, or its politicians suffering from the ex-
tremes of either inexperience or hubris, then the problems illustrated by Max Weber, in
his Politics as a Vocation also play their part. Once moralism is active in politics then
the responsibility for the consequences of its actions are borne by the theory, not the
politicians. Moralism, not morality per se is most definitely a form of anti-politics and
Brown is right to keep this distinction before us.
Brown goes on to explain the morality/politics divide in more depth, and her im-
pression is contained in the quote below:
[e]ven in its least philosophical modality, the problematic of
morality in politics is usually thought to center on the complex
relation between principle and power, or on the important inter-
vals between aim, strategy, action, and effect. Conventional in-
quiries into morality and politics almost always assume the rela-
tionship between principle and power to be fully antagonistic
(Brown 2001: 24).
Brown’s reduction of morality to principle and politics to power is not particularly
helpful, as it perhaps clouds the issue more than need be. Nonetheless, the point is one
with which E.H.Carr in The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919-1939 would agree, as the
utopian who dreams that it is possible to eliminate self-assertion
from politics and to base a political system on morality alone is
just as wide of the mark as the realist who believes that altruism
is an illusion and that all political action is based on self-seeking
(Carr 1939: 125).
However, using Brown’s terminology, if the assumption is made at the outset that
principle and power are incompatible, then no distinction will be able to be made be-
tween morality and moralism in politics as the terms collapse both into one another and
into a posited anti-politics.
The dangers when this collapse occurs are that while an anti-political moralism is
rejected, so too is all morality – a conclusion which would shock Machiavelli, who
knew its worth. Hans Morgenthau states not that moral principles cannot be applied to
the actions of states, but that ‘universal moral principles cannot be applied to the actions
of states’ (Morgenthau 1962a: 108). He does seem to contradict this statement in his
essay entitled The Problem of the National Interest where he states that ‘I have always
maintained that the actions of states are subject to universal moral principles’ (Morgen-
thau 1962a: 106). However he goes on to qualify this with the claims that ‘to know that
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states are subject to the moral law is one thing; to pretend to know what is morally re-
quired of states in a particular situation is quite another’ (Morgenthau 1962a: 106).
Morgenthau seems always to be aware that he is liable to be accused of denying
the notion of any sort of morality being associated with states and international rela-
tions, and it is this which drives him to seemingly be at odds with his own statements
(which has nonetheless not stopped him being accused on this very point). Thus, he
says, in referring to the relationship between universal moral principles and political
action that:
these universal moral principles cannot be applied to the actions
of states in their abstract universal formulation but that they
must be, as it were, filtered through the concrete circumstances
of time and place (Morgenthau 1962a: 108).
It is, perhaps, the ‘universal’ moral principles of which Morgenthau speaks which
are the aspect of his thought most liable to cause confusion. For while he does not ap-
pear to deny universal moral principles, neither does he think that, should there be any,
anyone could have any access to them and, if so, that they can have any bearing, in their
‘universal’ form at least, on international politics. Morgenthau does seem to be aware of
the difference mentioned above between politics as activity and the study of politics.
Indeed, Morgenthau seems to be acutely aware of the problems of the moral and the po-
litical and speaks of this:
curious dialectic of ethics and politics, which prevents the latter,
in spite of itself, from escaping the former’s judgment and nor-
mative direction, has its roots in the nature of man as both a po-
litical and moral animal (Morgenthau 1945: 5).
As Morgenthau is aware, the decision to place morality completely outside of pol-
itics is a moral decision and not a political one and those who do so commit the same
error as those who attempt to build morality into politics. Insofar as Cranston is correct
that politics is where there is disagreement concerning values, or even merely of New-
ey’s possibility of disagreement (Newey 2001: 50), then constructing the answer before
the disagreement has occurred, by either building morality completely into or out of pol-
itics, is to make the possibility of disagreement, not engagement in politics, but, rather,
the state simply of being wrong from the outset. As Crick says in his essay entitled The
Nature of Political Rule:
[p]olitics is not religion, ethics, law, science, history, or eco-
nomics; it neither solves everything, nor is it present every-
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where; and it is not any one political doctrine, such as conserva-
tism, liberalism, socialism, communism, or nationalism, though
it can contain elements of most of these (Crick 2005: 2).
In short, politics is flexible and malleable, and as such finds itself within other
disciplines’ realms, but as Crick correctly points out politics does not equal religion,
politics does not equal law, but as a relationship between disagreements, the political
could certainly find itself at home in these sphere.
One of the dichotomies which pushes politics towards religion more than morality
is the good and evil as opposed to the right and wrong dichotomy. As mentioned above,
Cole uses the religious dichotomy, and in discussion of morality and politics being fully
antagonistic, so too does Brown when she claims that:
the potential for absolute goodness is conferred on principle and
absolute evil on power […] a formulation of the relationship of
politics and morality that reduces to ‘power versus principle’ has
persisted into the present, especially when violence is at issue
(Brown 2001: 24).
Under the heading Politics in the Register of Morality Chantal Mouffe approaches
this tendency, and, with an eye to Schmitt, explains why this is a problem:
instead of being constructed in political terms, the ‘we’/‘they’
opposition constitutive of politics is now constructed according
to moral categories of ‘good’ versus ‘evil’.
What this change of vocabulary reveals is not, as some would
have it, that politics has been replaced by morality but that poli-
tics is being played out in the moral register. It is in that sense
that I am proposing to understand the ‘moralization’ of politics –
to indicate not that politics has become more moral but that
nowadays political antagonisms are being formulated in terms of
moral categories, We are still faced with political friend/enemy
discriminations but they are now expressed using the vocabulary
of morality (Mouffe 2005: 75).
This is a fascinating insight for a number of reasons. If we are to take the notion
of anti-politics or the risk of depoliticisation seriously, then the conflict-resolving poten-
tial of politics can be forfeited if it shifts into a position where its moves are limited by
claims which assert control over and above it. These claims of universalism, objectivity,
or morality prevent some options being present, and furthermore place any decision on
these options back into the realm of the universal, or the objective, or the moral, and
away from the political. However, it has also been argued that politics is plastic and can
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utilise any number of categories and remain political: it is the abdication in favour of
one category which depoliticises. What Mouffe makes clear is that politics can act polit-
ically, but still claim that its decisions are moral ones. Thus, we have another level of
argument: morality, moralism and the moral register or moral rhetoric.
Mouffe’s point is that while politicians, political scientists, and political philoso-
phers may discuss the moral and the political in a government’s position on account of
it appearing to have a moral dimension, it is not the case that this means it must contain
a moral dimension. To move into another realm in the name of politics is a very politi-
cal act, and there may be nothing quite as political as making a decision and clothing it
as moral, or legal or whatever best suits the political at that time.
Mouffe seems to think this move towards the moral register a threat, and it could
well be. However, it is not at all clear that it is. The political subsuming itself to the
moral is certainly depoliticising and Machiavelli has pointed out the weakness of this
position; the political turning to moralism in its decision-making is problematic while
Weber has indicated how important the politics of responsibility is. Nevertheless, cover-
ing the political in moral garb for the sake of the political is interesting, although if it is
a permanent transformation then it may become worrying, but this point leads to
Schmitt and perhaps a criticism of Schmitt and Mouffe by Schmitt himself.
In his first book on political theology, Schmitt proposes that the ideas in modern
political thought are in fact secular versions of theological concepts, that is that the:
metaphysical image that a definite epoch forges of the world has
the same structure as what the world immediately understands to
be appropriate as a form of its political organization (Schmitt
1985: Ch3 p46).
Schmitt’s argument seems on the face of it to be correct, certainly it is difficult to
imagine a secular, modern, Western nation of today being governed by an absolute
monarchy: the two views of the world would not map onto one another. However,
Schmitt is working in what I have deemed area two, and he is undoubtedly concerned
with the problems of area three, but it is not clear if he is aware that he is part of area
three and thus open to the same arguments. From the early part of the twentieth century
up until the end of the Cold War, the foe register is one which mapped well onto the sit-
uation as it stood: it was quite clear who one’s enemies were and this presence of an en-
emy united disparate entities into friends against them. The sense of place in the follow-
ing quote from the later chapter in Political Theology as Schmitt criticises liberalism is
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tremendous, and in the midst of the Weimar Republic, where this was written in 1922
and updated in 1933, could almost be seen as prophetic:
Donoso Cortés considered continuous discussion a method of
circumventing responsibility and of ascribing to freedom of
speech and of the freedom of the press an excessive importance
that in the final analysis permits the decision to be evaded. Just
as liberalism discusses and negotiates every political detail, so it
wants to dissolve metaphysical truth in a discussion. The es-
sence of liberalism is negotiation, a cautious half measure, in the
hope that the definitive dispute, the decisive bloody battle, can
be transformed into a parliamentary debate and permit the deci-
sion to be suspended forever, in an everlasting discussion
(Schmitt 1985: Ch4 p63).
The endless discussion and negotiation was in part what brought down the Wei-
mar Republic and decisions were eventually taken, not by discussion, to bring about the
decisive bloody battles. However, criticism of liberalism in the Weimar Republic is not
criticism of modern liberalism. The friend/foe dichotomy of the majority of the twenti-
eth century will be less effective once walls have fallen and great uniting enemies dis-
appear. Schmitt’s arguments need not hold for all time and the world as he experienced
it in 1930s Germany is not the world we are in now.
As pointed out in the very first chapter of this dissertation, what emerged after the
end of the Cold War was optimism and this expressed itself in universal principles and
ethics. What Mouffe has observed is that the register has changed to that of a moral reg-
ister. However, what Mouffe may have missed is the fact that this need not be forever:
this register may change again. In fact, if Schmitt’s assessment of political theology is
correct then a change in the world, or our assessment of it almost certainly will. This
should not, however, detract from the fact that if politics is operating, or is tending to
operate, in a moral register then that is the political situation in which the political scien-
tists and political philosophers must operate. This is not to claim that political scientists
and political philosophers must use the moral register themselves, but rather if the poli-
tics of the time are being carried out in the moral register, or a time of optimism, or de-
pression, or boom, or Cold War, then this will influence politics itself and how politics
presents itself. I do not claim that there is nothing in Schmitt which cannot be applied to
contemporary political debate and humanitarian intervention, but any claims that
Schmitt will be valid for all times might be considered as anti-politics itself.
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There are several grounds for using Schmitt’s arguments regardless of the above
criticism. Firstly, Schmitt made his politics/the-political distinction in an article con-
tained within Le Categorie del ‘Politico’ published in Italian in 1972. In this piece
Schmitt argues that once the state’s monopoly on politics diminished, new political
players appeared (along with a new level of possible theory) and only at this point were
politics and the political able to be classified (Schwab 1976: 12f). An acknowledgement
of this distinction ties Schmitt’s theory into thinkers such as Mouffe and Oakeshott.
Secondly, the useful friend/foe distinction is, famously, Schmitt’s, and thirdly, Schmitt
lists several items which are not politics, but for reasons quite different to that of Crick
or Miller. The listing of what is not politics starts off as clear enough, but becomes
thereafter more complicated. Schmitt argues that one:
seldom finds a clear definition of the political. The word is most
frequently used negatively, in contrast to various other ideas, for
example in such antitheses as politics and economy, politics and
morality, politics and law (Schmitt 1976: 20).
Thus, in part I of the essay, Schmitt lists the following political antitheses:
religious as antithesis of political
cultural as antithesis of political
economic as antithesis of political
legal as antithesis of political
scientific as antithesis of political (Schmitt 1976: 23).
However, he uses these as examples of ‘thoroughly polemical and thereby again
political antitheses’ (Schmitt 1976: 23) originating in the nineteenth century, which de-
mocracy must do away with, as they constitute a neutralisation and depoliticising of
domains which Schmitt deems important. Schmitt goes on to elaborate these claims.
Assuming that the state does not equal politics, an equation which Schmitt claims
occurs once the idea of state no longer held the monopoly on politics, then the old equa-
tion of state and society being separate no longer stood. The boundary changed and they
began to interact with one another, and so what was once purely social can now be of
interest to the state, and vice versa (Schmitt 1976: 22). Once this has occurred, there is
little which cannot potentially be labelled political – any claim to being neutral, i.e. not
involving the state, will not necessarily hold true (Schmitt 1976: 22). If this is the case,
then a claim such as morality is the antithesis of political, that is, conjecturing a clear
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delineation of morality from politics with unambiguous and impenetrable peripheries, is
thereby an attempt to claim ‘apolitical purity’ (Schmitt 1976: 21n), which is a particu-
larly political claim.
The contention that the apolitical, or non-political is political is, as such, not illog-
ical, as Schmitt explains:
designating the adversary as political and oneself as non-
political (i.e., scientific, just, objective, neutral, etc.) is in actual-
ity a typical and unusually intensive way of pursing politics
(Schmitt 1976: 23).
Hence, for Schmitt, any claims that morality is anti-politics is a political state-
ment. This initially looks contradictory and illogical. The claim that the statement ‘mo-
rality does not belong in politics’ is political results in morality being political and
thereby that the non-politics is political – surely a logical contradiction? If this is the
case then as soon as I mention anything in the same sentence or thought as ‘politics’ it
becomes political, ergo nothing can be apolitical and politics is everything. However,
the previous arguments – those of Crick and Newey above – have also hinted at this
conclusion. We saw that for politics to even take place there must be a previous moral
basis, otherwise there would be nothing to stop one killing, rather than arguing with,
ones opponent, and that it is better that a politician seem moral than to always be moral.
The moral can be present in politics, just as politics can be present in the moral, but this
does not mean there is no difference between morality and politics. There is little which
cannot, at some point or other, enter into politics or into which politics cannot itself en-
ter, if only for a short time. To deny an entire area into which politics can legitimately
enter as being for all times off limits is to have some sort of agenda. Schmitt seems to
be correct.
Schmitt realises that there are different types of argumentation occurring and
acknowledges two fields: politics and the political. This recognition that there is more
than one area at work, that discussing the theory of politics is not the same as doing pol-
itics appears in several commentators. Mouffe’s makes her Heideggerian ontic vs. onto-
logical distinction, i.e. politics vs. the political based on Schmitt’s distinction, while
Oakeshott’s quote concerning the ‘coherence of the two worlds together’ (Oakeshott
1946: ix) seems to follow similar lines. Any discussion of what politics ‘is’, is a meta-
politics for want of a better word, ergo, the discussion of the link between politics and
any other realm, be it morality, religion, or economics is clearly a political discussion.
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Schmitt’s contention seems to hold true and the awareness of what area one is engaging
at is something that is often being missed from the discussion on humanitarian interven-
tion.
Nonetheless, at first reading Schmitt himself seems to have issues with his own
conclusions, as he states:
[i]n contrast to the various relatively independent endeavors
[sic] of human thought and action, particularly the moral, aes-
thetic, and economic, the political has its own criteria which ex-
press themselves in a characteristic way. The political must
therefore rest on its own ultimate distinctions, to which all ac-
tion with a specifically political meaning can be traced. Let us
assume that in the realm of morality the final distinctions are be-
tween good and evil, in aesthetics beautiful and ugly, in eco-
nomics profitable and unprofitable (Schmitt 1974: 25-26).
This is interesting as, despite his claim that assertions of the sort ‘subjects such as
economics and morality are the antitheses of political’ are in fact political, he now la-
bels these areas as ‘relatively independent endeavors’ and declares that the moral and
the political have their own distinctions which other subjects will mirror but not share.
Surely these distinctions will render these subjects clearly delineated from other areas?
The point to remember here is that Schmitt is not claiming that these aspects, e.g. reli-
gious, moral etc, exist completely independently – this would mean Schmitt falling into
his own trap of claiming a universality which they cannot possess. Rather, he is simply
disagreeing with any assertions that these areas in no way overlap with the political, he
points out their distinctions but he does not deny their intersection. He goes on to state
that every:
religious, moral, economic, ethical, or other antithesis trans-
forms into a political one if it is sufficiently strong to group hu-
man beings effectively according to friend and enemy […] A re-
ligious community which wages wars against members of other
religious communities or engages in other wars is already more
than a religious community; it is a political entity (Schmitt 1976:
37).
Furthermore:
[e]motionally the enemy is easily treated as being evil and ugly,
because every distinction, most of all the political, as the strong-
est and most intense of the distinctions and categorizations,
draws upon the other distinctions for support […] the morally
evil, aesthetically ugly, and economically damaging need not
necessarily be the enemy; the morally good, aesthetically beauti-
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ful, and economically profitable need not necessarily become
the friend in the specifically political sense of the word (Schmitt
1976: 27).
This makes sense and would explain the movement into the moral register of poli-
tics: the economically profitable can also move into the political to express something
positively, and while the aesthetic might seem to appear less often, it is possibly there at
a more subtle level. Politics is a human activity and any claims that an entire and rea-
sonably global branch of human activity is amoral or non-moral seems to be a conten-
tion of colossal proportions. Once again Schmitt seems to be correct.
However, while Schmitt appears to have found a useful tool, it is by no means
clear that these delineations are the defining dichotomies for the categorisations he
claims. The discussion of politics and attempts to define what it is have been fraught.
Scientifically, we cannot prove what is not, only what is and the concept of anti-politics
mirrors this elusiveness. Defining something by what it is not is, as Schmitt might say, a
particularly political way to proceed. Schmitt’s thought tends to be discussed in legal
and political circles, but he makes claims that there are dichotomies at work in ethics
and that:
in the realm of morality the final distinctions are between good
and evil, in aesthetics beautiful and ugly, in economics profita-
ble and unprofitable (Schmitt 1974: 25f).
Schmitt’s claim that morality is based on specific criteria, namely as existing be-
tween two opposites, is not new. However, it is not at all clear that the criteria must be
between good and evil – as already claimed above, rights and wrong may be better for
ethics. The most famed of the accounts positing morality as existing between two ex-
tremes is that of Aristotle. In his Ethics Aristotle claims that:
it is in the nature of moral qualities that they are destroyed by
deficiency and excess […] both excessive and insufficient exer-
cise destroy one’s strength, and both eating and drinking too
much or too little destroy health, whereas the right quantity pro-
duces, increases and preserves it. […] Thus temperance and
courage are destroyed by excess and deficiency and preserved
by the mean (Aristotle 1976 Bk 2 1104a11-32 pg 94).
For Aristotle, the moral does contain dichotomies, but that to choose either of the-
se dichotomies on its own would be to give in to excess – the mean, the middle ground,
dare one say the political, is the answer to what is moral to Aristotle.
However, this is not the only criteria which Aristotle allows into moral questions:
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[f]or it is with pleasures and pains that moral goodness is con-
cerned, Pleasure induces us to behave badly, and pain to shrink
from fine actions. […] If the virtues are concerned with actions
and feelings, and every feeling and every action is always ac-
companied by pleasure or pain, on this ground too virtue will be
concerned with pleasures and pain (Aristotle 1976 Book 2
1104a33-b20 pg 95).
Thus, when Schmitt informs us that morality is concerned with good and evil, we
might agree, but we might also argue that Aristotle is not of this opinion, nor that there
is only one criterion of morality. Similarly, when Schmitt informs us that friend and foe
is the criterion which defines a political action we might agree that a conflict between
two opposites is possible, much as it is in morality, legality, economics and aesthetics.
That there is only one criterion, however, is not clear, nor that the criterion should it be
the case, remains unchanged forever. Indeed, to paraphrase Schmitt, and as we already
used it above, such a claim might well be an ‘unusually intensive way of pursing poli-
tics’ (Schmitt 1976: 23).
Moreover, as with other writers above, Schmitt seems to lean towards confusing
the moral with the religious, for surely it is religion which will deal more often in di-
chotomies of good and evil. It is also not merely the case that these domains of aesthet-
ics, morals etc can overlap with politics and that these domains draw upon other distinc-
tions, rather one can use these characteristics to legitimise ones own goals and demonise
those of the other (Schmitt 1976: 66). In fact:
being reproached for immorality and cynicism, the spectator of
political phenomena can always recognize in such reproaches a
political weapon used in actual combat (Schmitt 1974: 67).
Indeed, the use of other domains and the demonisation of the enemy, i.e. going
beyond the political framework results, Schmitt claims, in unusually brutal war. In such
cases the enemy is not simply the enemy, but is rendered an immoral, inhuman monster:
evil and ugly, who cannot only be defeated, but must be destroyed: if we are the side
possessing the virtues how could it be otherwise (Schmitt 1976: 36)? This is a state of
affairs which Schmitt credits Hobbes with recognising (Schmitt 1976: 65). Indeed, we
do not need Schmitt in order to give words to this claim. As we have seen, Koselleck
says that:
[b]y the yardstick of the laws of the moral world, social and po-
litical reality is not only incomplete, limited, or unstable but also
immoral, unnatural and foolish. The abstract and unpolitical
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starting point allows a forceful, total attack on a reality in need
of reform.
The totality of the politically neutral claim of a fixed, eternally
valid morality necessarily turns political acts and attitudes, once
they are subjected to a moral test which they cannot pass, into
total injustice. Moral totality deprives all who do not subject
themselves to it of their right to exist (Koselleck 1988: 152).
Finally, we come to the point where humanitarian intervention can be linked into
the discussion: this argument of Schmitt’s is directly applicable to the concept of hu-
manitarian intervention without any great leap of faith. Schmitt claims that humanity is
not a political concept (Schmitt 1976: 55) but writes the following, which is relevant
enough to the arguments surrounding humanitarian intervention to be quoted in full:
[t]he concept of humanity excludes the concept of the enemy,
because the enemy does not cease to be a human being – and
hence there is no specific differentiation in that concept. That
wars are waged in the name of humanity is not a contradiction
of this simple truth; quite the contrary, it has an especially inten-
sive political meaning. When a state fights its political enemy in
the name of humanity, it is not a war for the sake of humanity,
but a war wherein a particular state seeks to usurp a universal
concept against its military opponent. At the expense of its op-
ponent, it tries to identify itself with humanity in the same way
as one can misuse peace, justice, progress, and civilization in
order to claim these as one’s own and to deny the same to the
enemy.
The concept of humanity is an especially useful ideological in-
strument of imperialist expansion, and in its ethical-
humanitarian form it is a specific vehicle of economic imperial-
ism. Here one is reminded of a somewhat modified expression
of Proudhon’s: whoever invokes humanity wants to cheat. To
confiscate the word humanity, to invoke and monopolize such a
term probably has certain incalculable effects, such as denying
the enemy the quality of being human and declaring him to be
an outlaw of humanity; and a war can thereby be driven to the
most extreme inhumanity (Schmitt 1976: 54).
This is a startling passage both in the ideas it sets out and in the fact that it was
written more than 70 years ago. Its arguments, even if the underlying friend/foe dichot-
omy is not accepted, are powerful: the mere act of declaring oneself to be on the side of
justice or the good, or the true, automatically puts those whom one is fighting on the
side of those who do not fight for justice or the good or the true. Politically, we can
clash with the enemy to resolve the conflict; morally, we ought to destroy them. If one
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is involved in a humanitarian war, and it is to protect humanity from the other, then that
other has truly sunk very low indeed: if we possess all the virtues and they oppose them,
they can only be riddled with vice. If nothing else, Schmitt shows the linguistic dangers
of the use of the term humanitarian intervention, and it might certainly be argued that
episodes such as Guantanamo Bay and Abu Graib linked, as they are claimed to be,
with the ‘good guys’ of recent conflicts back this up. One need not find Schmitt to one’s
liking to admit that he may have a point. And, indeed, much of the recent work utilising
Schmitt has endeavoured to use his points without agreeing with his politics. These at-
tempts also highlight other issues at work which are perhaps not always identified as
part of the discussion of the political and the moral.
Dietmar von der Pfordten complains that there is hardly a clear identifying feature
of political action or decision-making in the whole of political philosophy, but that one
is rather more likely to find something by ‘conservatives’ such as Carl Schmitt rather
than those on the ‘left’ (von der Pfordten: 2001: 3f). His reason for this claim is that
while Hobbes and Locke make a relatively clear division between politics in the sense
of sovereign government and society in the sense of social community, Rousseau and
the Utilitarians have systematically blurred this distinction. While in Hobbes and Locke
the contract justifies political authority, in Rousseau it becomes a ‘social’ contract, a
contract which constitutes the society (von der Pfordten: 2001: 3f). Furthermore, he
claims that on account of the maximisation of happiness in all areas of life, the clear dif-
ferentiation between the political and the social sphere within Utilitarianism also loses
its importance. Moreover, in John Rawls there is no clear boundary between political
and social action: to the point that von der Pfordten claims that one can hardly differen-
tiate between politics and society (von der Pfordten: 2001: 3f) – the delineation upon
which Schmitt lays so much emphasis. Despite any arguments one might have with the
author’s interpretations, the notion of a left/right split is an interesting idea and one that
hints at underlying issues at stake in humanitarian intervention, and so will be followed
up.
A fundamental left/right split, in addition to confusions regarding what the subject
of politics actually is, and what the danger to politics in the form of anti-politics might
be, could result in specific undercurrents registering in the humanitarian intervention
discussion but without any reasoning to why they would be there. There does not appear
to be a left/right split on what the study of politics is: that particular paradigm shift
seems to be historical in nature as the further back one goes, in the UK at least, the more
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chance there is of politics being thought of in terms of philosophy. Similarly, the more
recent a definition one looks at, the less chance of seeing philosophy being mentioned at
all, never mind as the birth mother of the subject.
So what would the left/right split on the subject of morality and politics look like?
Claude Lefort gives a rather clear account of this and thus lends himself to the subject:
[m]odern conservative thinking does not doubt that relations of
property and relations of power constitute the essence of poli-
tics, however keen it is to extol the values of democracy. Of
course, it regards individual liberties and the guarantees accord-
ed to the security of citizens as sacred, But it scrupulously dis-
tinguishes between what falls within the domain of morality and
what falls within the domain of politics (Lefort 1986: 243).
The relation of property will not be looked at, its role in humanitarian intervention
not being convincing. The relation of power to politics has been mentioned briefly
above. This does take us into ideological territory and as such is well able to be a signif-
icant undercurrent. Of course, if one is to class Schmitt as a conservative thinker, as von
der Pfordten does, then not only would Schmitt dispute Lefort’s idea of politics having
an essence, but his distinction is friend/foe, and not power per se. Indeed, Schmitt’s
claim is that the negation of the political (something which he cannot approve of) is in-
herent in all forms of individualism and, ergo, in liberalism, which cannot then generate
its own positive theory, there is no such thing as liberal politics, but only a liberal cri-
tique of politics (Schmitt 1976: 70). Thus for Schmitt individual liberties are unlikely to
be sacred – although he would no doubt appreciate the use of the dominion of the reli-
gious for the political – but are innately in juxtaposition to the political. That said, many
conservatives would be offended to be grouped together with Schmitt, and it could be
argued that Lefort’s modern conservative may not be a term one could use with Schmitt.
Whether Lefort, von der Pfordten, or Schmitt is most at fault here is difficult to say, but
the three accounts do not fit seamlessly together.
However, of most interest in Lefort’s account is his claim that the conservative
keeps the domain of morality and that of politics quite separate. Again, we can quote
Schmitt and his claims that liberalism has done away with any separation on account of
its de-politicisation polemics and attempts at apolitical purity. Moreover, Schmitt’s
point that the absolute separation of morality and politics is just a very intensive method
of carrying out politics is applicable here as is his acknowledgement of the intersection
of realms, but the above criticisms of Schmitt’s position within conservative thought
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still hold. Nonetheless, if conservative thought is thought to differentiate clearly the is-
sues of morality in politics, and the thought of the left to be not as scrupulous on this
point, then judgments upon humanitarian intervention later on may be influenced. This
could mean that judgments on the concept of humanitarian intervention may not be
based on the idea of humanitarian intervention in itself but on humanitarian intervention
qua examples of action of the left or the right and thereby on an underlying dogma ra-
ther than the issue itself.
A perhaps less controversial type of conservativism can be applied to Edmund
Burke, but even here we can strike a blow against von der Pfordten’s left/right distinc-
tion by a Burke quote made famous in another inaugural speech, that of Lord Acton,
who quotes him as saying:
[m]y principles enable me to form my judgment upon men and
actions in history, just as they do in common life; and are not
formed out of events and characters, either present or past. His-
tory is a preceptor of prudence, not of principles. The principles
of true politics are those of morality enlarged; and I neither now
do, nor ever will admit of any other (Burke 1960: 282).
Once again, Laski and Burke are interesting bedfellows, we meet ‘true politics’ –
a concept of which Plato would be proud and which, were it to exist, would unlikely be
accessible to mere mortals – and Burke’s claim that they are ‘morality enlarged’ is ra-
ther in contradiction to Lefort’s assertion that the morality/political split will be ap-
proved of by conservative thinkers. However, in deference to Lefort, it could again be
argued that an author writing in November 1771 may not be classed as a modern con-
servative; furthermore, Burke is writing a private correspondence in a rather heated per-
sonal argument about his family’s behaviour in this case – a fact mentioned in the vol-
ume in question, but seldom mentioned in subsequent quoting.
It certainly looks like while a divide may be in place concerning morality and pol-
itics, there are issues in determining whether or not that can be classed as conservative
or not, and the relationship of liberal thought to conservative thought is also going to
have repercussions. However, insofar as area two seems concerned with ideologies and
dogmas, the infiltration of these notions into discussion of humanitarian intervention is
entirely possible. On occasion, this left/right split will certainly be knowingly done, but
as it seems unclear as to whether a left/right split generates specific answers this would
be an unnecessary, but powerful undercurrent.
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O’Sullivan claims, in criticising Rawls, that it is the element of power which sepa-
rates the moral from the political, a fact which he believes Rawls to have ignored
(O’Sullivan 1997: 742). However, if this is the case, then will it not also be the element
of power which separates the economic from the political, or the religious from the po-
litical, and we are back to the question of why the moral/politics split rather than any
other should be so important? Nonetheless, O’Sullivan’s answer to why Rawls feels
able to ignore this, throws doubt on von der Pfordten’s assertion that Rawls’ politi-
cal/social amalgamation is the main issue at stake:
[t]he answer is that he [Rawls] begins by moving all sources of
major conflict, arising for example from religion and morality,
out of the public realm into the private sphere. The public realm,
in short, is de-politicized at the outset (O’Sullivan 1997: 742).
Schmitt’s claim is that the merging of society and the state is a symptom of the
(politically motivated) de-politicisation of important domains. If we take this to be the
case, then the only possible retreat for the depoliticised would indeed be the private
sphere, regardless of what one assumes the essence of the political to be. If Crick is cor-
rect and
politics represents at least some tolerance of differing truths,
some recognition that government is possible, indeed best con-
ducted, amid the open canvassing of rival interests. Politics are
the public actions of free men. Freedom is the privacy of men
from public actions (Crick 2005: 4),
then the de-politicisation of the public sphere would force the ‘differing truths’ in-
to the private sphere, where conciliation will not be possible. One solves the conflicts by
not allowing them to be dealt with. This could be considered a freedom of sorts, as pub-
lic actions qua politics, if prevented from being public and forced into the private
sphere, would prevent the public actions taking place altogether, a situation which, as
Cranston mentions above, being completely without politics could be mistaken for
heaven (Cranston 1971: 293).
By a rather circular route we are back to why Schmitt so feared the depoliticising
of politics, alas, not via the problem of morality. A continuation of O’Sullivan’s critique
of Rawls indicates the way out of the labyrinth:
the real importance of Rawls’ theory work is that it provides the
classic illustration of the post-war eclipse of the political by the
moral (O’Sullivan 1997: 740).
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Here we see where the issue lies: any de-politicisation of the public sphere will
create a vacuum, sucking another domain into its place. It is not clear that the domain of
morality would be any better or any worse than those of religion, economics, or culture.
I have already mentioned that I believe Schmitt confuses the moral dichotomy of
good/bad, with a possibly religious notion of good/evil. Nonetheless, in filling a vacuum
the moral domain can quite happily come into question for as Ivison says:
almost no one believes that morality is never relevant for politi-
cal judgment or action (Ivison 2005: 171).
Dower would agree with him, and takes us back to the international level which is
necessary for humanitarian intervention in saying:
[e]ven if we agree that foreign policy must be shaped by consid-
erations of one type or other, that still leaves open the possibility
that moral values contribute to it, either because international
actors are persuaded that they are important, or because elec-
torates which they represent are (Dower 1998: 9).
Going back again to Schmitt, he would most probably agree with Dower – the rul-
ing out of any domain would not be a politically prudent thing to do – which is to say, it
could be very political, but not very clever. To rule it out would be for political reasons
– so a political act and for political reasons; and finally any attempt to separate the two
completely would be an attempt to depoliticise politics, ergo a political act one way or
the other. Schmitt makes it rather difficult to escape his logic.
Ivison can take on board those concerned with power, but his point is not limited
only to them, his argument extends to all politics when he reasons that all:
politics is moral in at least this sense: power never merely as-
serts itself. Power always seek to legitimize itself in some way,
or at least to de-legitimate its opponents, and thus always leaves
itself open to the counter-legitimizing moves and arguments of
others. In so far as politics is constantly dealing with questions
of legitimacy, morality is in some way intrinsic to it (Ivison
2005: 177).
Ivison and Dower’s arguments take us into enthralling territory. Schmitt has said
that the political will, qua political, utilise the other domains. Ivison and Dower have
shown that morality can occur within the political in ways which are naturally political.
Hence, an attempt to fashion a strict politics/morality separation could be seen, whether
you accept Schmitt or not, as a de-politicisation of politics.
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Furthermore, any discussion of why there ought to be a separation of these two
domains is well within the remit of political philosophy, indeed it would be difficult to
discuss this area without this method. And what is political philosophy? Hoffmann
would claim that political philosophy has traditionally been about the good state (Hoff-
mann 1998: 11), and Strauss makes only a slight deviation from this in professing that
political philosophy is:
the attempt truly to know both the nature of political things and
the right, or the good, political order (Strauss 1959: 12).
It is difficult to argue the question of why there ought or ought not to be a differ-
ence between morality and politics without the use of moral philosophy and its subset of
political philosophy. That this is the only story or that it is more ‘true politics’ than any
other method is nonsense on stilts: it is simply the correct method for certain questions.
However, if our academic study of politics pioneers are correct – and if they are wrong,
at the very least they are all in agreement and as distinguished a group of wrong as one
could hope for in politics – moral philosophy sits very comfortably in its politics chair.
Indeed, moral philosophy sits perhaps comfortably enough that the moral could well be
next in line to the throne upon the death of the political. This would obviously come as a
shock to the dominant theories of international relations, which, according to Brown and
Ainley:
claim to be explanatory and value-free rather than normative
(Brown and Ainley 2005: 207f).
Of course, the dominant theories are likely to fall to the same accusations from
Schmitt, on account of their attempts to keep politics ‘pure’ in the sense of morality
free. They argue that the dominant theories of international relations deem theorising
about ethics in the international system:
as utopian or irrelevant. States in an anarchy make the decisions
they must, based on national-interest calculations and (for the
neorealist) systematic imperatives. Morality exists only within
the borders of the sovereign state, which protects and promotes
the values of its citizens and thereby makes morality possible,
and as such is of no concern to IR [international relations] theo-
rists (Brown and Ainley 2005: 208).
Dower mentions above that morality could well contribute to the national-interest.
It seems that were it to, it could be denied by those who think it does not belong, its po-
litical aspect rejected and, thereby, depoliticised: which takes us back to the discussion
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above. The Schmittian argument concerning anti-politics becomes a bit more obvious
and it seems possible to utilise it in a number of ways, especially as, if the analysis of
Schmitt is correct, international relations theory and theorists seem intent on depoliticis-
ing politics.
While several aspects of these concepts may now seem slightly clearer, one issues
remains: why should morality be singled out in being so feared? That it might be the
prince regent to the political in its dotage is clear, but why should that be so explicitly
repudiated, and not the religious or the cultural or the environmental? If the aspect of
power, mentioned several times but held at a distance, is considered to be the determin-
ing factor in politics, as it is claimed conservative thought holds, then Nietzsche might
be able to explain. As he says in the Genealogy of Morals:
[w]hat if a symptom of regression were inherent in the ‘good’,
likewise a danger, a seduction, a poison, a narcotic, through
which the present was possibly living at the expense of the fu-
ture? Perhaps more comfortably, less dangerously, but at the
same time in a meaner style, more basely? – So that precisely
morality would be to blame if the highest power and splendour
actually possible to the type man was never in fact attained? So
that precisely morality was the danger of dangers? (Nietzsche
2000: GM §6).
According to Nietzsche, or as far as anything can be claimed to be according to
Nietzsche, the attainment of the highest power, if thwarted at all, can be thwarted by
morality – the danger of dangers, to continue my metaphor, not simply the prince re-
gent, but the in-house purveyor of regicide. We can take Nietzsche deeper into this ar-
gument. Assuming Schmitt is correct that a war of humanity would be the most inhu-
mane on account of the dehumanisation of the foe, a situation Hoffmann would agree
with, conveniently, at the international level when he says that once we have ‘moral
warfare’ we are in the situation where:
we are good, other states have moral rights only insofar as they
share our values, international relations is a clash between good
and evil (Hoffmann 1998: 19).
This is the story in The Birth of Tragedy, where Nietzsche repeats his ‘danger of
dangers’ but in a way which makes the comparison with a Schmittian war of inhumanity
more than justified:
confronted with morality (especially Christian, or unconditional,
morality), life must continually and inevitably be in the wrong,
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because life is something essentially amoral – and eventually,
crushed by the weight of contempt and the eternal No, life must
then be felt to be unworthy of desire and altogether worthless.
Morality itself – how now? might not morality be ‘a will to ne-
gate life,’ a secret instinct of annihilation, a principle of decay,
diminution, and slander – the beginning of the end? Hence the
danger of dangers? (Nietzsche 2000: BT §5).
Now it does all seem to be knitting together. Morality can slip so easily into the
place of politics because it is so often used anyway. A political notion of something be-
ing right can be made especially political by adopting the apparel of the moral and
claiming it is not merely right but also good, that is, by using the moral register. The
political is flexible but the moral has many answers in place before the questions have
even been asked and will be the easy option upon the rejection of politics. Thereafter the
depoliticised politics becomes morality and the demonisation of opponents is another
easy step: if you are right and good then opponents can only be wrong and evil, and as
Schmitt points out, will probably possess no conception of economics and invariably be
ugly: why should they not be destroyed if they oppose good? It should be made clear
that at no point does it become necessary for us to have to adhere to the Schmittian
view, or agree that power is the element of politics, adopt a left or right position, or be-
lieve that morality is the danger of dangers, however helpful this is to the argument.
A recap of the argumentation and the structure of the reasoning so far would be as
follows. Despite any ideological claims to the contrary, then, morality can be involved
in politics at some level or other. In its form as the anti-political, that is, as moralism,
the moral would negate politics and in eclipsing the political, the moral would replace
conflict with destruction for the non-moral. The moral would be the one danger which
could completely thwart power. If there is a conservative viewpoint, which is not clear,
which would demand a strict differentiation between the moral and politics, this would,
ironically, be part of the de-politicisation of politics on account of the natural utilisation
of the moral by the political. Any argumentation at the level of humanitarian interven-
tion is thereby going to have inappropriate preconceptions (anti-politics?) in place.
Conversely, if there is a liberal viewpoint to this issue, which is again not entirely clear,
which might think that the question of humanitarian intervention will invariably involve
morality, then this is just as mistaken; humanitarian intervention is a political action
which may or may not involve morality, but there is no necessity either way. Eclipsing
the political with the moral is also a de-politicisation of the political in this way.
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This area two discussion has tremendous repercussions for humanitarian interven-
tion, but this argumentation seems to stay firmly rooted in political philosophy, and is
seldom even picked up by political science, never mind politics. This is not to say that
moving this argumentation into areas one and three would help solve real world prob-
lems such as if and how humanitarian interventions are to be carried out; area two ar-
gumentation cannot solve all the problems of philosophy, nor show what must be done
in any given situation. However, area two discussion of anti-politics could certainly aide
the understanding of some of the issues posed in the other two problem areas. A further
discussion rooted firmly in area two also, surprisingly, has implications for the study of
the concept of humanitarian intervention, namely the idea of tragedy in political
thought.
4.3 TRAGEDY AND THE TRAGIC IN RECENT POLITICAL THOUGHT
There has been a recent upsurge in interest towards the theme of tragedy within
the study of politics and international relations. Richard Ned Lebow’s The Tragic Vision
of Politics from 2003 seems to have sparked the resurgence, followed by Mervyn
Frost’s article ‘Tragedy, Ethics and International Relations’ and James Mayall’s ‘Trag-
edy, Progress and the International Order: A Response to Frost’, both in the journal In-
ternational Relations in the same year. Thereafter, the topic is picked up again twice in
International Relations: once in 2005 by Lebow and Nicholas Rengger, and again in
2007 by J. Peter Euben and Chris Brown. This subject is of interest within this disserta-
tion for a number of reasons. Firstly, these articles are concerned with the notion of
politics, a notion so fundamental to, but largely ignored, by humanitarian intervention.
Secondly, they are concerned with correcting issues which they perceive to be at risk of
misunderstanding or misinterpretation within the study of politics. Thirdly, and of most
importance to this thesis, these arguments use the topic of tragedy to operate in several
different areas: the disjunction between politics as they are practiced (area three) and
political studies as the study of the world (area one) in an area two discussion. In short,
within this subject all three areas as I have outlined them are explored.
Before this resurgence can be examined, the originator should be located, and
what is meant by tragedy or the tragic within politics must be looked at. Only then can
this modern reassertion of the tragic be investigated. As may be envisaged, there is not
always agreement on what the notion of tragedy in politics might mean or involve.
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As Lebow has been the catalyst to the modern adoption of the idea of the tragic,
his influences and those from whom he has claimed to have taken up the theme are like-
ly to indicate the origins. Indeed, Lebow concentrates on three authors in his book The
Tragic Vision of Politics whom he deems classical realists, namely, Thucydides,
Clausewitz, and Hans Morgenthau. Of these three, two predate the academic subject of
political science, although both appear within the study of politics: Thucydides is better
known as a historian and Clausewitz as a strategist. Not only was Morgenthau a politi-
cal scientist writing from within a political science department, but he expressly wrote
on this theme, acknowledging his thoughts on tragedy in his Scientific Man vs. Power
Politics where chapter viii is entitled ‘The Tragedy of Scientific Man’. Thus it is to
Morgenthau via Lebow that I will turn my attention.
Lebow states that:
[m]odern realism, derived from the seminal mid-century works
of E.H.Carr, Frederick Schumann, John Herz and Hans J. Mor-
genthau, has been the dominant paradigm in international rela-
tions for the last fifty years (Lebow, 2003: 14)
and goes on to say that:
I hope to persuade readers that ethics are not only instrumentally
important, but that it is impossible to formulate interests intelli-
gently outside of some language of justice. […]
Realism is not just another arcane academic doctrine. As cur-
rently formulated, it offers an intellectual justification for a
range of policies at odds with core democratic and humanitarian
values. American presidents, secretaries of state and national se-
curity advisors have used – mostly in private or off the record –
the language of realism to defend their least palatable policies:
coups, bombings, interventions and support of oppressive dicta-
torships (Lebow 2003: 16).
Of course, this is an American academic theorising about area one American poli-
tics. However, Lord Douglas Hurd as a former British Foreign Secretary can claim:
I think the making of foreign policy is blending realism and ide-
alism. It is blending the world as you would like it to be with the
world as it is. It is an aim—I do not think it is the paramount du-
ty but it is an aim—of British foreign policy, I believe, and of
any government in the modern world, to make a contribution
towards a more decent world, the betterment of humanity and
the correction of human rights abuses (Hurd 1997a: Q79).
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Hurd’s views will be examined later on, but his rejection of dogmas from area
one, if not area two, for application in his field is powerful. Lebow is, he claims, return-
ing to these classical realists where he states that:
[a]ll three realists believed that it was essential, if only for prac-
tical reasons, that foreign policies conform to the ethical stand-
ards of their day (Lebow 2003: 16).
According to Lebow, Morgenthau, in his book Scientific Man vs. Power Politics
‘attributed the horrors of the twentieth century to hubris and miscalculation’ (Lebow
2003: 48). This hubris took the form of ‘the Enlightenment’s misplaced faith in reason
and the false belief it engendered that human beings could remake and control the social
and physical environments’ (Lebow 2003: 49). Despite this misplaced faith in believing
one could control environments, it would seem, ‘Morgenthau based his theory of inter-
national politics on his tragic understanding of the world in the hope that it would help
statesmen to avert another major and perhaps fatal war’ (Lebow 2003: 49). Lebow goes
on to say that:
Morgenthau saw obvious parallels in the methods and goals of
ethics and international relations theory. Philosophers and theo-
rists alike should search for underlying, universal truths through
the study of history, and adapt them to contemporary circum-
stances (Lebow 2003: 242).
At this point Lebow is paraphrasing Morgenthau’s idea which we saw above that:
these universal moral principles cannot be applied to the actions
of states in their abstract universal formulation but that they
must be, as it were, filtered through the concrete circumstances
of time and place (Morgenthau 1962a: 108).
And here it does seem that Lebow is correctly paraphrasing Morgenthau, however
this is the same Morgenthau who says in the same article two pages previous that:
to know that states are subject to the moral law is one thing; to
pretend to know what is morally required of states in a particular
situation is quite another (Morgenthau 1962a: 106).
It is not entirely clear to me either that Lebow is using Morgenthau correctly, or
that the discussion on tragedy is of use to area one or area three. Of course, Morgenthau
using the concept of tragedy (which will be investigated later), and Thucydides and
Clausewitz being interpreted in this manner would not necessarily be enough to gener-
ate this interest. There are several philosophers who have turned their minds towards the
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notion of tragedy who are also claimed by political science as its own, namely Aristotle,
Hegel and Nietzsche. Indeed, even within dramatic criticism, arguably since
A.C.Bradley’s ‘Hegel’s Theory of Tragedy’ was first published in Oxford Lectures on
Poetry in 1909, references to Hegel and tragedy have become commonplace (Paolucci
1975: xi). Bradley himself claimed that ‘Since Aristotle dealt with tragedy […] the only
philosopher who has treated it in a manner both original and searching is Hegel’ (Brad-
ley 1975: 367). Aristotle dealt with tragedy in his Poetics while Nietzsche addressed the
topic in his The Birth of Tragedy. Thus, we have authors within the political canon re-
ferring to tragedy, although by this they are meditating on tragedy as drama as opposed
to tragic politics, nonetheless, they will not be strangers to the field.
In order to proceed, we must discover what is meant by tragic and tragedy, and the
difference, if any, in these terms in the political sense, and how it moved into the politi-
cal sense. Corrigan, looking from the dramatic point of view does give a clear indication
that these two words are to be kept separate:
[w]e must make a distinction between ‘tragedy,’ which is a con-
stantly changing dramatic form that makes manifest and com-
municates the experience of tragedy and the feelings it arouses,
and the ‘tragic,’ which is a particular way of looking at experi-
ence that has persisted more or less unchanged in the Western
world from the time of Homer to the present. When we talk
about tragedy we are in the realm of aesthetics ; when we dis-
cuss the nature of the tragic, we are in the realm of existence. In
short, the difference between the two is the difference between
art and life (Corrigan 1981: 8).
This distinction may need to be borne in mind with some authors, and ignored
with others. The difference in these two terms is confirmed and an indication of how the
progression from drama to politics has been made can be seen in a quote by Henri Gou-
hier translated by Timothy Reiss in his book Tragedy and Truth ‘The tragic is a dimen-
sion of real existence. Tragedy belongs to literature and to theatre, the tragic belongs to
life’ (Reiss 1980: 1). However, as might be expected, agreement on definitions is not
forthcoming in the literature. The problem is most starkly shown by comparing the
above to Nicholas Rengger’s article where he quotes Oakeshott on Morgenthau:
[h]uman life is not tragic, either in part or in whole: tragedy be-
longs to art, not to life. And further, the situation [Morgenthau]
describes – the imperfectability of man – is not tragic, nor even
a predicament, unless and until it is contrasted with a human na-
ture susceptible to a perfection which is, in fact, foreign to its
character (Cited in Rengger 2005: 326).
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That tragedy belongs to art or theatre is not disputed anywhere, it is its relation to,
among other things, life, politics and international relations that cannot be agreed upon.
Lebow interprets Morgenthau’s position as sharing:
Thucydides’ tragic understanding of politics, reflected in their
belief that order was fragile, that human efforts to control, or
even reshape, their physical and social environments were far
more uncertain in their consequences than most leaders and in-
tellectuals recognized, and that hubris – in the form of an exag-
gerated sense of authority and competence – only made matters
worse (Lebow 2003: x).
Lebow goes on to claim in his 2005 article that ‘[t]ragedy is inescapable, and ef-
forts to circumvent it by power and intellect risk making it more likely’ (Lebow 2005:
330). This is a strange account, making tragedy appear more like fate than choice, and
perhaps in the world of the Ancient Greeks, which Lebow is keen to invoke, this is a
legitimate standpoint. However, tragedy is a legitimate political issue only insofar as
one can avoid it: if it is based on choice or decisions made. If this is not the case, if una-
voidable, it cannot, according to Oakeshott belong to politics, for, as we have already
seen:
[p]olitics is an activity, not of governing, but of determining the
manner and the matter of government, and where these are pre-
determined and are regarded as immune from choice or change,
there is no room for ‘politics’ (Oakeshott 1993: 8),
then we realise that Lebow is in danger of claiming that the tragic is of use to poli-
tics and in the process de-politicising it. If it were written in stars, if hubris were to be
the fate of humanity, and therefore unavoidable, then it would seem there is nothing at
all that could be done about this state of affairs by politics or anything else within the
realms of human beings. Lebow, it seems, may not be immune to hubris.
In his review article, Daniel Warner explains Lebow’s usage:
Lebow’s tragic is the complexity of human behavior, a literary
sense of the striving of the individual against forces beyond con-
trol as well as the limitations of human action. […]
And because human behavior is so complex, Lebow argues for a
more limited activity on the part of states and a recognition of
the dangers of great power attempts at domination. Tragedy, as
developed by Lebow, should lead to restraint; it should be a
counter to the hubris of great powers […].
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Lebow’s understanding of the tragic is inherent in human behav-
ior and not in any system. […]
Tragedy, for Lebow, is a way of confronting changes or ‘mod-
ernization’ without the arrogance of knowing immutable truths
that govern all human conduct in all time (Warner 2006: 226).
Again there is a tension in the understanding of the tragic, for, as seen above, Le-
bow has claimed that Morgenthau’s theory of the tragic should mean that philosophers
and theorists should search for underlying, universal truths through the study of history,
and adapt them to contemporary circumstances (Lebow 2003: 242).
Mervyn Frost, writing on the theme claims that:
[a]t the core of every tragedy is an ethical struggle. There are
many forms that the ethical drama in tragedy takes, but there can
be no doubting that the tragedies turn on ethical matters (Frost
2003: 479).
This is of interest as, at first, this looks like, and is in the context of the discussion
of tragedy qua drama. However, Frost goes on to explain that he sees no difference in
tragedy and tragic, nor in the discussion as qua drama or qua politics:
[w]hat are the identifying features of tragedy? I take this ques-
tion to be applicable to tragic plays, novels, films, and, of
course, to tragedy as it occurs and is told of in everyday life,
whether it be at the micro-level of the family or the macro-level
of world politics (Frost 2003: 481).
Frost then answers his question with a reinforcement of his answer above:
[a]t the heart of all tragedy is an ethical agon (the metaphor re-
fers to a duel or competition)’[…]
The agon reveals the element of conflict that is central to trage-
dy. The conflict with which tragedy concerns itself is that be-
tween two ethical forms both of which have a valid claim on the
actor or actors involved (Frost 2003: 482-483).
Perhaps even more interestingly, Frost then makes a claim which the other authors
avoid, namely that a ‘tragic account is thus a consequentialist one. It invites an ethical
evaluation of a series of events consisting of an act and its consequences’ (Frost 2003:
482) – if this is the case, then the tragic account risks being open to the common-or-
garden attacks on consequentialism.
In his reply, James Mayall agrees with Frost’s assessment that:
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[k]nowledge of past tragedies cannot prevent new ones happen-
ing. The injunction ‘Act so as to prevent a tragedy’ is nonsensi-
cal. It displays a misunderstanding of what tragedy is about. The
only way in which tragedies could be avoided would be if actors
had perfect information about the future, and if all the social
practices within which we participate could be shown to be in
perfect harmony with one another. Neither of these is plausible
or even possible. Therefore, tragedy is always a possibility. ‘Act
so as to avoid tragedy’ is a pointless command. It might even be
a comic one (Frost 2003: 486).
However, he takes issue with Frost’s consequentialist claim:
tragedy is not the outcome of mistakes or the failure to calculate
accurately the consequences of particular policies. On the con-
trary, tragedy is the outcome of a confrontation of two concep-
tions of the right, only one of which can prevail. It is tragic part-
ly because the defeat of one conception of right does not auto-
matically turn it into a wrong (Mayall 2003: 498).
The above quote is perhaps particularly suited to explaining the significance of
tragedy and humanitarian intervention, it is not a case that one has to make a political
decision to choose between wrong or right, one has to make a decision between right
and right, or wrong and wrong. So it is with humanitarian intervention, which can be
put, in overly simplified terms, either in the language of wrongs: that in intervening and
causing death or not intervening and not preventing death. Or in the language of rights:
that in intervening one is preventing harm, and in not intervening one is not risking ones
own people. In making the decision, committing a wrong cannot be avoided, indeed, the
tragedy is such that even not making a decision will, in effect, be a decision to not inter-
vene in a given situation.
A final attempt at explaining what a tragic notion of politics might be is given by
Chris Brown in his article ‘Tragic Choices’ and Contemporary International Political
Theory. Brown explains the tragic as being the sense that:
human action sometimes, perhaps often, involves a choice be-
tween two radically incompatible but equally undesirable out-
comes, that whatever we do in a given situation we will be, from
one perspective, acting wrongly, which constitutes for many
contemporary writers the essence of a tragic vision of the world
(Brown 2007: 9).
McCollom agrees and maintains that ‘choice is at the heart of tragedy’
(McCollom 1957: 4).
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Thus we have the recent writers on the topic claiming that: tragedy is art not life;
tragedy is art and the tragic is life; that there is no difference, tragedy is art and politics;
avoids arrogance in assuming universal truths; is the search for universal truths applied
to a contemporary setting; is a conflict where two rights make a wrong; and is a conflict
where both sides are wrong. That there can be any discussion on the idea at all with
such an array of arguments is a wonder. However, the parallels to the concept of hu-
manitarian intervention are apparent in both the content and the links to the political.
Reiss, a writer perhaps more at home in literature and drama than political science, is
the author who best makes clear the link between any notion of the tragic and politics:
[t]he periods in which tragedy has appeared have been notable
for a profound reorganization of the political and social order.
One thinks of the formation of the oligarchic polis and the
struggles that were brought to a temporary conclusion in the
Peloponnesian Wars. One is reminded of the creation of the
modern nation-state through the religious wars of the sixteenth
century, the Thirty Years War on the European continent, and
the years of the Commonwealth, Restoration, and bourgeois
monarchy in Britain. One recalls the German romantic move-
ment and the gradual unification of that country. Each appear-
ance of the discourse called tragedy was accompanied or imme-
diately followed by the invention of a powerful political-
philosophical discourse, destined to provide for some centuries
the limits within which such theory and practice could be con-
ceived: Plato and Aristotle; Machiavelli and Bacon, Hobbes, and
Locke; Kant, Hegel, German idealism, and Marx.
This complex conjuncture suggests that the discourse, tragedy,
plays a particular – and perhaps fundamental – role in the for-
mation of epistemes (Reiss 1980: 282-283).
This is a fascinating notion and it is based on this that Reiss can claim that
‘[t]ragedy and the political appear at all times to be inescapably linked’ (Reiss 1980:
289). Invoking the notion of the agon into an explanation, Reiss points out the tensions
and paradoxes at work within the idea of tragedy and politics, where tragedy:
escapes from, but installs, the political. Tragedy is at once the
moment of crisis and its resolution. Tragedy is simultaneously
the invention and the exile of the tragic, indicating the difficulty
but also the necessity of the political (Reiss 1980: 302).
Another viewpoint which is again enlightening and again outside contemporary
political science, is that of T.R. Henn who states that ‘[f]rom the beginnings tragedy has
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concerned itself with considerations that may be called, broadly, political’ (Henn 1956:
244). Henn goes on to explain this further:
[t]he reasons are obvious. One pole of the established type of
conflict is often formed of a kind of stalactite of petrified laws,
custom, usage, which is in itself challenged and broken by a new
order. […]
The State may be regarded as the perfect abstract protagonist in
tragedy. It can include among its claims the most powerful stim-
ulatory virtues: honour, patriotism, piety, love of tradition, loy-
alty; it can also call on the hidden todtentrieb for its mystical de-
fence through blood. In time of war its claims on truth are abso-
lute in proportion to the strength of its censorship (Henn 1956:
245).
This works well together with Reiss’s theory: any time of political upheaval may
generate an older and a newer system, neither of them necessarily better than the other
or more true, but, despite this, the very fact that this takes place on the political plane
ensures that there will be a conflict, but also that there will be a solution.
This at least explains an interesting, if not especially useful, link between tragedy
qua drama and politics, but why is so much emphasis being placed on this?
The political issue here, according to Orrin Klapp, is that since:
tragedy is at the same time a check on pride and a testimony to
human dignity, we may be fearful that without this perspective,
leaders may act with too much assurance that they are right and
with too little respect for the individuals under them (Klapp
1981: 254).
Hubris raises its head again, but not in the sense of the drama where the tragic he-
ro is destroyed, but rather that in a state where those making the mistakes of hubris are
not necessarily those that will suffer from its ill effects. Frost has mentioned ethical con-
flicts at work in tragedy, and Lucien Goldmann explains this notion admirably:
this means that, in every tragedy, there is an absolute primacy of
morals over the actual state of affairs, of what ought to be over
what is. It means that a tragedy is the representation of a uni-
verse dominated by a conflict of values (Goldmann 1981: 137).
We are now most definitely within the realms of politics and political science, and
this quote best indicates why this discussion, which so far has yielded little fruit, has
been of recent interest. The conflict of values mirrors Cranston’s view, quoted previous-
ly, that
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[p]olitics is in part an argument about values between men who
agree about some values but disagree about others. If they did
not agree about some – about the desirability of truth and jus-
tice, for example – they could not engage in a dialogue at all;
there could be no politics (Cranston 1971: 293).
This is an argument understood and presented by Carr, when he states that:
[c]oercion and conscience, enmity and goodwill, self-assertion
and self-subordination, are present in every political society.
The state is built up out of these two conflicting aspects of hu-
man nature, Utopia and reality, the ideal and the institution, mo-
rality and power, are from the outset inextricably blended in it
(Carr 1939: 124).
Carr does, in fact, mention the problem of morality and politics being one of trag-
edy, although it remains an underlying theme, where he maintains that:
[h]ere, then, is the complexity, the fascination and the tragedy of
all political life. Politics are made up of two elements – utopia
and reality – belonging to two different planes which can never
meet (Carr 1939: 118).
Insofar as this disagreement over values is within the realms of politics and moral-
ity, where regardless of what is done a tragedy will unfold, then the issue of tragedy
might well be able to be invoked for the issue of humanitarian intervention. To use the
three problem areas, the problem takes place in the realm of politics (area three), the
utopian and realist visions are from the realm of political science (area one), and the
discussion of tragedy and its place in political science that of political philosophy (area
two). Here too is where we can see the problem with the issue of the tragic in politics,
for the area two discussion of whether or not the concept of tragedy is of use in area one
still faces the issue of completely missing out what is actually happening in area three.
Nonetheless, two of the authors attempt to show the relevance of the tragic in area
three, and, significantly, both use the example of the dilemma of intervention as their
example. Brown and Frost both endeavour to show that the choice involved in deciding
whether or not to intervene ‘the agon would be between intervention and non-
intervention’ (Frost 2003: 484) could he helped by an understanding of the tragic. Both
maintain that the study of tragedy would aid decision-making in area one. Brown claims
that it:
ought to cause us to act modestly, to be aware of our limitations
and to be suspicious of grand narratives of salvation which pre-
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tend that there are no tragic choices to be made (Brown 2007:
11).
We are, it seems, to be on our guard, act modestly, and be aware of our limita-
tions, sage advice for any area. Frost goes further and states that:
[a]n education in the tragic tradition can help us identify ethical
problems and may help us understand certain key features of
these problems (Frost 2003: 486-487).
Again, this could well be useful in any area. However, it soon becomes clear that
both these authors are in fact discussing area two. Frost soon has us as objective observ-
ers:
[i]t alerts us to the relationships that hold between an actor, the
wider society within which he or she is constituted as an actor of
a certain kind, ethics, and the consequences of his or her
acts.[…]
In reading tragedies (or watching them), we come to see that
what is to count as ethical behaviour is not a free choice for the
actors concerned (Frost 2003: 486-487).
While our limitations, modesty and guardedness, as suggested by Brown, are, it
seems, to aid our sensitivity in writing about intervention:
[t]he key question, in both cases, is whether the genuinely tragic
nature of these situations is recognised in the discourse. The an-
swer, I think, is generally ‘no’. [...] it is difficult to find other in-
ternational political theorists who are sensitive to the dilemmas
of intervention (Brown 2007: 9).
Thus far, however, there does not seem to be any argument compelling enough to
demand that understanding notions of tragedy or the tragic will aid politicians in their
decisions, aid political scientists in their political science, or even justify the area two
debate on this topic. It is not at all clear why tragedy and not Lieven and Hulsman’s key
virtues of prudence, humility, study, responsibility, and patriotism would not be more
appropriate across all three areas. Frost’s claims that an education in the tragic might
help us identify ethical problems does not seem particularly helpful in the case of hu-
manitarian intervention. That the agon is between intervention and non-intervention is
clear, but what is not clear is how an understanding of tragedy could help the Red Cross
or New Labour’s foreign policy to assess whether or not to intervene. Euben goes so far
down this route of tragedy to claim that:
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[i]t seems that, despite our hopes, tragedy portrays a world that
is not made for us and for which we are not made. Human histo-
ry tells no purposive story and even if it did there is no position
outside ourselves or history from which we could authenticate
our activities (Euben 2007: 17).
The only response to this strange assertion that humanity and the world are not
made for one another comes from Eric Bentley’s book:
Margaret Fuller once said that she accepted the universe, and
Thomas Carlyle commented: ‘Gad, she’d better!’ (Bentley 1964:
279).
As McCollom correctly points out, ‘[d]ramatic tragedy refers to tragedy in life,
but it does not imply that Being or Substance is tragic’ (McCollom 1957: 20). Returning
to Bentley, and indeed to Nietzsche who is, on the whole, ignored in the recent discus-
sions of tragic politics, we can agree that:
[s]ince the whole notion of a tragic view of life was largely the
creation of Nietzsche, it is proper to recall that he did not reduce
tragedy to a philosophy (Bentley 1964: 278).
It is also Bentley who is confident enough to take a negative view of tragedy:
[t]ragedy transcends melodrama, and many people think it does
so in being more sensible […] But actually tragedy does not dis-
card the bizarre, macabre, and morbid elements of melodrama. It
exploits them farther. In tragedy, there is even more of mental
sickness, even more of destructive and monstrous passion (Bent-
ley 1964: 272).
One very curious omission from the discussion of tragedy in politics is its sister
muse, comedy. The forms of comedy and tragedy are almost identical: both require a
conflict of some sort to occur, both require recognition to occur and according to
Feibelman ‘[o]ften indeed the connection between comedy and tragedy is so close as to
render then hardly distinguishable’ (Feibelman 1962: 202). Feibelman also claims that a
situation can be both comedy and tragedy (Feibelman 1962: 203), Corrigan backs this
claim up:
[t]he combining of the tragic and the comic in a single play is
nearly as old as the drama itself […]
both tragedy and comedy depend upon generally accepted
standards of values (Corrigan 1965: 9).
As does Fry:
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[t]he bridge by which we cross from tragedy to comedy and
back again is precarious and narrow, We find ourselves in one
or the other by the turn of a thought (Fry 1965: 16).
Why then should politics not be corrected by comedy or the comic? As just indi-
cated, they are at times almost indistinguishable, but as yet no serious attempt at posit-
ing the comic in the political has been made. There could be confusion at work, of
course: by comedy some authors might understand the funny or the laughable and de-
clare the comic unfit for the purpose of discussing international relations, but as Fiebel-
man says:
[t]here could hardly be displayed a greater confusion of catego-
ries than in the mixing of theories of comedies with comedy it-
self […] The analysis of comedy can no more be funny that the
analysis of water can be wet (Feibelman 1962: 168).
Comedy, it seems, is not taken seriously, despite any usefulness of the tragic be-
ing mirrored in the comic. Comedy is often taken to be the lower art form, although
Socrates discusses its relationship to tragedy at the end of the Symposium, and Aristotle
wrote a, now lost, treatise on it. Furthermore, as Bentley pointed out above, there is a
‘high’ form of tragedy and its ‘lower’ form of melodrama, a division also reflected in
comedy’s relation to farce. Indeed, high comedy and high tragedy may have more in
common with each other than with their respective low forms, and indicate their endur-
ing linking with the political, for according to Bentley:
[t]ragedy and comedy are concerned, as melodrama and farce
are not, with justice (Bentley 1964: 260).
Feibelman points out that Bergson, amongst others, is of the opinion that comedy
is closer to ‘real life’ than tragedy can be (Feibelman 1962: 201), and, Sypher claims
that nothing human is alien to comedy (Sypher 1965: 32). Feibelman also states that:
[c]omedy is an intellectual affair, and deals chiefly with logic.
Tragedy is an emotional affair, and deals chiefly with value.
Horace Walpole once said that ‘life is a comedy to the man who
thinks and a tragedy to one who feels’ (Feibelman 1962: 199).
Meredith joyously claims that:
the test of true comedy us that it shall awaken thoughtful laugh-
ter (Meredith 1965: 470).
With tragedy’s twin back in place, tragedy might be better placed to prevent hu-
bris and induce modesty and be aware of our limitations, as:
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[c]omedy is an antidote to error. It is a restorer of proportions,
and signals a return from extreme adherence to actual pro-
grammes, in so far as these programmes are found to be faulty
(Feibelman 1962: 181).
Furthermore, comedy, if arriving on the political scene at the time of the political
upheavals which Reiss writes of, is perhaps more able to cope on account of being ‘by
its very nature a more revolutionary affair than tragedy’ (Feibelman 1962: 200), but also
on account of the ‘corrosive effect’ of humour which ‘eats away the solemnity of ac-
cepted valuation, and thus calls for a revaluation of values’ (Feibelman 1962: 182). The
emphasis on tragedy and the ignoring of comedy may, in fact, emulate the problems of
political science – the choice between extreme dogmas which cannot be altered, a
choice must be made and there is no middle ground, as in, for example, idealism and
realism.
And here is the crux of the matter – comedy, may, perhaps, be able to offer a reso-
lution: that is the difference between tragedy and comedy. In tragedy there is indeed a
conflict, one which cannot be resolved without recourse to death; comedy can turn on
the same conflict as the tragedy, but problems are recognised and are resolved. The
recognition of the tragic cannot solve the problem, it is simply acknowledged as tragic;
comedy on the other hand has its moment of recognition which is able to move the ac-
tors to avoid disaster. In a play this might be deemed ‘the happy end’ but in politics this
is the conflict resolved.
It is in failing to acknowledge the ‘political’ that any notion of the tragic will fail
to be of use within the realm of IR. Insofar as it is always concerned with values, insofar
as it is the ought above the is, insofar as they turn on ethical matters, talk of the tragic is
a turning away from the political. In discussing the Cold War, Lebow even states that
‘[t]he principal threat to peace was political’ (Lebow 2003: 243), a very strange claim.
Talk of universals, be they put in a contemporary setting or not, talk of some po-
litical decisions always being tragic and political science benefitting from an apprecia-
tion of the tragedy is a flight from the political. That hubris might be a vice within poli-
tics or indeed political science and political philosophy is not in doubt, that studying
tragedy and the tragic might make those prone to it more aware of it is, perhaps, possi-
ble. That there might be problems within recent manifestations of the ideology of real-
ism is not in doubt: that any notion of the tragic might render it any less of an ideology
is questionable. In fact, any form of realism which turns away from politics and sup-
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ports itself upon the tragic is liable to be a victim of Morgenthau’s arguments. That a
discussion of issues should delve so deeply into the notion of tragedy and never once
meet comedy is absurd. That a reform of political science is mooted which is not only a
flight from the political, but suggests a better connection can be made with area three by
adopting a normative suggestion from a political philosophy discussion of drama is at
the very least odd.
Reiss, who is not a political scientist or political philosopher, is the one author
who takes pains to ensure that tragedy and politics are firmly linked. However, Reiss is
also an author who ensures that ‘tragedy’ remains in the arts and ‘the tragic’ in life, and
so his bond is between politics and the art of drama.
That there may be occasions where a concept of the tragic is of use to politics is,
of course, not ruled out – the political never does rule avenues out – but this argument
would have no reason for putting the tragic above the comic or referring to it more of-
ten. It should be pointed out at this stage, that there are cases of area three politics refer-
ring to this area two discussion of tragedy, and not simply in a sense of the word ‘trage-
dy’ being taken to mean some sort of catastrophe. However, the one unambiguous poli-
tician using this terminology is former Czech President Václav Havel – himself a for-
mer playwright. Moreover, Havel seems to utilise this in order to account for historical
events, or facilitate understanding of the past, he does not appear to identify any other
usefulness of the device in this area (Pirro 2002).
Brown, perhaps, comes closest to a useful theory of the tragic, but in positing only
that it:
ought to cause us to act modestly, to be aware of our limitations
and to be suspicious of grand narratives of salvation which pre-
tend that there are no tragic choices to be made (Brown 2007:
11),
it is no more useful than notions of prudence or Lieven and Hulsman’s sugges-
tions for foreign policy, which are more practical and less prone to hubris than area two
discussions of tragedy. Moreover, one need not follow Oakeshott and claim that tragedy
is art and not life, to accept that tragedy at least emerged from art and belongs to aes-
thetics, and, while of use to politics, could just as easily come into conflict with the no-
tion of the political. But, even over and above these conclusions, it must be pointed out
that a firm grasp of the notion of the political and an awareness of the contestable nature
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of political initiatives, and the uncertain nature of its outcomes might lead to the same
conclusions as are reached in the notion of tragedy in politics.
This chapter, perhaps, seems furthest from the concept of humanitarian interven-
tion, barely touching upon it and hardly mentioning it. However, this is not the case. It
is this chapter which most clearly broaches the themes which are so important to the
understanding of the concept of humanitarian intervention, but which are seldom linked
into it. As has also been pointed out previously, in area two discussion humanitarian in-
tervention dissolves into analysis of the deeper underlying themes, of which humanitari-
an intervention is simply one example amongst many. However, as has been seen, area
two discussion is not so ensconced in the ivory tower that it has no application to areas
one or three. The recognition and discussion of the issues of the political and the moral
are dealt with in most depth in this area, and the dangers of rejecting the political and
replacing it with the moral are spelled out most clearly. Furthermore, for all that it may
not always be applicable to other areas, area two political philosophy discussion at least
does not assume that it can solve the problems in areas one and three, but is simply
more aware of the problems. Nor does area two assume it knows the answers to ques-
tions on humanitarian intervention, indeed, many of the questions asked in area one
seem to be strangely out of step with ideas of the political. To ask the question ‘is hu-
manitarian intervention legal/ or moral/ or good?’ is almost meaningless in area two: it
displaces the political, seems intent on creating a dogma, and the discussion on the trag-
ic proves, at least, that there are just as many reasons for as against and if there is no
avoiding tragedy, the best outcome is perhaps merely the comic. In this respect, areas
two and three might be said to have more in common with one another than with area
one political science.
Hence, this next section will examine area three generally, and New Labour theo-
rising on an ethical dimension to foreign policy specifically.
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Section III: Practical Politics
5 Approaches to the Concept in Practical Politics Literature
5.1 PROBLEM AREA THREE: PRACTICAL POLITICS
This section will deal with several area three attempts to define humanitarian in-
tervention. In these discussions there does seem to be a realisation that any definition
provided forms part of a defence of an agenda. Despite taking place on the practical pol-
itics stage, the displacement of politics for the sake of, for example, morality, is not un-
common. More often than not, the political is replaced by the moral, rather than some
non-moral alternative such as the legal or economic, and a Schmittian ‘unusually inten-
sive way of pursing politics’ (Schmitt 1976: 23) can be seen to occur. Four organisa-
tions which operate in the realm of practical politics will have a definition they have
provided examined, namely, The International Committee of the Red Cross, the Euro-
pean Union, Médecins Sans Frontières, and the United Nations’ International Commis-
sion on Intervention and State Sovereignty. Although these definitions have been gener-
ated by these agencies at some point in their history, it is not necessarily the case that
the organisations have ever actively used these definitions, or if they have if they still
use these definitions. As in chapter three, where political science definitions of humani-
tarian intervention were examined, it is the definitions themselves which are of interest.
As has been indicated elsewhere in this thesis, the post-Cold War optimism
which, most especially, Fukuyama and Rawls called attention to or exemplified can be
seen to be at work in these definitions. All the definitions in this section have been pos-
ited post-1989 and are indicators of a specific stance taken towards humanitarian inter-
vention by the organisation in question. These four examples of proclamations by inter-
national bodies have in common an attempt to present humanitarian intervention in
moral terms. Furthermore, these definitions are presented, in the cases of the Interna-
tional Committee of the Red Cross and Médecins Sans Frontières, in the form of ac-
knowledging several types and varieties of humanitarian intervention, but positing a re-
vision of these with definitions which declare not only their own commitments, but also
what they perceive ought to be the commitments of other internationals actors. In this
area the commitment presents many theoretical issues which are understandably ignored
in order not to impede the implementation of the agendas of the various proponents of
the ideal.
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5.2 INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS
The International Committee of the Red Cross offers a definition of humanitarian
intervention in its 2001 position paper on humanitarian intervention in International Re-
view of the Red Cross. This defines humanitarian intervention as:
‘armed intervention in response to serious breaches of human
rights and of international humanitarian law’. This wording also
serves to emphasize the fact that the forces engaged in the inter-
vention are bound by humanitarian law in their military opera-
tions (Ryniker 2001: 529-530).
The emphasis on armed intervention may be seen as delineating more clearly the
differences between NGO humanitarian operations and military operations which may
have humanitarian in their name. The position paper attempts to defend humanitarian
intervention by presenting it as a reaction to an act, or acts, which are illegal under in-
ternational law. The document emphasises that the method must be humanitarian and
subject to international law. Indeed, the meaning of humanitarian intervention is defined
primarily in terms of the means used by the interveners, rather than in terms of the end
they pursue.
This mode of approach causes a headache for NGOs as the terms humanitarian in-
tervention, military intervention, and military humanitarian intervention tend to be used
synonymously. This thereby associates the work of aid agencies such as the Internation-
al Red Cross with, for example, NATO military operations. The International Commis-
sion on Intervention and State Sovereignty makes this point very clear in its defence of
its definition of humanitarian intervention in its report The Responsibility to Protect:
[w]e have responded in this respect to the very strong opposition
expressed by humanitarian agencies, humanitarian organizations
and humanitarian workers towards any militarization of the
word ‘humanitarian’: whatever the motives of those engaging in
the intervention, it is anathema for the humanitarian relief and
assistance sector to have this word appropriated to describe any
kind of military action (ICISS 2001: 1.40).
The Red Cross agenda, then, aims to restrict the term humanitarian to use by non-
military and non-state organisations and purposes. The very nature of this agenda, how-
ever, tacitly acknowledges that the concept of humanitarian intervention may legiti-
mately be defined in other ways by other organisations pursuing ends diametrically op-
posed to those of the Red Cross. Although the resulting intellectual confusion does not
invalidate the worthiness of Red Cross activities, it does mean that there is little intellec-
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tual enlightenment to be gained in this area. Let us see if we fare any better in this re-
spect by considering the proclamations of a second international body, the European
Union.
5.3 EUROPEAN UNION
The 1995 Report on Human Rights in the World in 1993-1994 and the Union’s
Human Rights Policy by the European Union on human rights both within the Union
and in the world at large noted that the European Parliament had adopted the resolution
of 20 April 1994 on the right to humanitarian intervention. This resolution stated, re-
markably, that ‘the human rights situation in a country does not form part of its internal
affairs’ (Imbeni 1995: 30). The document then goes on to define humanitarian interven-
tion as:
the protection, including the threat or use of force, by a state or
group of states of the basic human rights of persons who are
subjects of and/or resident in another Member State (Imbeni
1995: 30).
This is an unusual document on a number of different counts. The rejection of
human rights as being an internal state affair is fascinating, sweeping aside, as it seems
to, centuries of European thought on sovereignty and the principle that whatever occurs
within a state’s boundaries is the state’s own business, although it becomes somewhat
clearer what exactly the boundaries of this theory involve once the humanitarian inter-
vention definition is added on. Once this has been done one realises that this statement
refers to other EU Member States and is not a far-reaching rejection of the concept of
state sovereignty per se: the EU is not outlining its foreign policy towards non-member
states. It is indicating a minimum standard which is taken for granted within the EU
states as a prerequisite of membership.
The implications remain startling, however, for in agreeing to cede matters of hu-
man rights to the EU the internal nature of these rights is indeed forfeited. Insofar as
many definitions of humanitarian intervention cite the concept of human rights viola-
tions as the reason for a humanitarian intervention, it could well be argued that since
human rights are not an internal matter, ergo, they are an external matter for the Euro-
pean Union. It therefore follows that it might actually be too mild to talk of the right of
humanitarian intervention as other states may in fact have the duty of humanitarian in-
tervention insofar as it occurs within the EU.
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Certainly, within the bounds of this definition it seems to be the case that Member
States are obliged to resort to humanitarian intervention to protect subjects and/or resi-
dents of other Member States. Despite the radical implications of this commitment to
humanitarian intervention, the meaning of the term receives little serious consideration.
At no point in the EU definition, for example, is the content of the human rights to
be protected made clear. All that we are told is that the human rights to be protected are
basic rights, a phrase used only once in the document with all other references simply to
human rights alone. This qualification, however, does not indicate whether humanitari-
an intervention to protect rights is only justifiable in order to prevent violations of them
or whether pre-emptive intervention is acceptable. The result is a level of vagueness so
great that practically any action by the EU can be defended as an instance of humanitar-
ian intervention. That said, it may be argued that membership of the EU involves secur-
ing basic human rights both for a state’s own citizens and for other EU citizens living
within its borders. A failure to provide these basic rights might well be considered a
breach of EU law, although, of course, this would not automatically subject a state to
the use of force.
This rather revolutionary document has not been used, as far as I am aware, as the
basis of any other attempts to define humanitarian intervention. The reason is fairly ob-
vious: it involves a very specific set of criteria which apply only to EU Member States
and within their confines assume that the need for humanitarian intervention is, in prac-
tice, non-existent. As in the case of the example of the Red Cross, no light is shed on the
concept of humanitarian intervention, in this particular case, however, because it is as-
sumed that when it comes down to it there is unlikely to be a need for it. The radical na-
ture of the definition is in fact possible because of the moderate nature of the states
within the EU.
5.4 MÉDECINS SANS FRONTIÈRES
Médecins Sans Frontières has a fascinating place in the discussions of humanitar-
ian intervention. One of its founders, Bernard Kouchner, has already been discussed in
relation to his position as Foreign Minister in President Sarkozy’s government in the
introduction and Chapter two, but as will be seen in the next chapter, he is also inextri-
cably linked to the phrase: the right to intervene. MSF seems to be acutely aware of its
position with relation to politics and the political. This may be on account of the nature
of its work, its relative youth in comparison to the Grande Dame of NGOs, the Red
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Cross, or perhaps the fact that MSF has a deep vein of French intellectualism running
through it, but there is a level of awareness not found in other NGOs.
Tellingly, MSF documentation does not provide a definition of humanitarian in-
tervention, but, rather, argues for remaining outwith politics, the argument changing ac-
cording to the political situation it finds itself in. In this sense, MSF is in an interesting
position as regards its relationship to area two and area three. On the one hand, insofar
as MSF goes into those areas suffering from war and conflict, areas where there are
problems in the area of practical politics, it is most definitely at work in area three. On
the other hand, however, its area two argumentation, which shows great understanding
of its role in area three, is designed to deny its political side and claim only the humani-
tarian for itself.
In its Activity Report 2003/2004: Military Humanitarianism: A Deadly Confusion
Fabrice Weissman argues that in going into Afghanistan, many NGOs worked under the
umbrella of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and the interim gov-
ernment, both of whom received support form coalition forces. The argument then fol-
lows that any NGO in this situation has abandoned its neutrality and independence – it
was ‘impossible to distinguish between a subcontractor working on behalf of a warring
party and an independent, impartial humanitarian aid actor’ (Weissman 2004). The poli-
ticians’ use of rhetoric also comes under attack, for if:
an appeal to humanitarian considerations can justify both a med-
ical aid operation and a military campaign, doesn’t that suggest
that aid workers and international troops represent two sides of
the same coin? (Weissman 2004).
MSF does not blame this situation on governments alone. The document also
holds other aid actors, especially that ‘liberal, universalist strain within the charitable
aid movement and among human rights defense groups’ (Weissman 2004) responsible.
Thus, in its 2000 Recommendation to the International Community (MSF 2000)
MSF states under point B.2. ‘To the international community and political decision
maker’ that:
MSF demands that the humanitarian and political-military agen-
das should be totally independent of each other.
And, moreover, that the UN should take care not to link humanitarian with mili-
tary or political priorities, going on to claim, perhaps surprisingly, that:
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[t]he mandate for humanitarian intervention should clearly re-
main the responsibility of humanitarian agencies (MSF 2000).
In a presentation to the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London, on
March 31, 2004, entitled Challenges to Humanitarian Action: The Impact of Political
and Military Responses to International Crises MSF does identify three forms of inter-
vention using force. These are intervention, involvement, and abstention –but not one of
them is described positively. It is pointed out that all three forms of intervention gener-
ally take place under a UN mandate and it is clear that MSF wants nothing to do with
any of them (Brandol 2004). Its reasoning for this is contained in the quote below from
a different article MSF’s Principles and Identity - The Challenges Ahead, a document
concerning MSF’s role:
we refuse to be involved in the integrated system. We reject the
reduction of humanitarian assistance to a role of army after-sales
service, whether for the United States government in Iraq or the
Russians in the North Caucasus (Captier 2005).
MSF is thus arguing against much of the prevailing discussion as regards the UN
and international law in humanitarian crises, where much is made of whether a particu-
lar humanitarian intervention (or involvement or abstention, to use MSF’s terminology)
has the approval of the UN. As far as MSF is concerned, if it is a humanitarian crisis
then this is irrelevant, as the political has nothing to seek here, anything it does intend is
simply clothed in humanitarian rhetoric.
Nonetheless, despite MSF’s intentions, the fact that it takes part in the discussions
of conflicts involves it within the realms of politics, and while it might wish for a clear
separation, its engagement with the questions ensures it cannot. Indeed, its criticism of
the ‘liberal, universalist strain within the charitable aid movement and among human
rights defense groups’ (Weissman 2004) is difficult to reconcile with its declaration that
‘abstention’, one of its three forms of intervention is:
characterised by international indifference to the extreme brutal-
ity of certain conflicts. This equates to issuing the principal bel-
ligerents with a licence to kill (Brandol 2004).
This notion of inaction being classed as intervention is attacked by James Rosenau
who claims that:
the height of definitional vagueness is occasionally reached
when inaction is regarded as intervention. Having defined inter-
vention as the impact that one state has on the affairs of another,
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logic leads some observers to classify inaction as intervention
whenever consequences follow within a state from the failure of
another to intrude upon its affairs (Rosenau 1969: 153).
What seems to follow is that an intervention can only be carried out by an NGO,
indeed, an NGO cannot remain outside, for to do so would be to condone the situation.
Should any NGO have any discussions with any non-NGO within the region regarding,
perhaps, access or verifying its location then the NGO risks being ‘involved in the inte-
grated system’ (Captier 2005). It would seem that the only way to avoid criticism by
MSF in an intervention is to be MSF in an intervention. MSF attempts to engage with
the political, whilst evading it, and answer political dilemma with moral solutions: it
continually risks that which is seeks to avoid.
5.5 INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION & STATE
SOVEREIGNTY (UN)
The fourth illustration of the rhetoric of humanitarian intervention as it has fea-
tured at international level is drawn from a commission set up by the United Nations in
response to concerns within the UN about the proper limits to interventionist action by
sovereign states (ICISS 2001). This commission has been quoted above, but merits fur-
ther investigation. The core assumption in this document is that:
[t]here is no better or more appropriate body than the United Na-
tions Security Council to authorize military intervention for hu-
man protection purposes. The task is not to find alternatives to
the Security Council as a source of authority, but to make the
Security Council work better than it has (ICISS 2001: xii).
The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty attempts to
cover every possible eventuality, with its document ranging from such concepts as the
‘Just Cause Threshold’ to specifics regarding ius ad bellum before reaching a definition
under the heading ‘the meaning of intervention’ (ICISS 2001: xii). Here ICISS states
that:
[t]he kind of intervention with which we are concerned in this
report is action taken against a state or its leaders, without its or
their consent, for purposes which are claimed to be humanitarian
or protective (ICISS 2001: 1.38).
As this quotation indicates, the object of UN intervention is rather different from
that envisaged by the other three international organisations previously discussed, since
it allows for the leaders of a state to be the target of it. Perhaps the most surprising as-
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pect of the definition is that the purposes referred to in the quotation need only claim to
be humanitarian, or alternatively to be protective. There is no mention of violations of
rights, basic or otherwise, and no reference to the charters, treaties, or resolutions to
which a legal basis to international right and wrongs. Any agent who adopts this defini-
tion is therefore, theoretically, able to label as humanitarian intervention whatever ac-
tion is claimed to be for someone’s good. It is not even clear that the action should be a
response to some undesirable policy adopted subject to the intervention, it would appear
that the action can be pre-emptive.
There is thus nothing in the UN definition which prevents any actor from claiming
that whatever policy it pursues can be labelled humanitarian intervention. Similarly,
there is nothing to prevent any agent responding to any situation at all by labelling
whatever action pursued as humanitarian intervention.
Despite the fact, then, that the UN definition of humanitarian intervention appears,
at first glance, to be less sweeping and more cautious than the EU definition, its vague-
ness could lead it to be far more indiscriminate in its application than the EU definition.
However, in practice the probability of the UN coming face to face with the need for
whatever it deems to be a humanitarian intervention is much higher than that which the
EU faces. The UN definition, therefore, must be in the position to account for them all.
In addition, there is a need for any UN definition to take account of UN Resolutions and
other sources of international public law – its hands are tied by law and its definition
must account for all cases, but need not intervene in all cases. This is not to say that the
EU ignores those aspects, but as mentioned above, the low risk of the definition being
used in practice does appear to allow the EU definition to take more liberties than the
UN definition does on account of the EU definition being unlikely to be invoked.
Despite this greater bind on the UN definition, however, the terminology used
fails to save it from the charge of vagueness, due, in part, to the fact that it must be used
to encompass any humanitarian intervention which the UN might come across. The in-
tervention envisaged, for example, is defined only by the general term action, which the
reader is told might mean any or all of the following: any application of pressure to a
state; conditional support programmes by major international financial institutions;
emergency relief assistance; and non-consensual or coercive acts (either actual or
threatened) such as political and economic sanctions, blockades, diplomatic and military
threats, military force and international criminal prosecutions (ICISS 2001: 1.37). There
is no mention of who might carry out the act of intervention. The outcome is that we are
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left with a definition which, despite being more restricted than that put forward by the
EU, fails to shed much light on the concept of humanitarian intervention.
Ambiguities and confusions concerning humanitarian intervention similar to those
found in the agendas of the four international bodies considered above, will be consid-
ered in more depth in the following chapters. In these chapters the concept will be ex-
plored in relation to the UK New Labour government’s commitment to the declared
ideal of a foreign policy with an ethical dimension and the implications for any humani-
tarian intervention it might wish to consider. The unique interest of the New Labour
case is that New Labour explicitly staked an important aspect of its political identity
both in opposition and in government on transforming British foreign policy.
The story of this commitment will be the subject of chapters six to eight. For the
moment, however, I want to draw a tentative conclusion about the rhetoric of humani-
tarian intervention from the analysis of what has been called area three usage of it so far
given in this chapter. This is that, despite the different agendas of the international or-
ganisations considered, the moralistic way of thinking about international politics means
that, in area three the concept of humanitarian intervention threatens to collapse into the
inescapable vagueness and ambiguity associated with what may be termed a politics of
good intentions.
The politics of good intentions is characterised above all by the cleavage of inten-
tions from outcomes. This cleavage is inspired by what David Runciman calls ‘the deep
perils of the siren call of simplicity’ (Runciman 2006: 27), according to which the
‘complexity of political existence generates a persistent temptation to seek out simplis-
tic solutions to the problems of politics’ (Runciman 2006: 26). A war can certainly be
lost, but one very seldom comes across a nation trying to have a war and failing: we
tried to launch a military campaign against state X, but it ended up turning into a rather
boisterous game of football and we lost on penalties... However, with the idea of hu-
manitarian intervention, the wish to, for example, stop a genocide by crossing an inter-
national boundary and protecting a people could follow this humanitarian plan to the
letter, and yet nonetheless be a war. This is to say that simply willing a humanitarian
intervention and trying to carry out a humanitarian intervention does not mean that a
humanitarian intervention will have taken place.
The potentially disastrous result of the cleavage in recent American foreign policy
has been illuminatingly explored by Anatol Lieven and John Hulsman, who focus in
particular on the ‘shabby argument’ made by former hard-line supporters of the Iraq
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War that ‘we should excuse their responsibility for this disaster because their intentions
were good’ (Lieven & Hulsman 2006: xvii). As Lieven and Hulsman go on to say:
[n]either in statecraft nor in common sense can good intentions
be a valid excuse if accompanied by gross recklessness, care-
lessness and indifference to the range of possible consequences.
Such actions fail the test not only of general ethics, but also of
the sworn commitment of state servants and elected officials to
[…] not simply pursue at all costs their own ideas of morality
(Lieven & Hulsman 2006: xvii-xviii).
At what I have called area three – that of practical politics – the concept of hu-
manitarian intervention, then, acts as a catalyst and raises the question of the limitations
of a politics of good intentions.
At the beginning of this thesis, the growth of sympathy for humanitarian interven-
tion was related to an intensified political moralism in the aftermath of the Cold War.
This moral concern has been analysed at three different conceptual areas with a view to
clarifying its implications for understanding the concept of humanitarian intervention. It
must now be asked what emerges from this analysis. Three main conclusions seem ap-
parent.
The first conclusion is that, in area three, the concept of humanitarian intervention
tends to dissolve into a politics of good intentions which opens the door to irresponsible
and potentially disastrous forms of action in the international order. The second conclu-
sion is that much of the debate at both areas one and three has proceeded in a way which
depoliticises the concept. My aim has been to show that a depoliticising approach over-
simplifies the issues involved, in particular by presenting them in moral terms which
ignore the complexities and uncertainties inherent in political action. In order to rectify
this situation, I have sought to show that in discussions of an action deemed to be a hu-
manitarian intervention, the political dimension cannot be ignored. What must immedi-
ately be added, however, is that the political dimension cannot be restored simply by
insisting that only states may properly be agents of humanitarian intervention. It is true,
of course, that the state is a political unit and that action by states may properly be
called political action. My point is that the full meaning of the political is missed if the
term is restricted in this way to the state, its agents, and its acts. When that position is
taken, the concept of humanitarian intervention inevitably becomes embedded in ulti-
mately arid discussions about the nature of sovereignty. They are arid because they
sidestep the real issue presented by humanitarian intervention, which is that it is politi-
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cal even when the relevant perpetrators and recipients are not states: discussions of
states and sovereignty are very often a placebo for this area two discussion. In this sense
of the term, the political dimension refers, as Chantal Mouffe noted, to ‘the dimension
of antagonism which I take to be constitutive of human society’ (Mouffe 2005: 9). It
follows, then, that the political notion of humanitarian intervention cannot be adequately
treated by trying to limit it to state action and issues of sovereignty.
The third conclusion which emerges is that the concept of the political is itself a
contested concept. This is now generally recognised in much area two theorising, as
well as in more thoughtful area one discussion. If we look, for example, in an area one
work like Understanding International Relations by Chris Brown and Kirsten Ainley,
the authors explicitly acknowledge not only that ‘the very nature of politics is heavily
contested’, but that there ‘are no politically neutral ways of describing “politics” or
“economics”’ (Brown & Ainley 2005: 2-3). The conclusion they draw is interesting.
What, they ask:
does this tell us about how to go about defining international re-
lations/International Relations? Two things. First, we have to
accept that if we can find a definition it will be a matter of con-
vention; […] Second, while it may make sense for us to start
with the conventional, traditional definition of the subject, we
should be aware that this definition is sure to embody a particu-
lar account of the field – and that the way it does this is unlikely
to be politically neutral (Brown & Ainley 2005: 2-3).
It follows that the literature in the area one political science approach examined
above involves, at best, an arbitrary characterisation of the political, insofar as the ques-
tion of the nature of the political is raised at all in this area.
The conclusions from the previous chapters will now be examined and illustrated
by the New Labour Government’s invoking of an ethical dimension to foreign policy.
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6 Robin Cook, New Labour & the Ethical Dimension
Having looked at some of the theoretical and historical issues to do with humani-
tarian intervention, the next three chapters will examine a ‘practical politics’ illustration,
namely, the ‘ethical dimension’ of foreign policy in the UK’s New Labour government.
As we have seen, an ‘ethical dimension’ may not be a form of anti-politics as long as
the political is not sacrificed to the moral: an ethical foreign policy where morality is
built in risks rejecting the political. However, it should be made clear that it is the rela-
tionship between the moral and the political which is important, not what this relation-
ship has been termed.
The New Labour example has been chosen for a number of reasons. Firstly, on
account of an optimism contained within it which would allow for cases of humanitari-
an intervention. Secondly, the ethical dimension was a theory which was to underlie all
governmental foreign policy, including any cases of humanitarian intervention, making
it useful in having both a theoretical and practical aspect. Thirdly, the theory is declared
in statements, reports, and interviews, inviting academic and press scrutiny of this topic;
this drew media interest making it a widely reported and extensively analysed sphere of
policy – there has been much written on this question, but there is also much hearsay.
In looking at the ethical dimension in foreign policy within the politics of New
Labour as area three example of political moralism, it will be necessary to discover
what was actually said and written on this subject at the time. The subject itself has end-
ed up being criticised by supporters and opponents of New Labour alike, and there ap-
pears to be hints of a revision of historical facts. This revisionism seems to work in both
directions, as some commentators wish to indicate that they saw the endeavour as
flawed right from the start and knew that it would end up being dropped. At the same
time, other authors maintain that the flaws were not actually that fearsome and that the
ethical dimension ought to be resurrected, if, indeed, it ever went away. Both attempts
end up complicating the matter, as confusions occur in what was actually said by the
Foreign Secretary in the New Labour government, Robin Cook, the other individual
ministers, and the government as a whole. Further complications arose in what contem-
porary media commentators, but also political scientists took to be the case based on
these statements.
Thus, this example will look at this issue in three ways: in the first chapter, the ac-
tual events as they unfolded and the political rhetoric will be examined – who said what,
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when. This will be an attempt to disentangle the primary sources from the secondary
interpretation of them, and will involve investigating the major press statements and in-
terviews of the time. It will examine the academic literature which forms the basis of
much of the recent discussion of the issue. I wish to argue that many of the assumptions
concerning statements made and press reactions to them, are incorrect and are now, mis-
takenly, firmly imbedded in the debate.
The second chapter of this examination will scrutinise the claims that the ethical
dimension to foreign policy was Robin Cook driven and based primarily in the FCO.
The four main departments linked to foreign policy will be examined and links and con-
trasts made explicit. In the third chapter of this examination the original sources will be
searched to discover if a New Labour doctrine of humanitarian intervention can be
found and the problems generated by it.
New Labour swept to power after the 1st May 1997 election with a rout of the op-
posing parties, winning 419 seats including the speaker. On the afternoon of 2nd May
1997 Tony Blair announced his cabinet, and it was made known that Robin Cook was,
as expected, to be Foreign Secretary. On 12th May 1997 Robin Cook launched the For-
eign and Commonwealth Office’s (FCO) new mission statement. This mission state-
ment contained the details outlined both in the election manifesto new Labour because
Britain deserves better and the four goals given in an interview with The Observer
which was published on 4th May: just over one week previously.
During his statement to the press on 12th May, Robin Cook used the following
words:
[t]he Labour Government does not accept that political values
can be left behind when we check in our passports to travel on
diplomatic business. Our foreign policy must have an ethical
dimension and must support the demands of other peoples for
the democratic rights on which we insist for ourselves. The La-
bour Government will put human rights at the heart of our for-
eign policy and will publish an annual report on our work in
promoting human rights abroad. […] Today's Mission Statement
sets out new directions in foreign policy. […] It supplies an eth-
ical content to foreign policy and recognises that the national in-
terest cannot be defined only by narrow realpolitik (Cook
1997a).
This emphasis on ‘an ethical dimension’ or ‘ethical content’ was soon being re-
ferred to in the press, perhaps initially only as journalists’ shorthand, as ‘ethical foreign
policy’, not simply at the time but long after Cook’s departure from the Foreign and
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Commonwealth Office (cf. Alibhai-Brown 2007; MacAskill 2000a, 2000b; Brit-
tain 2000; Gittings et al 1999; Guardian 2003; Hurst 2001).
6.1 THE MORAL AND THE ETHICAL DURING THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN
On the 16th April 1997, just over two weeks before the election, Tony Blair spoke
to an invited audience of 350 people in Southampton. His speech was reported the next
day in The Times by James Landale under the title ‘Blair takes politics into the moral
…’ and its very first sentence informs its readers that Blair intends to bring ‘a “moral
dimension” to British politics’ (Landale 1997). Throughout his speech Blair makes a
number of quite explicit claims about the relationship between the intended politics of
New Labour and the realms of the moral and the ethical; while he is not discussing for-
eign policy he does seem to indicate that this moral dimension will be located within the
government itself, thereby affecting all that it does.
Hence, when Blair speaks of justice it is not simply as an abstract word with a feel
good factor, it is given a specific task within government, namely, as some form of veto
within debates as Blair intends:
to put justice in its rightful place, at the head of the queue. We
will restore the social and moral dimension of British govern-
ment and ensure that, in all our debates, the question ‘is it
right?’ is asked persistently and that we get a clear answer be-
fore we take the decision (Landale 1997).
We may be within the realms of weasel words: Blair does not say whether the
clear answer which justice is to give has to be yes or no. However, other instances rather
put paid to this cynical notion, for example, it is ‘about making choices not only be-
cause they are prudent and sensible but because they are just’ (Landale 1997). That said,
it should be clear that there is some political rhetoric at work here, for not many parties,
whether in the midst of an election campaign or not, would claim to be the party of in-
justice. The term justice itself may end up being used as a rhetorical tool, but it is the
surrounding discussions which will make clear what Blair’s intentions were.
Blair’s words are quite clearly tying politics and morality together when he claims
it is ‘our right, and I would say our duty, to put politics in a moral and ethical context’
(Landale 1997). This is a battering ram of a sentence using the words ‘right’, ‘duty’,
‘moral’, and ‘ethical’ within a very short space of one another, and while we can argue
about whether or not there is any right or duty to do any such thing, the sentence itself is
rhetorically very strong. Moreover, it will be rather difficult to claim thereafter that one
Chapter 6: Robin Cook, New Labour & the Ethical Dimension 6.1
125
does not intend an ethical dimension to some aspect of politics. It may be being used as
part of a general election, but it is still a clear statement of intent.
A final quote from his Southampton speech provides an interesting angle as he
switches round the idea of government reflecting the people it represents, to the people
reflecting its government, where the:
health of the family and the strength of the nation ultimately re-
flect the quality of honest, decent, truthful government, govern-
ment which has a moral dimension and which always makes
sure that justice has a high place at the Cabinet table (Landale
1997).
The UK will not get the government it deserves, it will get the government it
ought to deserve, and perhaps become worthy of: a government in full possession of the
virtues. Indeed, some cabinet ministers might possibly be able to sit next to the embod-
iment of one of them, assuming they are high enough up the Cabinet table. While,
again, no government would claim to be the dishonest, indecent, and untruthful gov-
ernment, the moral dimension does seem to go beyond electioneering and indicate a
parallel with any future use of ethical dimensions.
Writing on this speech, David Walker does warn his readers that one cannot ‘hang
a man on the evidence of his election rhetoric’, (Walker 1997: 70) but, nevertheless, this
was a speech delivered to an invited audience, so we must assume it is thought out and
pitched towards its listeners, and the speech’s content is mirrored in the party’s 1997
manifesto.
It can hardly be argued that any other minister using the terms ethical dimension
or moral dimension, in conjunction with New Labour policy will have conjured this
from out of nowhere. Nor can it be claimed that there were no indications given that an
ethical dimension to policy might appear post-election. However, one speech is perhaps
not enough proof, regardless who gave the speech, so further pre-election usage will be
sought.
At no point in the Labour Party’s election manifesto of 1997 is the word ‘ethical’
mentioned. The word ‘moral’, however, was used twice: once in the section entitled
‘promoting economic and social development’ where it is stated that ‘Labour believes
that we have a clear moral responsibility to help combat global poverty’ (Labour Party
1997), and a second time in the final paragraph of Tony Blair’s introduction:
[t]his means knowing where we want to go; being clear-headed
about the country's future; telling the truth; making tough choic-
Chapter 6: Robin Cook, New Labour & the Ethical Dimension 6.1
126
es; insisting that all parts of the public sector live within their
means; taking on vested interests that hold people back; standing
up to unreasonable demands from any quarter; and being pre-
pared to give a moral lead where government has responsibili-
ties it should not avoid (Labour Party 1997).
Two incidences of a word in as large a document as a manifesto cannot, perhaps,
be thought of as significant, and in fact, this is the same frequency as in the Conserva-
tive manifesto of the same year (Conservative Party 1997). Nonetheless, the above
quote is very similar to the ‘honest, decent, truthful government, government which has
a moral dimension’ passage mentioned above (Landale 1997).
This list of actions, which he intends the party to carry out once it is in power,
seems to resemble a political ethical code, appearing almost like a list of possible politi-
cal virtues which the party intends to attain: to tell the truth, do what is right, stand up to
the bully, and so on. Bold claims when one’s manifesto promises that it contains ‘only
what we know we can deliver’ (Labour Party 1997). Indeed, Paul Williams lists the slo-
gans used by New Labour in foreign policy since 1997 and comes to the conclusion that
on ‘closer inspection, this reads like a list of aspirations rather than policy’ (Williams
2004: 921).
The mention of moral in its ‘combat global poverty’ guise (Labour Party 1997) is
acknowledgement that New Labour believes it has clear moral responsibilities beyond
its country’s own borders: we are approaching the idea of foreign policy also having its
ethical dimension.
Furthermore, Igor Cusack has drawn up a chronology of Labour’s foreign policy
from 1983 to 2000 and, while not citing his sources, asserts that as early as June 1996
the Labour Party was aiming to put ‘human rights and developmental issues’ to the fore
(Cusack 2000: 273). Also, according to Cusack, in September 1996 there were press
reports claiming that Cook was to declare that international trade should have a moral
aspect and The Times reported in February that Robin Cook was to give human rights a
more central role in its foreign policy (Cusack 2000: 273). However, without the
sources and with the problem here being that of hearsay it is difficult to base an argu-
ment on these sources, as I have been unable to locate these articles. Although this
might point to the idea of an ethical dimension to foreign policy having an earlier start-
ing point than might be claimed, this can only be mentioned as an aside.
However, Peter Lawler points out that Tony Blair had indicated that foreign poli-
cy was to be one of the four cornerstones in his ‘New Britain’ and that Blair had
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pledged to have a ‘comprehensive review of foreign policy and a revivification of Brit-
ain’s internationalist credentials’ (Lawler 2000: 281). This claim to internationalism
was also quite prominently contained within the 1997 Labour Party Manifesto:
[t]here is a sharp division between those who believe the way to
cope with global change is for nations to retreat into isolation-
ism and protectionism, and those who believe in international-
ism and engagement. Labour has traditionally been the party of
internationalism (Labour Party 1997).
Williams, too, has discovered prior information as he says that before:
New Labour’s arrival in government, the party’s relevant docu-
ments suggested some new directions in foreign policy were
likely to follow an election victory (Williams 2004: 921)
This all hints at there not being quite the level of surprise which some of the other
analyses which will be examined below seem to indicate. These authors focus on the
media reaction at the time of the announcement of the mission statement rather than the
party literature quoted and examined above.
The conclusion to be drawn from this brief outline is that the notion of ethics or
morality was in use by the party prior to winning the election. There was a hint of the
moral or ethical in the 1997 manifesto beyond merely the specific usage of moral vo-
cabulary, and it was echoed in at least one speech by the future leader. Nor was this idea
of an ethical dimension limited to domestic affairs: moral aspects to foreign policy were
at least being mooted: the press seemed to be aware of the moral rhetoric being used
before Labour won the election and it was reported.
6.2 THE NEW LABOUR GOVERNMENT’S FOREIGN POLICY STATEMENTS
On Sunday 4th May 1997 The Observer newspaper published a report of the in-
terview Robin Cook had given to Will Hutton and Patrick Wintour the previous day, in
which he outlined his foreign policy agenda.
Robin Cook, widely regarded as the most influential left-winger in government,
and indeed, not only the one minister in the FCO with prior government office experi-
ence, but the only one who had been in parliament when Labour was last in power
(Brown 2001a: 15), promised to ‘open a radical new era of British foreign policy’ which
he would nevertheless combine with ‘a vigorous defence of British interests’ (Hutton
and Wintour 1997).
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So far business as usual. However, Cook also undertook to publish a ‘Foreign Of-
fice mission statement’ within a fortnight which would set out the top four priorities for
UK foreign policy; one of these four foreign policy priorities would include placing
‘human rights and the environment at the centre of European policy’ (Hutton and Win-
tour 1997). Cook pledged to put an immediate ban in place preventing the sales of Brit-
ish land mines, but refused to discuss arms sales bans to individual countries, whilst as-
serting that bans could be possible (Hutton and Wintour 1997).
Having won the election, Robin Cook indicated in an interview, almost as soon as
he had an office to conduct it in, what he intended for his time in the Foreign and Com-
monwealth Office. True to his word, eight days later on the 12th of May 1997 in the Lo-
carno Room in the Foreign Office, Robin Cook unveiled his mission statement. The
four benefits intended to be secured for the UK were:
 Security. We shall ensure the security of the United Kingdom
and the Dependent Territories and peace for our people by pro-
moting international stability, fostering our defence alliances
and promoting arms control actively;
 Prosperity. We shall make maximum use of our overseas Posts
to promote trade abroad and boost jobs at home;
 Quality of Life. We shall work with others to protect the world’s
environment and to counter the menace of drugs, terrorism and
crime;
 Mutual Respect. We shall work through international forums
and bilateral relationships to spread the values of human rights,
civil liberties and democracy which we demand for ourselves
(FCO 1997: vi).
This was followed by a listing of the strategic aims of a global foreign policy and
the immediate priorities for the subsequent twelve months, neither of these documents
mentioned arms, rights, morals, ethics, or dimensions of any sort.
Of itself, it can perhaps be argued that the mission statement is not particularly
scandalous: security and prosperity are mentioned first, followed by international polic-
ing, with a mention of the environment, then mutual respect – a perfectly Westphalian
notion, one might think. However, the claim to wish to spread values is where the inter-
est lies.
Looking back at the electioneering rhetoric of Tony Blair it could well be argued
that this tenet is of a similar breed: just as no government will claim to be the dishonest,
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indecent, unjust, or untruthful government, what foreign policy would wish to claim to
be the foreign policy of human rights and civil liberties abuses, and a rejecter of democ-
racy? This may have been planned as a similar rhetorical device, and looking at this last
pillar in this way, it does not seem that unlikely.
Had the mission statement merely been put into action without a press conference
it is possible it may almost have gone unnoticed; the notion of mutual respect is not giv-
en any more weight than the other three foundations. In fact, as they are not presented in
alphabetical order and security is mentioned first – it is at the top – it might well be as-
sumed that mutual respect is rather lower ranking. However, perhaps worried that this
could be the case, that this aspect introduced by New Labour might fall by the wayside,
the press conference was held in a magnificent setting. With video displays in the back-
ground, the mission statement was presented to the media and Robin Cook gave a
statement entitled ‘British Foreign Policy’ (Cook 1997a). It is this statement which
seems to have changed emphasis and slipped very definite interpretations into place.
There has been much said on the very concept of the mission statement and
whether or not Malcolm Rifkind had released one beforehand, whether the concept was
new or not. However, one of the most relaxed quotes on the subject came from one of
Cook’s predecessors, Douglas Hurd, who said in his testimony before the House of
Commons Select Committee on Foreign Affairs:
[m]ission statements were invented after I became Foreign Sec-
retary. In my day they were called ‘Speeches in the House of
Commons’, but that seems to be rather out of fashion now. Of
course there were statements of intention. […] if you look back
at Hansard you will find plenty of mission statements, except
they were not called that. I do not object to the jargon of the
business school coming into these matters, but I do not think it is
a huge change. The stuff is all there—the statements of inten-
tion, the speeches—you have just re-christened them. If you are
happy with that, that is fine. It does not do any harm (Hurd
1997b: QQ101-102).
The first point to be made is that Robin Cook spoke of an ‘age of international-
ism’ (Cook 1997a). Lawler draws attention to the fact that Cook later speaks of how the
four goals of foreign policy contained in the mission statement ‘provide the Labour
Government's contract with the British people on foreign policy’ (Cook 1997a), a theme
‘reiterated in internationalist form’ (Lawler 2000: 286) in the mission statement’s com-
mitment to a ‘people’s diplomacy’ (FCO 1997). As John Young points out, in ‘rhetoric
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at least Labour sounded, as it has often done, more “internationalist” than the Conserva-
tives’ (Young, J 1997: 139).
In using internationalist language, New Labour would risk an ideological term be-
ing applied to their foreign policy right from the start, possibly opening them to attack at
an earlier stage than a new government might wish. However, as mentioned above, the
links to internationalism had been present in the Party Manifesto, so this seems to be a
planned battle line. Furthermore, this link to internationalism is pointed out and
strengthened in documents and speeches later in New Labour’s first term. As mentioned
below, the Ministry of Defence claims in 1998 that ‘British are, by instinct, an interna-
tionalist people’ (MoD 1998: 7); Tony Blair in his famous 1999 Chicago Speech de-
clares that we ‘are all internationalists now, whether we like it or not’ (Blair 1999), and
Cook in 2000 not only mentions it again, but defends his use of the term:
it is going to be the Internationalist century.
It is a curiosity of semantics that the word 'internationalism' pro-
duces a favourable reaction, except on the wilder shores of reac-
tionary isolationism (Cook 2000b).
We must conclude that it might be more difficult to claim that New Labour is not
arguing from an internationalist viewpoint than the opposite.
This continuation of thought from electioneering to government appears again a
few sentences later: ‘[w]e are instant witness [sic] in our sitting rooms through the me-
dium of television to human tragedy in distant lands, and are therefore obliged to accept
moral responsibility for our response’ (Cook 1997a) – here we see Robin Cook begin-
ning to apply the notion of the moral to the FCO mission statement.
Two interesting sentences arrive shortly afterwards. Cook claims that nation states
are interdependent: this may be a globalisation claim, or even further proof of an inter-
nationalist inclination to the foreign policy, yet this is followed by the proclamation that
‘modern world foreign policy is not divorced from domestic policy but a central part of
any political programme’ (Cook 1997a). This is remarkable for its logic. If states are
interdependent, and if domestic policy overlaps with foreign policy, then could it not be
the case that one state’s domestic policy overlaps with another state’s domestic policy,
that is, a denial of the traditional notion of sovereignty?
Cook goes on to speak of arms control and disarmament – using the idea of the
advances in the technology of weapons to make this in the national interest. The use of
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the language of realpolitik with disarmament policies is an interesting move, and it is
within this framework that he announces working towards a total ban on landmines.
While in the mission statement the environment is mentioned simply as one of
several aspects to do with the quality of life pillars, in his statement Cook tells us that
the ‘Labour Government is determined to push the environment up the international
agenda’ (Cook 1997a). This is worthy of note as it is mentioned where the drugs, terror-
ism, and crime contained within the mission statement are not. While it is not to be as-
sumed that the environment is the most important of the four, the fact that it has been
singled out to be talked of, will certainly leave it more open to comment.
It is the fourth tenet of the FCO’s mission statement which attracted the most at-
tention, and was the most misquoted, perhaps on account of the fact that it was so emi-
nently quotable. These soundbites include: ‘[t]he Labour Government does not accept
that political values can be left behind when we check in our passports to travel on dip-
lomatic business’; ‘[o]ur foreign policy must have an ethical dimension’; ‘[t]he Labour
Government will put human rights at the heart of our foreign policy’, and furthermore,
an annual report on work promoting human rights abroad was to be published (Cook
1997a).
Here we have the mutual respect aspect not being one amongst four, but perhaps
more like first among equals; furthermore, this is no Westphalian notion of sovereignty
and mutual respect, this is an ethical dimension added where the mission statement had
none. An internationalist policy with an ethical dimension is a bold announcement, and
Cook wishes it to be acknowledged as such when he claims that this ‘sets out new direc-
tions in foreign policy’ (Cook 1997a). Just in case a single mention of ethical might be
construable as a slip of the tongue, it is mentioned again as supplying ‘an ethical content
to foreign policy’ along with a rejection of realpolitik, and if it still is not quite clear,
then Britain must become a ‘force for good’ (Cook 1997a). Whereas the mission state-
ment taken alone might have been able to be construed as a fairly neutral document, it is
no longer. It is providing ‘ethical content’, an ‘ethical dimension’ (Cook 1997a), and
became, before very long ethical foreign policy to its commentators.
It should be noted that many commentators are at pains to point out that Cook
never used the phrase ‘ethical foreign policy’ (BBC 2001; Wheeler and Dunne 1998:
851), despite claims that it was ‘Mr Cook's phrase’ (Parker 2001). Notwithstanding, it
was frequently used by commentators (c.f. Brown 1998; 2000: 199; 2002: 173; Wick-
ham-Jones 2000: 11). Another point to be made here is that it is often used merely as
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shorthand and is very often used not as an ethical foreign policy but rather as either ‘an
“ethical” foreign policy’ or ‘an “ethical foreign policy”’ (c.f. Clwyd 1997; Rawnsley
1998; Parker 1999; Rath 2006) – inverted commas being a difference more tricky to
pick up on in formats other than the written word and perhaps adding to the confusion.
Chris Brown goes as far as to state that ‘no official ever used that phrase’ (Brown.
2001a: 16), whilst Wickham-Jones takes a more careful view:
government press officers did not dispute that characterisation
(at a time when they were happy, by and large, to correct that
they considered to be misinterpretations of policies) (Wickham-
Jones 2000a: 4).
However, it is not entirely the case that government press officers are to blame for
an error which Cook, it is claimed, would have made clear, especially as he made a
point of saying in a speech that:
[s]ome people have described our new approach as an ethical
foreign policy. I created a modest little stir last week when I
pointed out that it was not a description I had ever used myself
(Cook 1998d).
If we take a closer look at what was said, we may find out that both Brown and
Wickham-Jones are mistaken.
Although one might quibble at who or what an official is, there is one official
source, which is parliamentary not governmental, which not only uses the term, but
which one ought to expect to be especially careful in its usage, namely the House of
Commons Select Committee on Foreign Affairs’ First Report which was set up on 31
July 1997 to examine Foreign Policy and Human Rights. Although it might be argued
that this is not official government usage, any incorrect usage can be identified and a
correction submitted by the government. The introduction to the report mentions the
‘ethical dimension of the Government's foreign policy’ (HC 1998: Intro: 4) and that this
‘new emphasis on ethics in foreign policy was met with some scepticism’ (HC 1998:
Intro: 5). By the time we have reached the assessment chapter in the report we find that
there has been:
a great deal of discussion on the question of whether the foreign
policy of the present Administration is any more or less ethical
than that of its predecessor (HC 1998: Assessment: 85)
That is to say, the question is not if there is an ethical foreign policy but how ethi-
cal, and whether or not is it as ethical as the previous administration.
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Of more interest are the questions posed by the committee during the testimonies:
the phrase ethical foreign policy is used a number of times by various officials. One of
the first usages is on the first day of evidence hearing and it is by Liberal Democrat MP
David Heath who also explains what he thinks the committee is doing:
I think the main area of interest for this Committee is how we
take the idea of an ethical foreign policy beyond sloganising and
towards practical effects (HC 1998: Minutes of Evidence
25/11/97: Q9).
Not New Labour Government usage, but not corrected, either. A single usage in
the early stages of the committee may be regarded as an error, but three weeks later at
the next hearing when Douglas Hurd is being examined, we see further usage, and, as
above, it is coming down to the question of the practical:
Lord Hurd, we constantly come back to the main thrust of our
inquiry here, which is the practical measures which can be taken
to advance an ethical foreign policy (HC 1998: Minutes of Evi-
dence 16/12/97: Q90).
The question following directly after talks of policy instruments ‘which might be
used by a Foreign Secretary in pursuit of an ethical foreign policy’ (HC 1998: Minutes
of Evidence 16/12/97: Q91). Thereafter, Labour MP Diane Abbott points out to Hurd,
as someone who is not a Labour Party member that:
the idea of an ethical foreign policy has tremendous emotional
resonance for the Labour Party […] I can see why the Foreign
Secretary might want to present himself as taking forward this
totally new departure in ethical foreign policy (HC 1998:
Minutes of Evidence 16/12/97: Q92).
Taking these usages into account, I think it is difficult to argue that no official ev-
er used the term. It should be apparent that there is official use of the term ethical for-
eign policy and, moreover, that it is not simply a case of journalists’ shorthand – alt-
hough it cannot be ruled out that it is not politicians’ shorthand either. However, so far,
it must be admitted, there is no government official who has used the term.
It may be argued that while it is the case that the committee which was set up to
look into how human rights and foreign policy were to be implemented ought to know
exactly what the intended remit was, we are still not in the position to have Robin Cook
himself faced with this misuse and correcting it. Nor will we be able to after the follow-
ing examples.
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In a transcript of a radio interview conducted on 14 May 1997, Cook does not cor-
rect the interviewer whose first question of the interview (according to the transcript)
consists of ‘Is the whole ethical foreign policy beginning to unravel? Can we start with
Indonesia? Why are we still selling military equipment to them?’ (quoted in Guardian
1999) and lets the reference to ‘ethical foreign policy’ pass. Or course, this is still in the
aftermath of the election and one might argue that the problems had not appeared which
would result in the correction. Of perhaps more importance, then, is that Cook also lets
the usage pass in a context where one would expect that accuracy would be of the es-
sence, namely at his testimony before the above mentioned Select Committee on For-
eign Affairs in the following year. When asked by Conservative MP Virginia Bottom-
ley:
[a]fter all the euphoria of last summer about the ethical foreign
policy of the Mission Statement […] Does he go as far as some
of his predecessors suggested, that so much vaunting of human
rights and ethical foreign policy can actually be counterproduc-
tive and can actually cause difficulties or is that asking him to
go further than he feels able to? (HC 1998: Minutes of Evi-
dence: 06/01/98: Q216).
The first and last sentence in the question both mention ‘ethical foreign policy’
but are not rebutted by Cook and while, midway through his answer, he states that he is
‘quite happy to stand by the rhetoric I made. Sometimes rhetoric is attributed to me that
I never uttered’ (HC 1998: Minutes of Evidence: 06/01/98: Q216) he gives neither ex-
amples nor gentle hints that this rhetoric is to be found in his questioner. Of course, the
testimony is the verbatim record and perhaps not as likely to show a thought out answer
as a written statement. Yet, there is a platform to respond and were this misuse of a term
fundamental to government policy then one might expect that it would appear in the
written response to this report, but in the First Report from the Foreign Affairs Commit-
tee: Foreign Policy and Human Rights. Response of the Secretary of State for Foreign
and Commonwealth Affairs there are absolutely no corrections indicated (FCO 1998).
Here it seems that Kampfner is correct when he states that ‘Cook insisted that he
had never actually used the phrase “ethical foreign policy”, although it was only when
the policy started running into trouble that he disowned the phrase’ (Kampfner 1998:
216).
However, to further do away with Brown’s claim that no official ever used that
phrase there is a final source which can be quoted. For while the above examples do un-
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dermine this claim it could be argued that these counterexamples do not originate from
within cabinet, and are therefore not ‘government officials’, a former member of the
same cabinet did indeed use this phrase: Clare Short. In her 2004 book entitled ‘An
Honourable Deception? New Labour, Iraq, and the Misuse of Power’, within her chap-
ter on Blair’s First Term, Short says:
[i]n 1997 Labour began with a bang and we committed our-
selves immediately to all sorts of good things such as signing the
EU social chapter; an ethical foreign policy; a ban on land
mines; an aid programme focused on reducing poverty; rejoin-
ing UNESCO; and tightening controls on arms exports (Short
2004: 66).
As far as Short is concerned, and one would assume she ought to know, this was
no mere ethical dimension to foreign policy: it was an ethical foreign policy which was
announced in May 1997.
It can be argued that in 2004 Clare Short was operating under a different agenda,
having finally resigned over the Iraq War, and that this claim some seven years after the
facts cannot be taken simply at face value. However, although she does not quote it her-
self, her department does indeed use the term ‘ethical foreign policy’ in 1997, but this
will be discussed in length in section 7.2.
6.3 THE ACADEMIC REACTION
New Labour, its foreign policy, and any ‘ethical dimensions’ to the party are still
the subject of academic discussion, and as this thesis intends to look at the links be-
tween humanitarian intervention, morality, and politics, these discussions are of great
importance. How a government comes to its position, justifies this position, and the re-
action to it are all of interest here. Robin Cook’s position is one of the most clearly out-
lined and as such one of the most fascinating accounts for study.
It is necessary for this study that the facts surrounding the New Labour example
are as clear as possible and in the case of the press reaction to the ethical dimension a
great deal of imprecision has occurred. Several writers have commented on the press
reaction, but as far as I am aware, no large-scale study carried out. Thus, the one or two
paragraphs which an author might devote to the subject seem to be quoted extensively
and taken as law. As we have seen above, whether or not anyone in government used
the term ethical foreign policy has caused confusion and disagreement between com-
mentators, the reception of the ethical dimension in the press has generated even more.
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Some of these statements are not wholly incorrect, but hint towards a negative re-
ception or surprise within the UK press which does not appear to be borne out once the
reports themselves are examined. Mark Wickham-Jones who states that the ‘weight
placed in the mission statement on an ethical dimension took the press by surprise’
(Wickham-Jones 2000a: 4), while Little claims it was ‘unheralded and unexpected’ (Lit-
tle 2000: 253). Wheeler and Dunn (2004: 5) quote Wickham-Jones’ appraisal of the sit-
uation and Gaskarth goes so far as to say that:
[w]hen Cook announced in 1997 that New Labour’s foreign pol-
icy should have an ‘ethical content,’ former practitioners were
vociferous in their skepticism [sic]. Media commentary was al-
most entirely negative and the phrase ‘ethical foreign policy’
was used to condemn either the Government’s supposed amoral
hypocrisy or its naive utopianism (Gaskarth 2006b: 325).
Both of these quotes indicate a negative response, but while the Wickham-Jones
article hints at a mild bowling over, Gaskarth’s article claims a general derogatory retort
– two rather different accounts of the same period of time. Another quote by Wickham-
Jones again, in a different article, states that as shadow Foreign Secretary ‘Robin Cook
gave no indication that he would initiate an ethical dimension to UK foreign policy on
entering office’ (Wickham-Jones 2000b: 93), and the general consensus that the
(in)famous mission statement on 12th May 1997 is the starting date for this policy (c.f.
Dunne and Wheeler 2001: 167; Buller and Harrison 2000: 77; Wheeler and Dunne
2004: 5; Gaskarth 2006a: 45).
It is true that 12th May 1997 was the date that Robin Cook announced and held a
press conference on his mission statement for the FCO, thereby making it rather diffi-
cult to ignore. Nonetheless, as we have already seen in the previous section, there were
enough intimations in speeches and manifestos to give at least a suggestion of what was
to follow – the main issue being how much of such rhetoric makes it beyond the elec-
tion. And as will be seen, the content of the mission statement was known to the press
before its presentation in the Locarno Suite.
Wheeler and Dunne paraphrase Wickham-Jones in describing the press reaction to
Cook’s mission statement press conference, declaring that the ‘broadsheets referred to it
as ‘Cook’s ethical bombshell’, ‘unprecedented’, ‘startling’ and so on’ (Wheeler and
Dunne 2004: 5). In an earlier essay, they claim that it is the ethical aspect which ‘domi-
nated the media coverage’ and that it was a ‘radical departure’ in foreign policy (Dunne
and Wheeler 2000: 62). Claiming that it was the ethical dimension which, according to
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newspaper headlines, was the most controversial aspect of Cook’s mission statement
(Wheeler & Dunne 1998: 847), Wheeler and Dunne also quote a headline not mentioned
in Wickham-Jones’ listing, looked at in more detail below, namely the Daily Tele-
graph’s headline ‘Cook to lead the Foreign Office on moral crusade’ (Lockwood 1997:
6) which ‘gives a flavour of the “spin” put on the ethical dimension by the media’
(Wheeler & Dunne 1998: 847n).
However, while the headline itself is quite attention seeking it may be argued that
this is the point of a headline: the content of the article is more measured and more posi-
tive than the nine words might otherwise suggest. Indeed, the article didn’t make the
front page, turning up on page six; paragraph three states that the ‘speech made clear
that he wants the moral dimension to be well to the fore in his stewardship of one of
Britain’s more stuffy institutions’ (Lockwood 1997: 6). In fact, the Telegraph seems to
be more petulant than outraged at the mission statement, claiming that its five strategic
aims ‘look similar to those that Mr Rifkind would have drawn up had anyone asked him
for a “mission statement”’, and as for Mr Cook’s statement regarding the Common-
wealth, the UN, consular services and the strengthening of relationships ‘[n]o one would
argue with any of that’ and with regards to the benefits of these proposals ‘these would
not have surprised Mr Rifkind either’ (Lockwood 1997: 6).
In short, The Telegraph’s discussion or the moral dimension is fairly measured;
the similarities rather than the differences with Cook’s predecessor are pointed out, and
the article has an eye-catching heading. The tendency to over-egg the pudding as re-
gards the contemporaneous newspaper reaction can be as minor as confusing the head-
line with the content, as Wheeler and Dunne seem to, but also goes beyond this. I will
argue that the surprise and negativity with which it is assumed the mission statement
was met with was not the case. Part of the problem is that impressive hyperbole in head-
lines has been taken, by many in political science, as the response of the press, whereas
it is the content of the article which is of interest. As Simon Jenkins says in his testimo-
ny before the House of Commons Select Committee on Foreign Affairs: ‘Would that
you had read out what I wrote rather than what the headline writer wrote!’ (Jenkins
1997b). Too many of these accounts are written with the benefit of hindsight and it does
seem that a mixing up of facts has occurred. In fact, Wickham-Jones admits in a differ-
ent article within the same collection to that containing his overview of the press reac-
tion, although it is no mea culpa, that, ‘[i]t may be that too much has been made of the
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surprise expressed by media commentators and others’ (Wickham-Jones 2000b: 94).
This situation will now be investigated.
6.4 THE PRESS REACTION
In reporting the fact that Robin Cook was intending to release his first general
message via a film produced by Sir David Puttnam, the Daily Telegraph wrote criticis-
ing these ‘video “mission statements”’ and mentioned in passing what it thought this
video would contain, namely, ‘Labour’s priorities, thought to include human rights,
overseas aid and boosting the role of the Commonwealth’ (Fenton 1997a: 4). This guess
was of course not too far from the truth; however, rather than being critical of the pro-
posed mission statement or its perceived content, the Telegraph contents itself with crit-
icising the idea of making a video to accompany it. The priorities mentioned above are
not commented on further, this article’s main interest to this thesis being that a vague
idea of the content of the mission statement can be surmised five days before it is an-
nounced and still not raise any eyebrows even in a broadsheet not sympathetic to New
Labour or its policies.
The Guardian managed to find out the content of the mission statement prior to
the press launch, and published it on 12th May – there cannot, surely, with this leak and
the proof above of the sort of guesswork going on, have been many journalists present
who would not have had an inkling of what was in store. The Guardian’s Ian Black
claimed that the mission statement was:
expected to include:
Putting human rights and global environmental issues at the cen-
tre of British and European policy; […] Developing tough
guidelines on arms exports;
Integrating foreign policy into domestic issues […]
Most of what will be announced has appeared in New Labour's
foreign policy documents. Repeating it in the mission statement
- a device common in the private sector - is intended to signal
the will to implement it.
Foreign Office officials say they are pleased Mr Cook is im-
pressing his sense of priorities on the diplomatic service, which
many feel is badly in need of change after 18 years under the
Tories (Black 1997a: 10).
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This is fascinating, as not only does a contemporary account manage to give a
fairly accurate version of what the mission statement did actually contain, printed in
time to allow other journalists to read it and be prepared for the content, but the word
used to describe the mission statement is ‘unprecedented’ as opposed to anything more
shocked:
Robin Cook, the Foreign Secretary, issues an unprecedented
public mission statement today promising a Euro-friendly Brit-
ain with better internationalist credentials (Black 1997a: 10).
Moreover, it is not entirely clear what is ‘unprecedented’: the mission statement
itself, or its content. Furthermore, The Guardian claims that the majority of the content,
including the tough guidelines on arms exports and the emphasis on human rights, is
already contained in other policy documents – this press conference is merely to reiter-
ate them. The Foreign Office officials interviewed for the above quote do not appear
overly upset at proceedings.
Thus, as I have indicated above, Wickham-Jones’ assertion that the press were
taken by surprise (Wickham-Jones 2000a: 5) may not strictly be the case: the mission
statement was leaked, and more than one commentator had seen the writing on the wall
in Blair’s ‘New Britain: My Vision of a Young Country’, the 1997 election manifesto,
and the speeches in the run up to the first of May. Wickham-Jones does not cite the aca-
demics who were taken unawares by the ethical angle (Wickham-Jones 2000a: 5) and it
would be a surprise to find any. If it can be proven that the press were not quite as much
on the back foot as Wickham-Jones claims, then it would be a daring political scientist
who would admit to never reading a newspaper following a general election. Wickham-
Jones lists the press reaction as follows:
The Observer termed it ‘Cook’s ethical bombshell’ (18 May
1997). The Guardian described the mission statement as ‘un-
precedented’ (13 May 1997). A Financial Times leader called
the ethical angle ‘the most striking innovation’ of the goals laid
out by the foreign secretary (13 May 1997). Joe Rogaly, a re-
spected commentator on the paper, described it as a ‘startling’
development (17 May 1997). The Times reported, ‘Labour is
anxious to set a new tone: on human rights and arms sales the
shift is substantial’ (13 May 1997). The Economist concluded,
‘In Mr Cook, the moral dimension goes deep’ (17 May 1997)
(Wickham-Jones 2000a: 5).
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These headlines and quotes will now be followed up and assessed to see whether
they have been quoted correctly, used in context, and how the content matched up to the
headlines.
Looking at some of these articles in a little more depth is enlightening. The Wal-
ters and Garret article is not to be found in the UK or political section: it is in the busi-
ness section. This is of significance as the entire article is dealing with the defence in-
dustry’s reaction to the mission statement – hence the use of the word ‘bombshell’. The
article itself is balanced, showing reactions from both sides of the argument. Whilst
claiming that ‘the defence industry is reeling’ and that Cook ‘set alarm bells ringing’, at
the same time the article quotes group managing director of British Aerospace, Mike
Turner, as being ‘relaxed’ and saying ‘[w]hat I like about Cook is that he says “Yes,
human rights are important” but he also thinks about what is in the national interest’
(Walters and Garret 1997). Digby Waller, defence economist at independent think-tank
International Institute of Strategic Studies is reported as stating that ‘British defence ex-
ports will be affected only at the margins’ (Walters and Garret 1997). The paraphrasing
and lack of context makes this headline appear far more damning than it actually is: the
bombshell is a headline writer’s gimmick rather than a true representation of a balanced
article.
The ‘unprecedented’ quote from The Guardian is delightful, as its precedent was
set the day previous, on the 12th, when The Guardian leaked the mission statement and
it was described then as ‘unprecedented’ by Ian Black (Black 1997: 10). In fact, Black
uses ‘unprecedented’ on another occasion on the 12th, i.e. one day prior to the press
conference, in a more in-depth commentary, a paragraph in which hyperbole is rather
noticeable:
Cook is to go public with his plans today by issuing an unprece-
dented mission statement at an on-camera press conference in
the glittering Locarno Room – a striking contrast to the lobby-
style unattributable briefing the FCO prefers (Black 1997b),
In fact, despite Wickham-Jones’ claims of surprise and shock, the tone is rather
one of enthusiasm, referring to Cook as ‘the energetic Scotsman sweeping away the
cobwebs’ in charge of a department claimed to be ‘perhaps the stuffiest, most cautious
in Whitehall, we are in for some interesting times’ (Black 1997b). Other terms used are
‘imaginative’, ‘fascinating’, and an FCO official is quoted as saying that this change
was badly needed and that ‘Now we're going to have some fizz. We had competence
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without the fizz for too long’ (Black 1997b). As mentioned above, it is not clear wheth-
er it is just the notion of a mission statement itself which is unprecedented or its content,
and in the above article it does seem to be the idea of a mission statement which is de-
scribed. The further adjectives used; ‘on-camera’, ‘glittering’ and ‘striking’ do not ap-
pear to add negatively to ‘unprecedented’ (Black 1997b). This is not to say that prob-
lems were not foreseen or forecast, but these will be examined later.
The quote from The Financial Times article cannot truly be described as surprised
and the use of the word innovation might simply be in response to Cook’s description of
his mission statement as ‘a new direction’ (Financial Times 1997). The Financial Times
is fairly neutral and addresses the dilemmas which the inclusion of this ‘ethical dimen-
sion’ into foreign policy might bring, but does end with ‘(n)onetheless, a policy which
sets out to do the decent thing whenever possible is no bad place to start’ (Financial
Times 1997): again, not quite giving the impression of a newspaper in distress. Further-
more, the Rogaly article, which discusses Robin Cook’s statement is only one of three
news events of the week involving both politics and ethics. The other two stories in-
volved Royal Dutch/Shell and Rupert Murdoch: Robin Cook comes off best. Rogaly’s
mention of ‘startling’ is followed by the word ‘innovation’, not ‘development’ as Wick-
ham-Jones claims, and while a ‘startling development’ can indeed bode ill, a ‘startling
innovation’ emerges as more positive than that. Moreover, the paragraph following this
is worth quoting in full:
[t]he new government’s stance is admirable. We cynics must re-
sist the temptation to pelt it with rotten tomatoes. We may, how-
ever, mutter that the foreign secretary’s ability to carry out his
self-proclaimed new mission will depend in large part on other
governments. They must be persuaded to co-operate, to join the
club of benevolent intentions. Here’s hoping (Rogaly 1997: 3).
That Rogaly is a cynic, he admits himself and he points out a major problem.
However, admiring the stance and admitting of some hope, albeit faint, is not the doom-
mongering which might be implied from the Wickham-Jones quote: on the contrary,
this is a paragraph where Rogaly is hoping against hope in spite of himself – he regards
the endeavour as admirable, surely not a negative reaction.
The Times article is interesting as it seems to be at pains not to be in any way
shocked. In response to Cook’s ‘new departure’ The Times sighs that ‘the more prosaic
truth is that every year, the thick annual Foreign Office report is prefaced by a summary
of its mission, aims and objectives’ (The Times 1997). While The Guardian might claim
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that it is the idea of a mission statement which is unprecedented, The Times won’t even
allow it that accolade. Echoing Hurd’s thoughts on the mission statement, The Times is
of the opinion these features were always there, just called by other names – they do not
see any innovation there. They do admit it is to Mr Cook’s credit that he does not dis-
miss the public’s desire to help during disasters and atrocities, and that there is merit in
an annual report on human rights (The Times 1997); but as with the other newspapers,
The Times is worried about how exactly this will all work when the horns of a dilemma
loom. The Times is not shocked, startled or taken unawares. As with a great many of the
other contemporaneous press reactions, the tone is balanced, credit is given where they
think it is due and the possible problems pointed out.
A similar sense of ennui can be detected in The Economist article which Wick-
ham-Jones quotes:
Mr Cook is not the first British foreign secretary to arrive in of-
fice determined to change things. Nor will he be the last to run
up against the diplomats' natural scepticism about his ability to
do so (The Economist 1997).
Like The Times, The Economist cannot be shocked and is also at work to ensure
that no-one else is either and so, contra Wheeler and Dunne who tell us that:
[i]n the preceding fifty years, there had been no public articula-
tion of a conceptual framework for understanding the means and
ends of foreign policy (Wheeler and Dunne 1998: 847),
The Economist is able to say of the mission statement:
Mr Cook wrote it personally, and he says it represents ‘a new di-
rection’. As it happens, this claim is readily testable. For in
March, just before the election campaign began, Mr Rifkind also
published his own mission statement, in the Foreign Office's an-
nual report. Comparing the two, anyone expecting a cultural
revolution is doomed to disappointment (The Economist 1997).
Again, as in all the other articles, The Economist is aware of the issues at stakes
and neither euphoria nor depression is forecast, the possible future problems are pointed
out and The Economist makes no prophesies, and instead, as with the other national
newspapers, sets out the issues:
[a]s Mr Cook makes real-world decisions over the next couple
of years, which will prevail? The answer to that question will
not be known for some time. When it comes, it will say a lot
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about how radical, once the energy of victory wears off, Mr
Blair's government is really going to be (The Economist 1997).
The conclusion to be drawn from this section is that with a post-election policy
following on from pre-election promises, which included references to, amongst others:
internationalist elements to foreign policy; the moral, and the ethical, added to which
there was a leaked version of the mission statement, there was unlikely to be a surprised
journalist in the room. The emphasis placed on some elements may have raised a few
eyebrows, which may have had something to do with the traditional image of the FCO
rather than the content, but, realising that something had to give, it was the aspect of
what would eventually have to be sacrificed in this stance and when that would be
which raised the most questions, which will be looked at now.
6.5 POLICY ISSUES RAISED BY THE PRESS
The one problem which was obvious to all the commentators in the first few days
after the mission statement press conference was that of foreign policy with an ethical
dimension being pulled in two directions. This takes the form of the ideals of, for exam-
ple, human rights being at the centre of the policy, or the UK being a ‘force for good’
(Cook 1997a), or coming into conflict with that of ‘prosperity’ (FCO 1997: vi) i.e. jobs
in the arms industry. As Dawkins and Coyne point out, even when a balanced argument
is called for:
[w]hen two opposite points of view are expressed with equal in-
tensity, the truth does not necessarily lie exactly half way be-
tween. It is possible for one side simply to be wrong (Dawkins
and Coyne 2005).
That is to say, it is not necessarily the case that a middle ground can be found: if a
solution is to be found it may involve one of the views being completely disregarded to
the benefit of the other. It was clear to many commentators that this was inevitable, it
was just a matter of waiting to see which principle toppled first. As we have seen above,
the political can remain the political whilst moving through, for example, the moral and
the legal, but once the moral steps away from what is right, it stops being the moral. The
moral is more likely to give. This next section will look at some of the media comment
which deals explicitly with this point and how this point was dealt with. This is of inter-
est to make clear whether anyone damned or encouraged this policy right from its start.
The BBC website pointed out that ‘[h]uman rights policy is rarely clear cut’ and
that the dilemma facing the British Government is how to ‘balance concern for human
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rights abroad with the need to protect British trade and employment […] between turn-
ing down a contract to supply weapons to a regime which has a poor human rights rec-
ord, or the loss of jobs in the defence sector in Britain’ and concludes that the ‘new La-
bour Government is unlikely to find easy solutions to this dilemma’ (BBC 1997). The
BBC is not taking sides and simply points out that not supplying goods to specific buy-
ers will result in job losses in that sector. The dilemma is whether the human rights rec-
ord of a far off land is of more importance to a UK government than unemployment
numbers at home. No solution is offered and the difficulty of dealing with such a di-
lemma is acknowledged.
A feature piece in The Times the day after the statement clearly addresses the is-
sue the Government will face, namely:
the stronger the principled commitment to human rights, the
greater the risk of being pilloried for double standards. […]
What balance is to be struck between concern for moral stand-
ards and Britain plc? (The Times 1997).
Moreover, The Times article points out problems which could occur within gov-
ernment without clarification, pointing out that ‘[o]missions, in any broadbrush state-
ment of objectives, are often the most illuminating clues’ (The Times 1997), a continu-
ing issue for the Government, and as late as 1998 Wheeler and Dunne were complaining
that:
[d]espite repeated public statements about the need to put human
rights at the heart of foreign policy, the government has not elu-
cidated a conceptual framework for deciding the priority and
consistency of the various principles contained in the mission
statement (Wheeler and Dunne 1998: 848).
This lack of explanation would cause internal problems, maintained The Times:
[f]aced with this policy, coupled with instructions to promote
human rights forcefully, but told to make ‘maximum use of our
overseas posts to promote trade abroad and boost jobs at home’,
the natural reflex of British ambassadors must be to wire home
for clarification (The Times 1997).
Thus the risk here is one of generating confused foreign policy. Echoing this, Si-
mon Jenkins in his opinion piece on 14 May 1997 states that:
[s]tudents in advanced mission-statement studies know that the
devil is in what is not said (Jenkins 1997a).
And points out that:
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we must not take Robin Cook's new mission statement too seri-
ously. We are still in the post-election novelty phase (Jenkins
1997a).
It is clear that Jenkins is going to wait and see, but he points out some of the pos-
sible problems. As we have already seen above, while claiming to be a cynic, he does
not damn the entire venture. Jenkins’ piece is of interest as he is examined as a witness
in the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs on the idea of foreign policy and human
rights, and is able to explain in more depth what his opinion is. In his article Jenkins
points out the fact that there are moral ambiguities of foreign policy but indicates that
what he sees in New Labour’s message is:
not diversity with continuity, not even responsibility with
change. It is morality. Out goes pragmatic, opportunistic British
diplomacy. New Labour is ethics. […] From the people who
brought you the Iron Lady now comes...Holy Tony.
Human rights is to be at the heart of British foreign policy. […]
This foreign policy has the most interventionist slant of any I
can recall (Jenkins 1997a).
This looks rather uncomplimentary. That said, the foreign policy is not deemed
‘interventionist’ per se, rather it has the most ‘interventionist slant’ – it leans towards it
(Jenkins 1997a). As with the other commentators, however, Jenkins, the hopeful cynic,
is not prepared to condemn the entire endeavour as completely impossible and leaves
Cook with a lifeline, albeit a slender one:
[m]odern interventionism is short-term and paper-thin. It is up-
held by none of the commitment of empire or of old Cold War
alliances. Such imperialism risks being mere television diplo-
macy. The challenge for Mr Cook is to prove that his new moral
outreach can ever deliver a practical goal. Otherwise it is just
showing off and feeling good (Jenkins 1997a).
One might expect that this dilemma between the moral and the political would be
given short shrift in The Financial Times, but the notions behind it get a sympathetic
hearing, a balanced discussion of the issues is presented, and the question is left hanging
of what the new Labour Government will actually do in practise. The Financial Times
says of the mission statement that ‘(a)s a statement of principle, this is commendable’,
and even that ‘a policy which sets out to do the decent thing whenever possible is no
bad place to start’ (The Financial Times 1997).
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However, before the impression is made that The Financial Times wholeheartedly
approves of the policy, it points out the problems:
giving [the Mission Statement] substance will mean addressing
some dilemmas. […] Taking a tough moral stand in such cases
may mean sacrificing export orders and jobs at home. That is a
legitimate choice, but one which the government must have the
political courage to defend if its approach is to be credible (The
Financial Times 1997).
This is not simply dependent on political will. The Financial Times points out that
hard choices will remain, with few easy answers and that ‘most foreign policy is based
on complex trade-offs, in which moral absolutes must contend with other less noble pri-
orities. That, no doubt, is why Mr Cook offered few specifics yesterday’ (The Financial
Times 1997). Like the analysis in The Times, The Financial Times points out the lack of
specifics but rather than see this as a failing, it sees this as a necessity. This cannot be
deemed an attack on the Cook’s proposals, but rather as a somewhat downbeat ending
to a fair hearing.
The Observer’s article of 18 May 1997 collected opinions from various sources as
to what this ethical dimension might bring, some of these views are already mentioned
above. The most interesting aspect is that there is neither euphoria nor doom – both
sides on this argument are aware of the potential for conflict and aware that it will be a
zero sum game: they are not sure enough yet of who will benefit to express either of
these extremes. Even whether or not there will be an effect is brought into question in
The Observer’s article through the query: ‘[i]s the stated desire for a more ethical for-
eign policy just impressive rhetoric, or will it translate into decisions and policies with
direct consequences for overseas trade?’ (Walters and Garrett 1997).
Those in the defence industry are quoted as saying:
[e]xactly how Labour's policy will have an impact is unclear.
But will they really take the purist's view if they can see it cost-
ing thousands of jobs? […] The Government will have to choose
between an ethics policy on the one hand, and foreign currency
receipts and jobs on the other’ (Walters and Garrett 1997),
while a spokesperson from Amnesty International says:
[o]ne big issue will be consistency. We were used to the last
government making good statements about human rights viola-
tions in small countries, but they often soft-pedalled when it
came to important allies, such as Turkey. […] They have been
making the right noises, but so far the only commitment has
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been some kind of annual report to Parliament, which would
provide a list of licences granted during the year (Walters and
Garrett 1997).
Any claims that Robin Cook might have had that this was a ‘new direction’ were
being countered by, of all possible opponents, Amnesty International, claiming that the
previous administration had said much the same thing – they will wait and see what ac-
tion it will bring. That responses were guarded is to be expected: fine words are all very
well, but as with any new government, one simply has to play the waiting game. The
unusual aspect to the ethical dimension in this administration was the direct conflict
with trade which they had built into the theory – a loser would be shown at the first con-
flict of these values and that would set the tone.
The Guardian ran several articles in the early days of the mission statement and
exhibits the same general understanding and misgivings as the other newspapers, ‘it will
be fascinating see to how much comes of it’ and ‘even if Cook's tour doesn't change the
world or really put Britain at the heart of Europe, it won't be boring’ (Black 1997b).
However, the Guardian also talks of the mandarinate ‘muttering about the dangers of
double standards and problems of accuracy’ and that ‘Defence manufacturers and the
DTI are still much keener on exports than ethics’ (Black 1997b).
Some parts of The Guardian articles seem to afford Cook less sympathy than one
might expect. Black reminds his readers that they should not get ‘carried away too far:
this is a circle-squaring enterprise, in which the ethical dimension fits awkwardly
around the angular core of strategic and commercial self-interest’ (Guardian 1997). The
Guardian goes so far as to suggest that the landmine ban was ‘[s]moke and mirrors’ in-
sofar as it was on the cards already (Black 1997b). However, where it gets more inter-
esting is in The Guardian’s response to Cook’s idea of benchmarks. Even although it
can guardedly claim that ‘sniffing the air these exciting first few days, no one expects
enormous changes’ (Black 1997b), nonetheless establishing a set of benchmarks ‘moves
the parameters of foreign policy discourse in an encouraging direction’ (Guardian
1997). This is on account of the benchmarks encouraging public scrutiny, and thereby
having huge potential for achievement or disappointment (Guardian 1997). Herein lies
the problem for Cook and the call to caginess in The Guardian: ‘Judgment must come
later, but at least Mr Cook has given us the commitments against which the performance
can (and will) be judged’ (Guardian 1997). The conclusion being that Robin Cook has
created a zero sum game, clear rules on how he is to be judged, and has invited the pub-
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lic to watch. He is either confident of himself, confident people will forget, or likes to
provide his own rope for hanging himself. The Guardian makes it quite clear that there
is nothing to be done but wait, and then judge.
Hugo Young in The Guardian does not hold out much hope, pooh-poohing
Cook’s pretention of a new direction and pointing out the similarities to previous in-
cumbents of the office, before putting the question to his mission statement ‘[i]s this any
more meaningful than what went before?’ and asking of Cook ‘How can he deliver on
this promise?’ (Young, H. 1997).
Young quotes Douglas Hurd, not long after being made Foreign Secretary as say-
ing ‘we should penalise particularly bad cases of repression and abuse of human rights’
and spoke of ‘the moral imperative’, which, Young points out ‘didn't last long’ (Young,
H. 1997). The difference between Hurd and Cook, according to Young, is that people
will expect more: Cook has given a pledge which ‘elsewhere on its agenda, the Blair
Government has been careful not to give: visible, ambitious, demanding’ (Young, H.
1997) – to renege on this promise would be dangerous.
The Economist follows a similar line of attack as The Guardian: pointing out the
lack of difference between Cook and his predecessors, and musing on how it will all
turn out. This might sound like criticism, but few of the newspapers felt confident
enough to say exactly what Robin Cook, the left-winger, may or may not get up to – all
bets were hedged. Thus:
[i]f Mr Cook wants to challenge any of these beliefs, a change of
style will not suffice. He will have to manage a change of sub-
stance, in the face of the accumulated wisdom of a venerable
British institution. It will not be easy (The Economist 1997).
While The Guardian concentrated on comparisons with Hurd, The Economist
chose his direct precursor, Malcolm Rifkind. A few commentators made note of the fact
that prior to Robin Cook, the FCO did, in fact, have a mission statement (FCO 1997)
and The Economist’s comparison is worth quoting in full:
Mr Cook will ‘strengthen the Commonwealth’. But then Mr
Rifkind wanted to ‘work for a stronger Commonwealth’. Mr
Cook will ‘spread the values of human rights’. But then Mr
Rifkind promised to work for ‘respect for human rights’. Mr
Cook wants a ‘successful transition in Hong Kong’ which, as it
happens, are precisely the words Mr Rifkind used (The Econo-
mist 1997).
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The Economist also points to the difference in style between the ‘cautiously word-
ed’ mission statement and Mr Cook’s speech at the press conference, hinting, perhaps,
at an FCO approved mission statement and a Cook approved speech and an indication
of battles to come (The Economist 1997). Nor does the author overlook Tony Blair’s
role in supporting Cook, describing him as a ‘prime minister who has a touch of the
moralist about him’. In short, The Economist has no wish to make a call as to how this
will all end, and finishes the article with a balance sheet and a question:
[o]n the one hand, bureaucratic opposition, the lobbying of the
arms makers, the alarm of employees in arms factories at the
prospect of losing their jobs, the anger of the backbenchers who
represent them; on the other hand, conviction and a determina-
tion to make a difference. As Mr Cook makes real-world deci-
sions over the next couple of years, which will prevail? (The
Economist 1997).
Writing in the Telegraph on the 18th May John Simpson points out that Defence
and Foreign Office posts are tricky positions in the Labour Party as ‘too much contact
with the United States, the EU or weaponry makes you unpopular with the Left of the
party’ (Simpson 1997: 33). Simpson argues that British foreign policy transcends do-
mestic politics and he points out several controversial foreign policy decisions where
the party in government acted in a way which might have been thought more in keeping
with the party in opposition. Simpson appears to be hinting at something which will be
examined in section 7.5, namely that the dance of the diplomats is stronger than the pull
of the party within the FCO. In short, Simpson’s analysis is ‘by voting Malcolm Rifkind
out of that magnificent office and putting Robin Cook in his place, we have changed
virtually nothing’ (Simpson 1997: 33).
Despite Wheeler and Dunne’s and Wickham-Jones’ claims (Wheeler and Dunne
2004: 5; Wickham-Jones 2000: 5) there is no indication of any great surprise caused by
the mission statement and Robin Cook’s statement to the press. The matter had been
hinted at, reported on, and leaked to the press a day previous to its announcement. Cook
was assumed to be serious about carrying the matter through, and the matters which
might arise were discussed.
There are a few conclusions we can draw from this chapter. The lack of surprise
with the press was such that various previous incumbents of the post of Foreign Secre-
tary were compared to Cook and the general feeling was that there were more similari-
ties than differences. Both Hurd and Rifkind had stated that they wished to deal more
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robustly with regimes which violated human rights. Arguments raged as to whether pre-
vious foreign secretaries had used mission statements, and if so, whether they called
them mission statements or not.
Gaskarth’s claim that the:
[m]edia commentary was almost entirely negative and the
phrase ‘ethical foreign policy’ was used to condemn either the
Government’s supposed amoral hypocrisy or its naive utopian-
ism (Gaskarth 2006b: 325)
has been disproved. Media comment for the time period directly following the an-
nouncement of the ethical dimension was in reality well balanced and thoughtful. That
negativity appeared later, once the dilemmas which the media had discussed arose is not
in doubt, but these are two distinct time periods.
The point to be made is that the episode directly following the election of New
Labour has not been adequately researched, and it has been assumed that the negativity
of the press which followed the first few dilemmas had been present from the start,
which was not the case.
Though not 100% sure Cook would, neither was anyone 100% sure he would not
manage to negotiate through the problematic issues which would occur as a result of the
ethical dimension. Furthermore, any media commentators in the UK who immediately
attacked the new policies of an incoming government, which had won by such a re-
sounding margin, might well find themselves out of kilter with their audience – such a
course would be, at the very least, imprudent.
It cannot be argued that the press was either truly sceptical or truly convinced.
Both sides of the issues were discussed and nobody in the media seemed inclined to de-
clare whether or not they thought Cook would fall at the first hurdle. It seems that the
press did not want to be wrong-footed on this account. Praise for the sentiments, clarifi-
cation of the dilemmas, uncertainty at whether or not Cook would make the difficult
decisions, and instances of where other Foreign Secretaries had fallen seems to be the
general pattern.
Cook himself made things easy for the press: using buzzwords and rhetoric; link-
ing himself to internationalism and giving the ethical prominence. He generated a zero
sum game and publicly laid out the criteria by which he was to be judged: all the press
had to do was wait. Any attempt to predict what was to come would have left the news-
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paper in question possibly open to ridicule – the nature of the game indicated a 50/50
chance of being right or wrong. The press let Mr Cook take that chance himself.
Looking at this chapter with the benefit of the analysis of areas one and two, we
can observe some issues. The central question of ‘where is the political?’ will receive a
somewhat confused answer from this chapter. Firstly, the Labour Party had been so long
out of power that practical politics seems to have transformed into political theorising.
Secondly, this theorising does seem to favour of the moral. Thirdly, this seems to be ar-
ea one based political science, whereby an ideology has been chosen and is being de-
fended, as can be observed below:
Today's Mission Statement sets out new directions in foreign
policy. […] It supplies an ethical content to foreign policy and
recognises that the national interest cannot be defined only by
narrow realpolitik (Cook 1997a).
This quote seems to quite clearly illustrate de Jasay’s point, outlined in the intro-
duction, of instrumentalism:
the state as an automatic machine which dispenses ‘social deci-
sions’ when we feed out wishes into it (de Jasay 1995: 10).
Cook plainly sees foreign policy as a structure, to which ethics provides the con-
tent – the automatic foreign policy machine will dispense ethical decisions if only the
content is ethical. As we also saw above, Koselleck warns that:
[t]he abstract and unpolitical starting point allows a forceful, to-
tal attack on a reality in need of reform
The totality of the politically neutral claim of a fixed, eternally
valid morality necessarily turns political acts and attitudes, once
they are subjected to a moral test which they cannot pass, into
total injustice (Koselleck 1988: 152).
Cook risks a great deal in his approach, but area one has been concerned with es-
tablishing itself as a science and has made a similar error, assuming a neutrality it can-
not possess, and assuming that the selection of a doctrine can pass unhindered through
the instruments of state. Moreover, the fixation of area one on ideology, which if taken
too far can be seen as a form of anti-politics (insofar as the answers are predetermined
and not dependent on circumstance), can be seen in Cook’s rejection of realpolitk. The
analysis by area three practitioners of foreign policy as regards ideologies will be
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looked at in the following chapter, but we have seen in chapter four that Douglas Hurd
states that:
I think the making of foreign policy is blending realism and ide-
alism. It is blending the world as you would like it to be with the
world as it is (Hurd 1997a: Q79).
Suffice to say former foreign secretaries were not of the opinion that an ideology
could be chosen and adhered to, such a view misunderstands and rejects the political.
However, in his defence, Cook was able to turn to little else other than political science,
his party was so long out of power, and was not to know that there has been a crisis in
the concept of the political.
As we have seen from the section on tragedy, Morgenthau does not deny that
there can be ethics at work in politics, but, crucially:
to know that states are subject to the moral law is one thing; to
pretend to know what is morally required of states in a particular
situation is quite another (Morgenthau 1962a: 106).
I have claimed above that while the study of tragedy as regards politics has been
interesting, it is not particularly useful. Nonetheless, the connection between politics
and tragedy is perhaps best made in this chapter where Cook’s area three statements il-
lustrate the concept well. If we take Lebow’s quote that:
Thucydides’ tragic understanding of politics, reflected in their
belief that order was fragile, that human efforts to control, or
even reshape, their physical and social environments were far
more uncertain in their consequences than most leaders and in-
tellectuals recognized, and that hubris – in the form of an exag-
gerated sense of authority and competence – only made matters
worse (Lebow 2003: x).
Then one might begin to recognise the links between the belief that the state is
simply an instrument with the idea of hubris, for if the state is neutral, then to control it
is no problem at all and so a rejection of the political could almost be deemed hubris
from the outset. As Bentley pointed out, ‘[t]ragedy and comedy are concerned […] with
justice’ (Bentley 1964: 260). Thus, it is possible that we will meet with one or other of
the concepts when Cook’s claim that ‘[t]he Labour Government will put human rights at
the heart of our foreign policy’ (Cook 1997a) is considered. Insofar as Fiebelman is cor-
rect when he states that:
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[c]omedy is an intellectual affair, and deals chiefly with logic.
Tragedy is an emotional affair, and deals chiefly with value
(Feibelman 1962: 199).
Then it is most likely to be tragedy. The use of tragedy does not answer questions
on the political, but it does make the issues with which this dissertation is concerned
more apparent.
This chapter has been based on the mission statement given by Cook after the
election, mainly to show the press reaction and indicate that the response by some aca-
demics to these first few days in office is flawed. Of more immediate significance is to
what extent the notion of an ethical dimension within foreign policy was only linked to
Cook and to what extent it was endemic within the New Labour Government’s depart-
ments. This is what chapter seven will now consider.
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7 New Labour Consensus on the Ethical Dimension
Having looked at the build up towards the 1997 election, the mission statement,
and clarified the media reactions, we are now able to progress towards what the ethical
dimension actually was. The basis of this idea as it was brought into being in the Locar-
no Suite mission statement was simply the announcement of something to come. We
now have to look at how this idea moved on, how it was expressed in policy and state-
ments, and how deeply this dimension was embedded within the entire Government.
One facet of the ethical dimension of foreign policy which seems to be often con-
fused is that this was Robin Cook’s idea alone and that this dimension may or may not
have come into conflict with Blair’s notions of foreign policy. Some commentators have
argued that this idea emanated from Robin Cook and that this caused problems. Wick-
ham-Jones claims that not only was this Cook’s idea, but that:
Cook’s ethical turn was motivated, in part at any rate, by a de-
sire to raise his political profile within the Blair administration
as a different kind of foreign secretary (Wickham-Jones 2000b:
109).
Not going quite this far, Vickers nonetheless does not have Cook working in har-
mony with Tony Blair in his drawing up of the ethical dimension and claims that:
Robin Cook has been eager to draw on the Third Way as a point
of reference for his foreign policy, though it is not clear to what
extent this reflects an agenda laid out by Blair or by himself, and
press reports indicate some tensions between the two (Vickers
2000: 39).
Wickham-Jones, in a different article, also maintains not only that there were is-
sues between Cook and Blair, but that the ethical dimension did not sit comfortably in
Blair’s Government, when he enquires just:
how closely Tony’ Blair’s Third Way corresponds to Robin
Cook’s ethical initiative is an open question […]. On the face of
it there appears to be a manifest tension between the two. […]
There have been persistent press reports of tensions between the
prime minister and his foreign secretary (Wickham-Jones 2000a:
17).
Vickers claims also that there was a problem with clashes with other departments
when this FCO theory came into conflict with their priorities:
[f]or example, the foreign secretary can tighten up arms sales
only if he has the support of the DTI [Department of Trade and
Chapter 7: New Labour Consensus on the Ethical Dimension 7
155
Industry], but this is resisted because the DTI has a very differ-
ent set of priorities to the Foreign Office. Foreign policy will
continue to be a problem for the Labour government unless
some way is found to integrate it into the heart of the New La-
bour project and to reconcile the domestic and the international
agendas (Vickers 2000: 44).
This would mean that either a coherent plan for the entire government had not
been thought of, or that Cook sallied forth on his own without discussion – neither of
which seems particularly convincing. This begs the questions of how much of this was
Cook’s policy alone, and would it be possible to initiate any such policy without the full
backing of party and to appreciate those domestic aspects which may come into conflict
with the idea? I am inclined to agree with Little who points out that:
it is unlikely that he [Cook] could have launched such a policy
without either the approval of the prime minister or the agree-
ment of Labour’s spin doctors. All must have accepted that it
was possible and desirable to sell foreign policy in ethical terms
(Little 2000: 254).
It would seem extraordinary that one of the first acts of a new Foreign Secretary,
in a new government so long out of power, would be to generate division within the
ranks. One other possibility is that this ethical dimension was, in fact, integrated within
other departments and was more New Labour than simply Cook alone.
David Walker begins his chapter The Moral Agenda with the words ‘[w]hen La-
bour was a socialist party, it had a predefined moral agenda’ (Walker 1997: 66) before
arguing that New Labour, in abandoning its socialist roots, cannot have an ‘intrinsic
moral position’ (Walker 1997: 66). Combine this with the claim that the Labour Party
was the party of internationalism – as claimed in the Labour Party manifesto and Blair’s
‘revivification’ as outlined by Lawler, both mentioned above (Labour Party 1997;
Lawler 2000: 281) – and the Party has, or had, a ‘predefined moral agenda’ (Walker
1997: 66). Add to this mix the fact that Cook was Labour’s first Foreign Secretary since
David Owen in the Callaghan Government of 1979, then, by necessity, much of the in-
novations in foreign policy would be based on ideas and theories rather than experience.
Indeed, this basis becomes more obvious when one realises that Cook was the on-
ly cabinet minister with any parliamentary experience whatsoever under a Labour gov-
ernment (Brown 2001a: 15), having been elected to parliament in the February 1974
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election with a narrow majority of 961 votes (Kampfner 1998: 37) and staying in par-
liament, uninterrupted, for the intervening 23 years. There was virtually no other expe-
rience to draw upon.
The Kampfner book in its very first words outlines, perhaps, why the ethical di-
mension was attached to Cook in people’s minds: Kampfner wanted to write a book
about ‘the role of the radical left in the Labour party under Tony Blair, approached
through its most controversial proponent, Robin Cook’ (Kampfner 1998: 7). Cook was
well known both as a politician and a radical and any ideas which looked like belonging
to the Party’s Left or containing anything which could be labelled radical could be
pinned on Cook quite easily. Cook may or may not have been a radical but nonetheless
it would be rather surprising if a Foreign Secretary announced a foreign policy which
conflicted with all other government policy: radical Foreign Secretaries do not stay as
such long, with either the post or the adjective soon being removed.
The FCO is responsible for foreign policy, but after Tony Blair’s Chicago speech
he could not thereafter be accused of not having an interest in foreign policy himself.
New Labour also created the Department for International Development (DFID), which
would also have to deal with aspects of foreign policy. On top of that there is the Minis-
try of Defence which is likely to have a voice on facets of foreign policy. It does not
seem wise for a new Foreign Secretary to adopt a policy that would almost from the
start come into conflict with other departments of government. The very idea seems
somewhat ludicrous.
In this chapter I will show that an ethical link can be found within all the above-
mentioned departments, and that ethical dimension was a New Labour policy, not simp-
ly a Cook modification. This close link between the politics and ethics will then be in-
vestigated later in the thesis. If that does prove to be the case that the ethical in New La-
bour is much more prevalent than thought, then any scandals, alleged or otherwise,
which only encompassed the FCO would be unlikely to change the entire party’s (ethi-
cal) outlook on the matter. That an ethical dimension may not function in the party’s
foreign policy would not logically mean that it would have to be removed from any oth-
er department.
7.1 COOK, ROBERTSON & SHORT
In attaching the concept of the ‘ethical’ to merely one department and one minster
if the theory were actually more deeply embedded in government policy, commentators
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would risk overlooking an underlying model which might prevent a thorough under-
standing of the New Labour Government in power.
As seen above, Robin Cook was quick off the blocks in announcing, explaining,
and suffering for the ethical dimension with the announcement in May 1997. The nature
of the announcement, in contrast to the perception of the FCO as the last bastion of
stuffiness, along with its speed in respect of other departments and statements, attracted
the attention of the media, and, as we have seen above, the hype and headlines have of-
ten been taken at face value. Hence it is necessary to look at several key players in gov-
ernment who could also have reason to influence foreign policy and what they have said
or written on the subject.
It is of interest that other governmental departments are so often left out of the
picture during discussions of an ethical dimension to New Labour’s foreign policy. Two
are mentioned in passing in Williams: ‘the Department for International Development
(DFID) and the Ministry of Defence both published their “ethical” concerns early on’
(Williams 2002: 61). Williams then goes on in a later article to go into slightly more
detail:
Defence Secretary George Robertson declared that the UK’s
armed forces would act as a ‘force for good’, while Clare
Short’s new Department for International Development set out
to alleviate world poverty and ensure that Britain did not forget
its obligations to the planet’s poorest citizens’ (Williams 2005:
1).
There is no study of the phrase ‘force for good’ and just a rather banal account of
DFID. This somewhat prosaic view of the ethical in other departments seems wide-
spread, with Wheeler and Dunne pointing out that the Department for International De-
velopment might have an interest in development issues:
Clare Short’s newly formed Department for International De-
velopment jointly produced the annual report on human rights,
much of it emphasizing Britain’s role in promoting the right to
development (Wheeler & Dunne 1998: 853).
Even Lilleker who is writing on the Strategic Defence Review within the Depart-
ment of Defence fails to mention any notion of the ethical contained within the Review,
saying only that the ‘only element of New Labour’s approach that had the appearance of
innovation was the attachment of an ethical notion to foreign and defence policy’.
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Lilleker mentions the phrase ‘force of good’ but in relation to Cook (Lilleker 2000: 219)
before later declaring the Review ‘something of a damp squib’ (Lilleker 2000: 219).
These examples indicate that the main thrust of the ethical dimension is not being
picked up on in other departments, and from the brief mentions that they are given one
might be mistaken for thinking that it was mere lip service to the idea, hence the con-
cept of the ethical dimension is only being attributed to Cook. Another commentator
quotes an interview where ‘George Robertson, Labour’s defence secretary, said, “I want
our armed forces not only to defend our country, but to be a force for good, in a very
complicated and a very difficult new world that we are facing”’ (Wickham-Jones 2000:
16). However, once one has seen the radio transcript of the interview one realises that
Robertson uses the phrase ‘force of good’ three times within a short space of time – of-
ten enough for the interviewer to pick up on it and question its use during the discussion
(BBC 1997b).
These departments and documents are important enough to crop up in at least
some of the writers on the subject, but then only fleetingly. I intend to look at some key
documents and statements made from other departments with foreign policy interests in
order to analyse whether or not an ethical dimension is present. The presence of some
form of an ethical dimension in all of these would indicate that the ethical went beyond
the FCO. It is not the intention to provide a completely comprehensive overview, this is
merely designed as a brief synopsis of the departments to pick up on key words,
phrases, and intentions which will aid in discovering what the New Labour’s ethical di-
mension on foreign policy intended to do.
Obviously, an ethical dimension to foreign policy emerging solely from within the
FCO and from one man will differ from one intended by several government depart-
ments. Once this has been answered satisfactorily, it will be possible to look in more
depth at what the ‘ethical dimension’ might involve, at what point (if at all) it was aban-
doned, and the problems this theory poses.
7.2 DFID: CLARE SHORT
The Department for International Development was set up in 1997 to replace the
Overseas Development Agency and it was headed by a secretary of state with cabinet
rank. The first secretary of state for International Development was Clare Short and the
department’s white paper on international development was presented to parliament in
November 1997. Entitled Eliminating World Poverty: A Challenge for the 21st Century
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the document set out the aims of this new department and as such, one would expect it
to link in with other foreign policy aims.
Accordingly, in the summary announcing the 12 strands, in section 3 ‘Consistency
of Policies’ under point number 7 it states that DFID shall give ‘particular attention to
human rights, transparent and accountable government and core labour standards, build-
ing on the Government’s ethical approach to international relations’ (DFID 1997: 7).
Within section 3 the white paper goes into more detail on how it means to achieve these
goals and under point 3.52 which is mainly concerned with conflict prevention it states
that it is crucial to understand the causes of conflict and to resolve disputes non-
violently before stating that:
[t]o achieve this, we shall deploy our diplomatic, development
assistance and military instruments in a coherent and consistent
manner to:
 spread the values of civil liberties and democracy, rule of law
and good governance, and foster the growth of a vibrant and se-
cure civil society
 strengthen social cohesion, promote mediation efforts and en-
courage the regeneration of societies recovering from conflict
 protect and promote the full enjoyment of all human rights
 help solve political and other problems before they cause con-
flict
 advocate measures to control the means of waging war
 provide humanitarian assistance for victims of conflict and per-
secution
 contribute to international peacekeeping (DFID 1997: 69).
There are several items of interest contained here, and the first is the page seven
reiteration of the ‘ethical approach to international relations’ (DFID 1997: 7). This is
worthy of note as the white paper was presented in November 1997 – a full six months
after Cook’s FCO announcement when it must have been quite clear within government
which issues were cropping up vis-à-vis the idea of the ‘ethical dimension’. Indeed, by
this time the ‘arms to Indonesia’ affair, where in July 1997 the Labour Government sold
Hawk aircraft to Indonesia, despite the possibility of them being used for internal re-
pression, had occurred.
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Had these issues been considered insurmountable, or were DFID not committed to
the ethical dimension, then it seems probable that they would have been left out or at
least significantly watered down. Cook might have claimed only to have used the term
ethical dimension, but another department seems to think this dimension could be
stretched further.
Moreover, this document claims that this list of aims which the ethical approach
involves will be adhered to by ‘our diplomatic, development assistance and military in-
struments’, this would seem to indicate the FCO and the Ministry of Defence, as well as
DFID being involved (DFID 1997: 69). ‘International peacekeeping’ and ‘controlling
the means of waging war’ while certainly not outwith the remit of DFID would seem to
gravitate more naturally towards the Ministry of Defence or even the FCO (DFID 1997:
69). Again, if there were no overarching theory this would, at the very least, be treading
on several departments’ toes. Nonetheless, DFID declaring its ambition to use military
instruments to protect and promote all human rights seems to be going quite far.
In section 1 ‘The challenge of Development’ of the white paper point 1.20 states
that these ‘principles form the basis of our international as well as our national policies.
The Government has already made clear its commitment to human rights and a more
ethical foreign policy’ (DFID 1997: 16). While point 1.21 talks of why the objectives of
international development ought to be embraced and tells us ‘because it is right to do so.
Every generation has had a moral duty to reach out to the poor and needy and to try to
create a more just world’ (DFID 1997: 16).
These two quotes are intriguing on a number of counts. Firstly, we have an offi-
cial use of the exact phrase ‘ethical foreign policy’, again this use is by Clare Short,
who, as was seen in the previous chapter, seems inclined to use this term. However, this
is a 1997 usage contained within a contemporaneous official document, as opposed to
her later memoirs and it would seem that, for this minister at least, the ‘ethical’ was not
a dimension, but rather an integral part of the policy. Secondly, the reasons for agreeing
with the objectives set out in the white paper are down to it being ‘right’ and our ‘moral
duty’ – surely the tracks of moralism if ever there were any. No political reason is given
here, only ethical reasons. Cook, it could be argued, may have aware of the difference
between an ‘ethical dimension’ and ‘ethical’ foreign policy, but it is not clear that this
distinction was made by, for example, DFID.
The accusation could be levelled that any attempt to tie the ethical dimension in
DFID and the FCO together is question begging. However, we are simply comparing
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official statements and documents and as such the public face of government policy.
Moreover, despite being separate governmental departments the FCO and DFID, even if
only initially, were working together on these ideas if Cook is to be believed:
I therefore make our commitment to human rights, not just on
behalf of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, but as part of
a Government policy coordinated with the Department for Inter-
national Development. I have consulted closely with Clare Short
on these commitments, and she has contributed to many of the
initiatives which I am about to make (Cook 1997c).
This is an important quote as it points out that the intention, at least, was not only
to have this foreign policy, but to integrate it beyond the FCO: that decisions being
made at the FCO were at the very least being relayed to other departments. But it goes
beyond this. Cook is consulting with Short and she is contributing to FCO initiatives –
any later attempts to pin ethical foreign policy on Cook alone must ignore DFID’s
recognition of the concept.
It would seem that the first major document coming from DFID is just as keen to
promote the ideas outlined by Robin Cook. The phrase ethical foreign policy is used and
there was sufficient time between Cook’s announcement and the DFID white paper to
have anything that might cause embarrassment removed, especially if the departments
were indeed consulting closely. That is perhaps the most interesting aspect of this doc-
ument, as it shows that the idea of ethical foreign policy was most definitely being
mooted from within government, and was not simply journalistic shorthand apparent in
the media’s frequent use of this term.
Six months after it has been seen that the media leapt upon the term, and that it
was the ethical dimension which generated the most interest in the FCO mission state-
ment, the term ethical foreign policy is mentioned in an official document, despite or
perhaps because of this attention. Moreover, the DFID document seems to indicate that
this policy extends beyond the department itself into the FCO and the Department of
Defence: it is not merely the case that there are hints of an ethical dimension being read
into the text, it is clear that DFID is keen to promote these ideas. This is of significant
interest and is unjustifiably overlooked in the literature on this area.
7.3 MOD: GEORGE ROBERTSON
The Labour Party manifesto of 1997 promise to ‘conduct a strategic defence and
security review to reassess our essential security interests and defence needs’ and that
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this would be foreign policy led (Labour Party 1997). Taking longer than intended, this
review was finally delivered fourteen months after the election. The time scale is, of
course, significant as while the DFID white paper had six months to gauge opinion and
results, the Strategic Defence Review (SDR) had over a year, time enough to purge any-
thing likely to generate negative headlines. It must be assumed that any suggestion of
the ethical that has managed to get to this stage is quite obviously intended.
Taking our lead from Robertson’s BBC interview mentioned above, we may tally
up our ‘force for good’ references: the phrase is mentioned nine times throughout the
Ministry of Defence (MoD) document. Robertson does use other terminology and thus
‘we have a responsibility to act as a force for good in the world’, are ‘a leading force for
good in the world’, and a ‘real force for good’ (MoD 1998: 7; 12; 68; 261, 65). Robert-
son, it seems, is keen to get this point over. Beyond this and in his introduction under
point 19 Robertson states that the:
British are, by instinct, an internationalist people. We believe
that as well as defending our rights, we should discharge our re-
sponsiblities [sic] in the world. We do not want to stand idly by
and watch humanitarian disasters or the aggression of dictators
go unchecked. We want to give a lead, we want to be a force for
good (MoD 1998: 7).
This is a rather startling paragraph. Firstly, while the Labour Party can claim to
have an internationalist history it is an odd claim to make of the whole population. Alt-
hough as we have already seen, Blair makes this claim that we ‘are all internationalists
now, whether we like it or not’ (Blair 1999), while Cook makes the century internation-
alist (Cook 2000b). The use of internationalism does appear to be running through a
significant amount of New Labour documents and does indicate a party stance and not
simply rogue usage. Linked to this, Robertson manages to squeeze in talk of rights and
responsibilities on the international stage, this is certainly within the realms of the ethi-
cal, and there does appear to be a mirroring of language occurring.
While the world is unlikely to run out of aggressive dictators any time soon, there
are very few aggressive dictators around who are foolhardy enough to invade their in-
nocent neighbours. While this could happen, it would be more likely the case that ag-
gressive dictators would vent their aggression on their own populations. The aggression
mentioned in the above-cited quote is not qualified. Does being a force of good involve
invading states to prevent internal aggression, that is, going beyond what current inter-
national law might allow? Or does this simply mean joining UN sanctioned defences of
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states which are being aggressively attacked, that is, affirming the current international
law? There is no indication as to what this might actually mean or involve.
Further on in the document there does appear to be some qualification of the idea
of policing aggression. In chapter two under the heading ‘security priorities in a chang-
ing world’, point 21, the document states:
[a]s a Permanent Member of the UN Security Council and as a
country both willing and able to play a leading role internation-
ally we have a responsibility to act as a force for good in the
world. We do not aspire to be a world policeman; many of our
important national interests and responsibilities are shared with
others, particularly our Partners and Allies in the European Un-
ion and NATO’ (MoD 1998: 11 – 12).
The force for good does not compel the UK to leap into the fray at every hint of a
misdemeanour: however, it does not say that the UK will not. There is perhaps no aspi-
ration to be a world policeman, but this statement is not placed in the sentence with the
phrase force for good, it is in the sentence explaining our interests and responsibilities
are also those of others. The UN, the EU and NATO are mentioned as possible others
and seem to indicate that while the UK does not wish to be a world policeman, if its in-
terests and responsibilities with other states compel it to do so, then so be it.
In chapter one of the Strategic Defence Review entitled ‘A Strategic Approach to
Defence’ we are given a reiteration of the linking of defence and foreign policy:
[d]efence serves the aims of foreign and security policy. The
Government's manifesto sets out a broad vision of Britain's role:
strong in defence; resolute in standing up for our own interests
and as an advocate of human rights and democracy the world
over; a reliable and powerful ally; and a leader in Europe and
the international community (MoD 1998: 10).
This obvious linking of defence and foreign policy, defence and human rights, de-
fence and democracy, all seems to back up the claims made by DFID that DFID, de-
fence, and foreign policy were connected. Interestingly, defence serves foreign policy,
albeit not exclusively. Furthermore, this paragraph invokes the manifesto, which one
assumes contains aims and goals which the whole government can agree on: by appeal-
ing to it, the MoD at least is showing its agreement. This being the case the ethical
should be of the same sort throughout the cabinet. Indeed, this paragraph uses language
which is very similar to Blair and Cook’s rhetoric.
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The document is almost 400 pages, but much of this is supporting essays and fact-
sheets, indicating that the document is to be distributed in different ways to different
groups of people: this is very useful for our purposes as both explanations and sound
bites are included which might allow the ethical to be more clearly identified.
In supporting essay two: ‘The Policy Framework’, under the title ‘Interests’ one
might assume a rather realist account would appear. However, counter intuitively, the
notion of interests is tied into a more internationalist viewpoint, which is quoted at
length below:
[a] nation's foreign policy must reflect its values. Britain stands
for a strong world community, where differences are resolved
fairly and peacefully. Our national security and prosperity thus
depend on promoting international stability, freedom and eco-
nomic development. As a Permanent Member of the United Na-
tions Security Council, Britain is both willing and able to play a
leading role internationally. We have a responsibility to contrib-
ute to a strong world community. But we cannot achieve all our
aims alone. Instead, we need to work through strong partner-
ships and alliances, particularly the EU and NATO. We also at-
tach immense importance to the international community as a
whole working together through the UN and other international
organisations (MoD 1998: 93 [9]).
There is much of interest here: the foreign policy link to defence is once again
mentioned, but this foreign policy is linked to values. The values are of great signifi-
cance here as the UK foreign policy is to reflect the country’s values: if the foreign poli-
cy is moral it is because the UK is moral. The UK’s strength is linked to justice and
peace; national security is linked to freedom; the notion of duties and cooperation is
linked to the UK’s role internationally. Rhetoric it may be, but it is political rhetoric
which is quite obviously using moral language, a point made by Mouffe above. It could
be the political simply using the moral for its own, very political, ends, but risks basing
the policy on the moral. The essay continues with point 10 and to put right any notions
that these links are not intentional the document continues:
[t]his is summed up in the four broad foreign policy goals out-
lined by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary on 12 May
1997;
Security of the United Kingdom and Overseas Territories and
peace for our people by promoting international stability, foster-
ing our defence alliances and promoting arms control;
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Prosperity, promoting trade and jobs at home, and combating
poverty and promoting sustained development overseas;
Quality of Life, protecting the world's environment and counter-
ing the menace of drugs, terrorism and crime;
Mutual Respect, spreading the values of human rights, civil lib-
erties and democracy which we demand for ourselves (MoD
1998: 93-94 [10]).
The four goals are mentioned in full, including the fourth goal of not simply ad-
hering to the ideas of rights and democracy, but actively spreading them: all within an
MoD document. However, this link to the FCO is made clear in ‘the Policy Framework’
where it states that the Review has been ‘foreign policy led’ and, in its first stage at
least, was conducted jointly by the FCO and MoD (MoD 1998: 79 [2]). Fourteen
months after the FCO press conference, the values mentioned are still at work in gov-
ernment. Defence policy has been worked out in collaboration with the FCO, who
would have known the problems the idea was encountering in the media and have been
able to advise on avoiding any pitfalls. This far-reaching interdepartmental influence is
a point surely worthy of more notice in the literature.
Looking to one of the factsheets, ‘Modern Forces For The Modern World’, which
is most definitely dealing with military forces and not merely abstract policy, we see
under the title ‘Britain's Security and Interests’ that this spreading of the word is to be
taken seriously:
we have responsibilities as a leading member of the international
community, and a collective obligation to those whose condition
is much worse than our own, to help promote peace, freedom
and prosperity worldwide.
Britain must therefore be a force for good in the world (MoD
1998: 261).
The logic seems to be something of the sort that our values inform our foreign
policy, which then has duties and responsibilities. In the above paragraph it is an obliga-
tion to promote peace, and therefore we must be a force for good because how could we
be otherwise?
Again, it could be argued that abstract notions such as freedom and force for good
do not tell us too much and in actual fact they might simply be political rhetoric: words
with a feel good factor. Phrases such as values and responsibilities may denote ideas of
the ethical to the philosopher, but perhaps not to the man on the Clapham omnibus: we
Chapter 7: New Labour Consensus on the Ethical Dimension 7.3
166
may be seeing what we want to see. However, supporting essay five entitled ‘deter-
rence, arms control, and proliferation’ makes clear that these are all part of a wider
framework, and explains what this framework is.
Under the title ‘Humanitarian Obligations’ there are two points, 52 and 55, which
most clearly and without ambiguity point out what the underlying framework is. Point
52 gives us an obligation, tells us what this is part of, and how this obligation leads to
action:
[a]ll States have an obligation to minimise and alleviate the con-
sequences of conflict for innocent civilians. This is fundamental
to an ethical security and defence policy, and we have clearly
shown our commitment in this area, in particular by our efforts
to ban anti-personnel landmines, and to ratify the Additional
Protocols to the Geneva Convention (MoD 1998: 132 [52]).
A slip of the pen? Is an ethical security and defence policy actually what is meant?
In case we might think it is not, it is mentioned again under point 55:
[t]he Government is convinced that the interconnecting policies
and programmes set out above, which have either emerged from
or been confirmed by the analysis and conclusions of the Strate-
gic Defence Review, represent a coherent, ethical and militarily
sound contribution to British security (MoD 1998: 133 [55]).
The ethical lies at the centre of this review, alongside coherent and militarily
sound. This must surely be considered proof that any notion of ethical foreign policy
was not simply the work of one man from the radical left of the party working from
within his own department. Rather this is a concerted attempt to put the ethical into all
aspects of policy which could impact on the international level, and that this issue can-
not be looked at in isolation from the government. This paragraph makes absolutely
clear that this is a New Labour and not a Cook policy. The ethical as it is laid out in the
points above also have implications for humanitarian intervention theory within the
government.
The policy framework essay states under the title of ‘The Defence Contribution’,
point 24 that:
[o]ur analysis has shown that to do this [make a major contribu-
tion to Britain's objectives in this rapidly changing world], our
force structures and military capabilities need to be based on:
[…] supporting the Government's wider international responsi-
bilities, including as a Permanent Member of the UN Security
Council, particularly in relation to the maintenance of peace, in-
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ternational order and stability, humanitarian principles and dem-
ocratic rights (MoD 1998: 96-97 [24]).
Ultimately, it is the section directly above which is of significance to humanitarian
intervention. There is a hierarchy at work in this paragraph, namely, that military capa-
bilities and structures are to be based, it seems here, on government’s wider responsibil-
ities. This may not seem much, but the preceding paragraphs have already listed inter-
ests, and the responsibilities are not presented as obligations, as there may be to NATO
or the UN, but as being beyond contractual. The wider international responsibilities in-
clude membership of the UN but are not exhausted by them.
It may be argued that what is meant is international cooperation within NATO, or
even the EU, and that this is not necessarily a rejection of the role of the UN. One might
expect the New Labour Government, keen on human rights and democracy to look to
the UN as a guiding light. However, perhaps surprisingly, it seems rather that New La-
bour would prefer to be a guiding light to the UN.
Robin Cook has questioned various aspects of the UN and it is to perhaps be
borne in mind that New Labour mentions the UN in a number of speeches, very often
with suggestions for its improvement:
[w]hen it was formed in the 1940s, the United Nations was
based on the presumption that the threat to peace was interna-
tional aggression and the role of international law and interna-
tional organisations was to halt wars of aggression. It was an
understandable preoccupation given the two World Wars in the
lifetime of those who wrote the UN Charter.
And their initiative has been very successful within its own
terms. Wars of aggression between states are now a rarity. Sad-
ly, internal conflicts are only too common. The UN needs new
rules on when it can intervene to keep the peace within a state
rather than between states (Cook 2001).
What the UN has will be built upon, but just because something does not appear
in a UN document does not limit New Labour, in the mind of New Labour, it is simply
the case that the UN is slightly behind the times.
The language used is that of ‘humanitarian principles and democratic rights’
(MoD 1998: 96-97 [24]). Human rights is the phrase that the FCO used in its mission
statement which was repeated twice in the SDR and are cited above, namely, ‘Mutual
Respect, spreading the values of human rights, civil liberties and democracy which we
demand for ourselves’ (MoD 1998: 94 [10]) and ‘an advocate of human rights and de-
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mocracy’ (MoD 1998: 10 [13]). That the writer of the document might confuse ‘democ-
racy’ and ‘human rights’ and end up with ‘humanitarian principles’ and ‘democratic
rights’ cannot be ruled out, but is not hugely likely as the term ‘human rights’ is so
prevalent.
Human rights are the rights demanded as a human, so democratic rights might be
the rights demanded as a citizen in a democracy, which may or may not be different to
human rights in a non-democracy, or perhaps the right to belong to a democracy? It is
not clear why the UK government would favour democratic rights above human rights,
although the two uses mentioned above are the only two uses of the phrase in the SDR
compared to three uses of the phrase intellectual property rights.
However, to further complicate matters, Cook states that:
[i]f every country is a member of an international community,
then it is reasonable to require every government to abide by the
rules of membership. They are set out in the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights (Cook 1997c).
One might expect the membership rules to be contained within the UN Charter,
but it seems not. Moreover, the thirty principles contained within the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights are summarised by Cook to ‘six core human rights’:
 Everyone has the right to life without fear of violence sponsored
or tolerated by the state.
 Everyone has the right to liberty and freedom from arrest with-
out due process of law.
 Everyone has the right to freedom from torture or cruel and in-
humane treatment.
 Everyone has the right to freedom of thought and the right to
express their thoughts.
 Everyone has the right to practise the religion of their choice.
 Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his or
her country through democratic procedures (Cook 1997c).
It seems this is the basis upon which the guiding principles are to be built. That
the Declaration is not the Charter; that the thirty principles are reduced to six ‘core hu-
man rights’ (Cook 1997c); that quite clearly even some of these six could come into
conflict with one another – none of this is mentioned in Cook’s speech and the MoD
does not mention where exactly its democratic rights spring from.
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What may be of mild interest for the model of ethical foreign policy may be of
greater significance for the idea of humanitarian intervention. To this end let us focus on
two statements contained within the supporting essays; the first is from essay two ‘The
Policy Framework’ and the second from essay six ‘Future Military Capabilities’.
‘The Policy Framework’ essay is in itself of significance as it is the part of the re-
view which concerns itself with building the foreign policy goals of the FCO into the
framework. Of these goals ‘Mutual Respect, spreading the values of human rights, civil
liberties and democracy which we demand for ourselves’ (MoD 1998: 94 [10]) is of
most consequence for our purposes. This policy is slightly odd and allows for much.
The mutual respect of which it speaks is not respect for others as they are, but respect
enough to consider remaking them in our image.
The statement that ‘[a] nation's foreign policy must reflect its values’ (MoD 1998:
93 [9]), and what exactly that could mean, and how this affects the idea of humanitarian
intervention is outlined in supporting essay six where it states that:
[t]he Government promised at the outset of the Strategic De-
fence Review that the process would be foreign policy-led, iden-
tifying what our forces need to be able to do and making sure
that they had the necessary capabilities. This promise has been
kept (MoD 1998: 149 [43]).
Our values are reflected in UK foreign policy, and this, it seems, feeds into the
SDR itself. It is in annex A to the Future Military Capabilities Essay, under the title of
‘The Missions of the Armed Forces’ that we find a reference to humanitarian:
Peace Support and Humanitarian Operations: To contribute
forces to operations other than war in support of British interests
and international order and humanitarian principles, the latter
most likely under UN auspices (MoD 1998: 151 [Annex A.
(E)]).
The ‘most likely under UN auspices’ is interesting as it allows for other backing
(MoD 1998: 151 [Annex A. (E)]). However, the content of these missions is explained a
few pages later, under the heading ‘Peace Support and Humanitarian Operations’ A25.
MT20 ‘Humanitarian Operations and Disaster Relief Outside the United Kingdom and
Overseas Territories’ the SDR tells us that:
[h]umanitarian crises and disasters, if not addressed rapidly and
effectively at an early stage, can often lead to potentially serious
conflicts. When appropriate, and at the request of the Foreign
and Commonwealth Office or Department for International De-
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velopment, the Armed Forces contribute to humanitarian and
disaster relief operations, either on a national basis or as part of
a co-ordinated international effort (MoD 1998: 155).
Whilst the latter quote alone is almost rather commonplace, seemingly dealing
with disasters, it is of interest as it is not simply the FCO who can call on the military to
act, DFID, it seems, is also able to call upon the British armed forces. The above quote
also specifically allows for a unilateral approach to whatever humanitarian crisis it is
dealing with.
When linked together these two quotes make for fascinating reading. The first
quote has ‘British interests’ and ‘humanitarian principles’ (MoD 1998: 151 [Annex A.
(E)]) as possible reasons for these humanitarian operations and it is not clear that these
two motives converge. While humanitarian operations are ‘most likely’ under UN aus-
pices (MoD 1998: 151 [Annex A. (E)]) if serious conflict looks like a possibility, it ap-
pears that the FCO or DFID can request that the MoD act without international coopera-
tion.
Theoretically at least, according to this document, it would be possible for a hu-
manitarian crisis to occur, where there might or might not be British interests involved,
that would allow the UK to become militarily involved unilaterally, at the request of a
department other than the FCO. It is not clear if this conclusion was intended from the
start. It is, however, certainly possible.
It is not to be construed that I am insinuating that New Labour came to power
with the intention of carrying out, or planning to carry out humanitarian interventions;
however, as mentioned above, a generation of not being in power guaranteed a theory
based policy, while the landslide win engendered a condition of goodwill and optimism
not minded to formulate a theory based policy upon timidity.
The Strategic Defence Review is all but ignored in both the academic and media
discussion on the notion of ‘ethical foreign policy’ within New Labour: if mentioned at
all in the ethics debate the Ministry of Defence or the SDR is generally simply men-
tioned in passing, and without any indication that there are ethical issues contained
within it tying it to the ‘ethical dimension’ (Williams 2002: 61; Chandler 2003: 300).
After appraising the document it is not clear why this has been ignored. The FCO
four goals are incorporated into the review, indeed, the FCO was involved in writing it.
The idea of values, most noticeably with the idea of UK forces being ‘a force for good’,
the notion of having international duties, and the proposal that the policy be ethically
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sound are all mentioned. Combine these ideas with references to operations other than
war – based on humanitarian principles – and the possibility that these operations could
come about without UN sanction makes for very interesting reading.
It is hard to argue that an ethical dimension element is not running through this
document. There is a great deal more conformity of thought concerning the ethical di-
mension, the FCO, and the application of ethics within these documents than has been
assumed.
7.4 DTI: FOUR MINISTERS
The input from the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) on aspects of the eth-
ical dimension is difficult to gauge. The reason for this is the fact that the department
changed the president of the board of trade (also known as trade secretary) position four
times in four years. The first trade secretary, Margaret Beckett only remained in the job
a little over a year before being replaced by Peter Mandelson after Blair’s first reshuffle.
Mandelson was forced to quit after six months, whereupon Stephen Byers took over un-
til 2001 at which point he was replaced by Patricia Hewitt.
In an article entitled ‘Blair is blamed for muddle at “Jekyll and Hyde” DTI’ the
Daily Telegraph reported on the Institute of Directors claim that four heads of depart-
ment in four years meant the department ‘suffered from an extraordinary level of politi-
cal instability’ and that the turnover of ministers had caused ‘frequent changes of the
emphasis of policy’ (McSmith 2002). Thus, despite this department being affected by
foreign policy and potentially generating changes in foreign policy, its influence and
capability to act were seriously weakened by this lack of stability. Notwithstanding this
fact there is at least one major announcement of the DTI with regards to the ethical di-
mension to foreign policy which warrants attention.
There is a curious anomaly in this major announcement, the document itself is en-
titled ‘Strategic Review of UK Export Licensing Controls, 1997, URN No: 97/1029’.
This document can be found on the Department for Business Enterprise & Regulatory
Reform (BERR – formerly known as the DTI) and is the speech of the Government’s
announcement on this new criteria of UK export licensing in the House of Commons on
27 July 1997: this DTI announcement is made by Robin Cook, the Foreign Secretary.
It is Cook who outlines the changes to export licences despite the fact, which he
mentions later on, that licences to export these items are issued by the president of the
board of trade (Margaret Beckett at this point), and that the licensing authority is the
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export control organisation of the DTI (Cook 1997e). He then goes on to outline the
new criteria for an export licence before also announcing that for transparency and ac-
countability, there will be an annual report on the state of strategic export controls and
their application.
Cook talks during this announcement of the defence industry being a ‘strategic
part of our industrial base’ (Cook 1997e): industrial bases a topic surely more at home
with a trade secretary than with a Foreign Secretary. A further point to note is that he
announces that the criteria will not be backdated, and it is this which allowed the sale of
Hawk aircraft to Indonesia, the first test case in the ethical dimension which commenta-
tors had predicted would come: the media duly pounced on this failure of the ethical.
It is not clear why Robin Cook should have given this announcement, when so
much of its content was the business of the Department of Trade and Industry. That a
manifesto commitment ‘Labour will not permit the sale of arms to regimes that might
use them for internal repression or international aggression’ (Cook 1997e) was being
broken by a commitment made by the previous government or honoured as soon as pos-
sible still does not completely account for Cook giving the speech.
That said, with such a wide ranging content it is possible that Blair, Beckett,
Cook, or Robertson could have given the speech as its contents could certainly have
covered more than one portfolio. One cannot imagine that the speech would have gone
ahead had the DTI not approved of the content, or were the idea at least not govern-
ment-wide. At any rate, it is made a bit clearer why Cook himself is so strongly associ-
ated with the notion of ethics and foreign policy. Thereafter, the export licensing and
any difficulties with it were placed squarely at the door of the Foreign Secretary, alt-
hough as was made clear in the quotes above, the DTI was the department with the li-
censing power.
7.5 FCO: ROBIN COOK
Having looked at DFID and the Ministry of Defence documents dated from six
months after and fourteen months after the election which still hold true to the ideas ex-
pressed at the mission statement press conference, we are now able to look more closely
at Cook’s ideas. These ideas occur over a longer time span that the other departments,
and will enable the examination of New Labour’s concept of humanitarian intervention
within this same framework.
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The reason that Cook is so often taken to be the standard-bearer for any notion of
the ethical within foreign policy can be explained as follows. While there was an indica-
tion of a moral message in the run up to the 1997 election, one of the first public acts of
any government department was Robin Cook’s speech outlining the mission statement
of the FCO. This initial statement was then followed by the DTI announcement of the
linking of the ethical dimension to arms sales, thereby linking Cook to the concept in
the public’s mind.
Nevertheless, the FCO is not a Foreign Secretary alone, and it would be strange if
the Foreign Secretary were to give speeches on subjects which other FCO ministers of
state would negate in their work; indeed, it was not the case that they did.
In his May 1999 speech ‘Defence and Security: A Snapshot of the Issues’ FCO
minister of state Geoff Hoon defended Cook and his ethical dimension:
Robin Cook made it clear when we took office two years ago
that it would be important for us that we have an ethical dimen-
sion to our foreign policy. He has taken some stick for this
since. To my mind it is wrong - and unfair - to examine every
deed and utterance that we make looking for absolute perfection.
[…] But our understanding remains: we can and we will bring
these issues out in the open and we can and we will put a great
deal of effort into making the world a better place, as well as a
safer place, for us all (Hoon 1999).
Hoon seems to signal that, perhaps, Cook’s choice of words has been attacked, but
what he meant by those words, his ethical dimension, is being acted upon. It is not that
there is not an ethical dimension, but rather that it is impossible for it always to function
as well as might have been hoped – it cannot be perfect. In emphasising the ‘ethical di-
mension’ and not the ‘ethical’ itself, and by pointing out the impossibility of perfection,
Hoon may be emphasising the political at work in the policy. However, in the same
speech Hoon indicates that there is an ethical structure at work in the background, even
perhaps generating problems of its own:
we cannot, and we will not, act without a framework of principle
to guide and inform us as we chart our way through the unpre-
dictable waters of diplomacy. Human Rights, democracy, and
the rule of law are […] not soft, 'touchy-feely' concerns that can
be left to one side as soon as the going gets tough (Hoon 1999).
However, in generating a framework to shore up an ethical dimension, one also
creates the scaffold for one’s own condemnation should one not apply it: the going may
well be tough, and it seems from Hoon’s speech that it was.
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Another FCO minister of state, Peter Hain, in a speech in September of the same
year entitled ‘Africa: Backing Success’ uses the same language of rights and necessity
as the mission statement, indicating that two years later these ideas are not abandoned. It
is, however, of interest that a further dimension is added:
human rights are not just a moral imperative. Where they are re-
spected, economies flourish. Human rights make humans rich
(Hain 1999).
The idea of the moral working their way into what has traditionally been deemed
a state’s interests will be looked at in full below. But despite a two year time lapse from
the mission statement’s announcement, and notwithstanding the ‘going getting tough’,
as Hoon has indicated earlier in the year (Hoon 1999), Hain feels quite able to speak not
just of morals but of moral imperatives.
However, as we have seen above, it was Cook who gave the announcement con-
cerning the strategic review of UK export licensing controls and was, moreover, openly
acknowledged in departmental papers to be working closely with DFID and the MoD:
overlap is occurring, is acknowledged, and this can surely not be coincidence.
In short, to locate the ethical dimension solely within the FCO and to associate it
only with Robin Cook alone is a mistake. This was a government-wide policy covering
all departments with any interest in foreign policy.
Nonetheless, it was Cook who made the majority of speeches on this theme, and it
seems that the other departments did look to the FCO to manage the idea. We can now
look at the FCO in more depth to examine their content to get closer to what the ethical
dimension was intended to be.
It is clear that any differences in policy through time are of importance and will be
explored. However, it is the outlining of what this ethical aspect might be and indica-
tions of how this relates to humanitarian intervention which are of foremost interest.
Of the several recurring themes in Cook’s speeches which have a bearing on any
notion of humanitarian intervention, that of the overlap, and in some cases almost
equivalence, of the domestic and global spheres is of significance. This is a topic to
which Cook returns repeatedly. As early as June 1997 he indicates a move in this direc-
tion when he speaks of:
this connection between the domestic sphere and international
events […]. We must recognise that diplomacy has expanded
beyond its international sphere of inter-state relations, security
treaties and trade agreements (Cook 1997b).
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This is simply a connection at first and it can hardly be denied that a connection
exists between the domestic and the global; however, the point to note is that of the in-
ternational sphere expanding beyond its traditional boundaries. Where else can the in-
ternational expand but into the national, and this throws up the question: whose national
affairs? Where does that leave the internal/external division or the concept of sovereign-
ty? All issues on which the government might well be questioned. By 2000 this connec-
tion has become a convergence, as Cook states that as ‘the world grows smaller, nation-
al interests and global interests are converging’ (Cook 2000c).
The most noticeable implication here will be the risk of the nature of the national
and international becoming indistinguishable. It does not follow that they must become
indistinguishable, however, differentiating between the two will be considerably more
difficult. This would have the result that our questions above have little meaning: they
only have meaning if there is a clear boundary between national and international. The
notion of sovereignty melts away if one cannot tell what a state is, or where one state
ends and another starts, or what the affairs of the international are. Without this bounda-
ry, even a fairly unclear boundary, the notions of external and internal, the international,
and national affairs simply dissolve as they cannot be clearly distinguished. It is not
necessarily the case that one will argue ones own sovereignty out of existence, but the
sovereignty of others may possible be in danger.
Further implications appear in other speeches and become apparent once the logi-
cal connections are built between them, for example:
[f]inally, and famously, the last commitment in the Mission
statement was to spread the values of human rights, civil liber-
ties and democracy. Ours is a Government that believes that the
values which inform our domestic policy must also inform our
foreign policy (Cook 1998a).
Thus, not only is the international sphere expanding, but the national, insofar as it
relates to the UK, is not thereby getting smaller. The international is moving in a certain
direction: outwards. As such it can only eat into the domestic sphere of others. One
might hope that foreign or international values might work in both directions: both into
the UK domestic sphere to perhaps challenge assumptions, and this same process in re-
verse. But Cook only has UK values emanating outwards, informing our international
policy; and while this need not necessarily be a bad or good thing it must be expected
that allegations of neo-colonialism are liable to be made.
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Moreover, as the quote stands, the international also risks becoming a subset of
the domestic; this could result in what we class as an international affair becoming an
internal issue and one is, by definition, involved. More worryingly, perhaps is the dif-
ference to international cooperation. Taking more interest in the international arena
might mean more international cooperation, but an enlarged domestic sphere does not
require this teamwork. The domestic realm expanding into that of the international
could have repercussions: an element of unilateralist interest has been worked into what
might previously have been regarded as a foreign affair with which one has no concern.
One might well work together with international institutions in international affairs, but
if the affair can be seen to be an issue of domestic policy then this caveat is overridden.
Furthermore, as other states do not necessarily have this overlap of national and
international which Cook suggests, there could be a number of issues. The first is that
other states will not be of the opinion that the international matter actually concerns the
UK at all; the second is that an external event could generate an obligation for a unilat-
eral response for the UK which no other government would feel necessitated action.
One risks upsetting several governments with this position. Of course, if one is commit-
ted to being a force for good this is not necessarily a problem – being good is not the
same as being popular.
That this stance will generate obligation is confirmed below:
I firmly believe that the values that inform our domestic policies
must also connect with our foreign policy. That if we demand
democracy, human rights and social justice for our own country,
then we must produce a foreign policy which promotes the same
values for other communities as well (Cook 1998d).
This is expressed in the form of a logical if…then statement, and with no necessi-
ty to demand these values, Cook is claiming that any values that the UK deems im-
portant for itself are to be applied to other states. Moreover, this demand is determined
to be more that simply a logical: if…then, and is firmly in place in other speeches:
[w]e support human rights and democracy for other people be-
cause these are values we demand for ourselves (Cook 2000b).
Before long we find the national/international fusion producing a moral obligation
to ensure that any domestic values become international values:
[a]s a government we are determined to reduce poverty at home.
That confers on us a moral obligation to help fight poverty
abroad (Cook 1998b).
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This is a levelling device which does not acknowledge international difference ex-
cept as something new to apply ones domestic values to. There is no hiding that this is a
moral stance.
Another facet of FCO speeches of the Cook era which is of importance in the un-
derstanding of the administration towards humanitarian intervention is the suggestion
that the ethical dimension is in no way in conflict with the national interest. The im-
portance of this stance is in its ability to bridge the gap with realpolitik to avoid criti-
cism from this quarter. Cook’s strategy is to agree with what his critics say and counter
that they have not thought the idea through:
I am constantly being lectured that the work of the Foreign Of-
fice should only be about the national interest. Actually, I agree
with that. But I also believe that promoting our values, taking
pride in our principles is in the national interest (Cook 1998c).
This tone does change in the course of time to rejecting the argument altogether.
In its place, instead of a pride in principles, the line of argument used is one of attempt-
ing to put the critics on the back foot with claims that it is realpolitik arguments that are
unrealistic and are prepared to put the nation’s interests on hold for the sake of dogma:
[w]hen I made our commitment to human rights, I was criticised
in some quarters for sacrificing the national interest for princi-
ple. There is something odd with a national interest that is in
conflict with principle. I would robustly argue that the British
national interest is promoted, not hindered, by a commitment to
human rights. […] our pursuit of human rights is both principled
and practical (Cook 2001).
Here we see Cook using the word principled – the implication is therefore in place
that any argument against him is thereby unprincipled – and indicating that such an un-
principled foreign policy as his opponents seem to seek would be strange. Indeed, his
inference is that this principled (not necessarily ethical) foreign policy is better than the
unprincipled one, promoting as it does the national interest, and arguing on the grounds
of practicality.
It seems that here Cook identifies that there is a problem of sacrificing the politi-
cal for the moral, but he allocates this stance to his opponents, and attacks them on ac-
count of their sacrificing the political for the amoral or non-moral. Unfortunately, Cook
does not realise that these two positions, his and that which he attributes to his oppo-
nents, are both just two sides of the same coin: both are sacrificing the political on the
altar of the non-political. To attack the extreme of realism and binding oneself to an ex-
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treme of idealism is self-defeating: both extremes, realism and idealism, make the same
error and can be attacked with the same argument – this is the point Lieven and Huls-
man make.
This change of tone in argument is also used in conjunction with the domestic vs.
global reasoning above and builds the foundation for subsequent claims regarding hu-
manitarian intervention. In the quote below from the Foreign Policy and National Inter-
est speech to the Royal Institute of International Affairs at Chatham House in January
2000 Cook reiterated these assertions:
[t]he purpose of our foreign policy is to pursue our national in-
terests. [...] our national interest will more and more coincide
with the global interest. […] Promoting our values enhances our
prosperity, and reinforces our security.
Critical Engagement, enlightened self-interest and Diplomacy
for Democracy provide a foreign policy through which we can
best pursue Britain’s national interests.
Those national interests girdle the globe.
The new forces of globalisation offer immense prospects for
progress. Those prospects will be fulfilled only if we take every
opportunity to pursue our national interest through a foreign pol-
icy that also meets the international interest (Cook 2000b).
This speech is worth quoting extensively as it shows a repeated message ham-
mered home and underlines how important the lessening of the internal/external distinc-
tion is. Cook clearly states that the pursuit of national interest is the purpose of foreign
policy, although in the full speech these national interests are explained with reference
to the four objectives set out in the 1997 mission statement.
The values mentioned in the mission statement both ‘enhance’ and allow us to
‘best pursue’ these national interests (Cook 2000b). However, it is the threefold refer-
ence to the national interest and global interest converging – the national interest ‘coin-
cides with’ and ‘meets the international interest’ whilst ‘girdling the globe’ – which
very much looks like a plan for perpetual peace. This will be examined later, but it can-
not be doubted that this is a foreign policy filled with the optimism mentioned in the
first chapter.
If a principled foreign policy is the best way to promote the national interest, and
if international and national interests overlap, then there is a risk of British values being
indistinguishable from ‘universal’ values and what is good for the UK being good for
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the rest of the world. If the premises are correct then any attack on the case via argu-
ments based on western values or cultural imperialism are misplaced, as, according to
the line of reason, the international sphere is contained within the domestic sphere and
one might as well argue that one’s own moral decisions are cultural imperialism im-
posed by oneself: the argument is rendered illogical. It is only with the domes-
tic/international split out of the way that this argument can function. It allows either side
of the argument to be adopted – an attack on the concept of UK values is sidestepped by
rendering them international values, an attack on universal values is avoided by deem-
ing them British.
We now have, according to the arguments used, what Neville Chamberlain may
have described as ‘a quarrel in a far-away country between people of whom we know
nothing’ (Chamberlain 1938), and of interest – perhaps, perhaps not – to international
relations, becoming an affair for domestic politics. This realm of domestic politics, inso-
far as it becomes known to us via, to use Cook’s example, television, means we have a
moral responsibility on account of what he deems our response. Furthermore, this re-
sponsibility is put to us in terms of our status as witnesses. What we have is an incredi-
ble transformation of an act not affecting the UK becoming domestic affairs; we are also
converted from TV viewer to a witness to a crime, generating personal moral responsi-
bility. This has further ramifications which are discussed below.
Cook twice mentions the idea of us all being ‘witnesses in our sitting rooms’ and
that as such we have a ‘responsibility’ (Cook 1997a & 1997c) for our response to ‘gro-
tesque breaches of human rights’ (Cook 1997c). This statement is of great importance,
for it brings the idea of the national equating to international within the realm of the pri-
vate.
The idea that we could have a responsibility for ‘grotesque breaches of human
rights’ (Cook 1997c) is problematic. Crick tells us that ‘[p]olitics are the public actions
of free men’ and freedom ‘is the privacy of men from public actions’ (Crick 2005: 4),
Weintraub points out that ‘it may be worth reemphasizing the cautionary point that there
is no necessary connection between the notions of “public” and “political”’ (Weintraub
1997: 6). Weintraub’s point is, I believe, that the two notions do not map directly onto
one another and the definition of the one term does not necessitate the other. While
Weintraub maintains that the public and the political are not necessarily linked, he will
surely agree that the links between the private and the political are even weaker and the
movement of the political into the private or personal is, if nothing else, of interest.
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So, while I do not wish to get too involved in the definitions of public and private,
I do wish to acknowledge that there is some sort of a border or barrier and that the col-
lapse of this boundary would at least impinge upon the political in some way. If the po-
litical does not acknowledge some form of public/private distinction then the risk of the
political encroaching on the private is present.
This is not to suggest that Cook is envisaging a total state with his remarks, but ra-
ther that the shape, for wont of a better word, of the political changes. If one under-
stands the moral viewpoint as a private viewpoint, then a private viewpoint dominating
the political, which is not private, will have some sort of effect. The most likely affect
will be a de-politicisation of these spheres as contentious issues end up being moved
from the realm of politics, where compromise and solutions are possible, to another
realm – here the moral sphere – where other methods are applicable.
There is another dilemma, at the heart of some of the talk on human rights, which
is not acknowledged as such by ministers such as Cook. It has already been hinted at
above, and it is the notion of British values versus universal human rights. This may ap-
pear at first to be simply a rerun of the domestic/global issue already mentioned. Like
that split, this is an issue of blurred edges and the movement of ideas from one sphere to
another, but on account of the addition of values, it leads to a slightly different and in-
teresting conclusion which will now be looked at.
As already seen above Cook is quoted as saying:
[b]ut I also believe that promoting our values, taking pride in
our principles is in the national interest (Cook 1998c).
This idea of our values or British values is used on several occasions, sometimes
within the one speech, as below:
[w]e have done much to promote British values of democracy
and freedom […]
In the global age it is in Britain's national interest to promote
British values of freedom and democracy. [...]
Promoting our values enhances our prosperity, and reinforces
our security (Cook 2000b).
This is not a case of promoting human rights, but quite clearly British values,
which does put one in the position of defending a stance that some might call neo-
colonialist. This is obviously going to raise questions of Western or relative rights or
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values and why these should be imposed on other states. The quote below has already
been given as an example of a state of affairs in the UK being used to justify creating
this state of affairs in another state, viz., that which is the case in the UK ought to be the
case elsewhere:
if we demand democracy, human rights and social justice for our
own country, then we must produce a foreign policy which pro-
motes the same values for other communities as well.[…]
What we have tried to do consistently, and with new priority, is
to give our values practical expression that gets results (Cook
1998d).
It is not argued why something that is the case in the UK ought to be promoted in
the rest of the world. Nor is it explained why if something is the case in, for example,
Yemen, Malawi, or Indonesia, to pick countries outside Europe, these values are not to
be promoted throughout the world. Moreover, the argument is not that perhaps some of
the UK’s choices must be followed through, rather, if it is a UK value then it must be
made practical and promoted abroad. Even if this is not neo-colonialism or jingoism,
and is simply an acknowledgement of an ensuing diplomatic contest, there will at least
be accusations of such behaviour.
In another example of domestic/global and political/private amalgamation Cook
states that:
if Britain as a nation wishes to promote our values and to defend
human rights then it cannot all be left to government (Cook
1997c).
Once again the international has been transformed not simply to the national, but
to the private, this despite ‘Britain as a nation’ (Cook 1997c) perhaps finding it difficult
to act qua nation via any other method than by government. As mentioned already, the
public and the political may not be necessarily linked, but the private and the political
are even less so.
The problem with this approach is compounded when one then claims that human
rights are universal. If this is the case then why should British values be promoted over
and above the universal ones? Or is there no difference between universal human rights
and British values? Cook does claim that human rights are universal, but the notion of
British is thrown into the mix:
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I am proud that I live in a Britain which respects human rights. I
am proud also that we are campaigning for those same universal
rights to be enjoyed by the peoples who at present are denied
them. I reject the sneers of those who take our freedoms for
granted but want us to turn a blind eye to oppression elsewhere
(Cook 1998c).
This speech is most definitely accepting that human rights are universal, but Brit-
ain is mentioned as being a place where these universal rights are accepted. Does this
mean there is a complete overlap or could the British values be to accept the universal?
If there is an overlap why mention the British and risk entering into a Western concept
argument of human rights? Cook’s position may well be that Britain respects universal
values, but a ‘blurring’ round the edges of his argument seems to threaten. This seems
to be a blurring of edges following that of national/international; but it might well be the
case that this is intentional in order to side step the argument entirely.
By loosening the boundaries of the concepts and denying that they conflict with
one another, one can entirely avoid the universal/relative argument relating to human
rights. Put more bluntly, rejecting the dichotomy enables one to always step into what
was previously the opposing viewpoint. Hence, when it is argued by some that a con-
cern for human rights is a form of cultural imperialism, Cook can respond with:
I reject that self-serving excuse. When we ask those govern-
ments to observe basic standards of human rights, we are not
seeking to impose some peculiarly British concept, but are invit-
ing them to observe rights which have been recognised by the
whole world (Cook 1997c).
How does that tie in with the idea that ‘Britain is best served by a foreign policy
of enlightened self-interest’ (Cook 2000b) or that the idea of ‘diplomacy for democracy’
involves promoting the British values of democracy and freedom (Cook 2000b)? Of
course, as with much of this discussion, this could simply be rhetoric, but conflicts in
thought are generated and these show where the weaknesses in the arguments lie.
This distorting of the edges is fascinating and it is here that New Labour’s argu-
ments become somewhat problematic. The lines of reasoning above indicate that Cook
is attempting to blur the edges between these viewpoints, thus enabling him to step from
one side to the other in the argument. However, this is not unproblematic.
The structure of the argument appears to be that by blurring the boundary between
idealism and realism an attack on a position can be turned into an attack on the opposing
position. However, in doing so Cook risks making the two opposing theories indistin-
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guishable from one another and thus making any defence difficult. Thus when Cook
claims that promoting the UK’s interests is in the national interest (Cook 1998c) he may
well avoid criticisms from Realists that he is damaging the national interest, however,
this makes him vulnerable to the attacks from idealists that he is espousing realism. Ra-
ther than avoiding attacks from his opponents, he risks turning those he might be ex-
pecting to be his political friends into opponents.
Another point where Cook risks a great deal is in aligning himself with idealism:
thus leaving him open to allegations of hypocrisy should his actions not align with its
principles. We shall now look at this argument and how the praxis view of realism ver-
sus idealism differs from the theory.
While it is of political interest whether a particular issue is a national or interna-
tional affair, there is no necessity, politically, for any government to come down on one
side or the other of the realist/idealist split. Moreover, it can be argued that both the re-
alists and the idealists are two sides of the same coin, both making the same mistake –
namely to sacrifice the political to some viewpoint vis-à-vis the moral. In either case the
political is lost, and a form of anti-politics is posited.
Furthermore, publicly claiming a realist or idealist standpoint is to publicly rule
the other out, again weakening the concept of the political. To keep the political in poli-
tics is to not rule any area out; if this is the case then the political will dip into realist
and idealist territory as compromise dictates. If the political dips into both the realist
and idealist stockpiles, then if it becomes necessary to have to claim a standpoint it is
most probably (but not always) rhetorically easier to claim that of the realist. The ideal-
ist will have problems explaining why an action is carried out which does not adhere to
their ethical ideals, the realist can claim that any ethical action is only for realist mo-
tives. Indeed, claiming to be an idealist might be a very realist thing to do. Both view-
points if strictly adhered to in the praxis are, of course, unsustainable. It must be noted
that this does not make realism ‘more correct’ than idealism, simply rhetorically more
defensible most of the time; adopting an extreme of realism makes exactly the same er-
rors as that of an extreme of idealism.
Cook the politician seems to have understood what Cook the theorist has not, for
in speaking of Madeleine Albright he said that she ‘shows that it is possible to be an
idealist and a realist at the same time’ (Cook 2000c). This is something that the theory
behind much of what counts as international politics does not yet seem to have grasped.
Furthermore, it is not illogical to claim that someone can be both realist and idealist at
Chapter 7: New Labour Consensus on the Ethical Dimension 7.5
184
the same time: it is more likely to be illogical to maintain the one stance for all times
within something like international diplomacy, which is dealing daily with real world
problems.
An unlikely ally in this rejecting of choosing one theory over the other is one of
Cook’s predecessors, Douglas Hurd. Speaking in front of the House of Commons Select
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hurd is moved to say:
I think the making of foreign policy is blending realism and ide-
alism. It is blending the world as you would like it to be with the
world as it is. It is an aim—I do not think it is the paramount du-
ty but it is an aim—of British foreign policy, I believe, and of
any government in the modern world, to make a contribution
towards a more decent world, the betterment of humanity and
the correction of human rights abuses (Hurd 1997a: Q79).
This would seem to be a rather surprising statement from a former Conservative
Foreign Secretary, but that would be to concentrate on the principles rather than the po-
litical. We have seen the media’s response to Cook’s mission statement and the idea of
the ethical dimension to foreign policy and this response was, on the whole, political in
nature as opposed to dogmatic: the problems of acknowledging an idealist stance were
conceded, the idea was welcomed, albeit meekly, awaiting the tests which would befall
it. As we have seen, the arguments of those concerned with the theory are less likely to
admit the political constraints than the media.
As we see above, Hurd does not condemn Cook’s approach, and he does say more
which will be looked at presently. Another previous Foreign Secretary was called to
give evidence to the same committee and might be expected to more inclined to approve
of Cook’s ethical dimension, however James Callaghan says:
I ask you to begin by recognising the inconsistency in dealing
with different situations throughout the world. I do not think
there is one general principle or consistent regulation that you
can lay down and apply to every case. Now, that is not very
helpful because it is negative. Secondly, I do not think that we
should encourage the Foreign Secretary always to advertise his
achievements. Sometimes good is done by stealth (Callaghan
1997: Q114).
Which is not to deny the ethical dimension, but rather to point out, as Hurd has,
that there is not simply one way or one method, it is not simply a case of applying ideal-
ism or realism: in short it is political. Furthermore, Hurd goes on the defensive concern-
ing the notion of the ethical dimension:
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I believe there has always been an ethical dimension in recent
years in British foreign policy which has not always been de-
scribed in that slightly pretentious way. […] What is slightly ir-
ritating (and only to me—there is no reason why it should irri-
tate the Committee) is to pretend that a shift of two or three de-
grees is a shift of 180 degrees and that all his predecessors were
immoral rogues (Hurd 1997a: Q76).
The recognition of the political would signify that one was aware that neither an-
gels nor devils were involved in politics: Hurd is correct: had all Cook’s predecessors
been immoral rogues then there would have been very little politics. Hurd goes on to
mention human rights and claims that:
every French President, German Chancellor and British Prime
Minister dealing with China […] should have the human rights
items on their agenda (Hurd 1997a: Q83).
Although he points out that these discussions of human rights can be ‘private
pressures’ (Hurd 1997a: Q83): it might be argued this is Callaghan’s ‘good by stealth’
by another name (Callaghan 1997: Q114). This continuation of the argument that the
political cannot be simply realism or idealism is carried on by Callaghan who goes on to
say:
I think that there is a strong case all the time for emphasising
that human rights are of ethical importance in the conduct of
foreign policy, but I think you should all recognise that we are
frail and we shall constantly fail in certain areas for reasons at
the time either of force majeure or because you believe the bal-
ance of argument on one side or the other comes down in differ-
ent directions for different countries (Callaghan 1997: Q108).
What these former Foreign Secretaries are able to bring to the discussion is the
knowledge that the realist/idealist split is in the theoretical area, in the area of politics
such a split is meaningless. This implies that much of the theory in political science may
have lost its connection to the praxis aspect.
This confusion is seen in a great many of the discussions on the issue in the area
of political science, which highlights the problem which humanitarian intervention faces
if this split, that is between the theories of area one and the praxis of area three has not
been acknowledged when dealing with the subject.
If we look at one academic paper which mentions the testimony given by Hurd
before the House of Commons Select Committee on Foreign Affairs Wheeler and Dunn
feel able to say that:
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[w]hat Lord Hurd is venting is the realist conviction that state
leaders have to work with the world as it is and not as idealist
foreign ministers would like it to be (Wheeler and Dunn 1998:
868-9).
This is the same Lord Hurd who said before the same committee on the same day
that:
I think the making of foreign policy is blending realism and ide-
alism. It is blending the world as you would like it to be with the
world as it is (Hurd 1997a: Q79).
If not a wilful misreading then this is significant misunderstanding of what Hurd
is saying. Furthermore, in the conclusion to their article, Wheeler and Dunn claim that
they manage to generate a:
‘third’ alternative course for British foreign policy between the
rival doctrines of realist pragmatism (the traditional course) and
its antithesis, a form of cosmopolitanism which looks to replace
the states system with a universal moral community (Wheeler
and Dunn 1998: 868),
And, without irony, mention this third course in response to Hurd’s comment that
what irritates him is the pretence that a ‘shift of two or three degrees is a shift of 180
degrees’ (Hurd 1997a: Q76). This is an odd statement. Hurd does not maintain that all
previous Foreign Secretaries were rogues or realists, nor that this two or three degrees
means that Cook is a realist too. On the contrary, he argues, as does Callaghan, that for-
eign policy cannot be a one-size-fits-all realist or idealist answer, but that it uses both:
and this answer is itself neither realist nor idealist, but rather political.
In attempting to spawn a ‘third’ route which ‘requires more than a shift of a few
degrees, but less than an about turn’ (Wheeler and Dunn 1998: 868) Wheeler and Dunn
bestow an assurance on the concept of the border between realism and idealism which it
does not possess. There is little in politics which is black and white, but many shades of
grey, and to lay claim to a single shade of grey as the answer and not some other hue is
to make the same mistake again. As Freeden points out in his article entitled ‘What
Should the ‘Political’ in Political Theory Explore?’:
[n]egotiation and compromise are political activities that can
prevent the eruption of uncontrollable disorder. The fluid struc-
ture of political concepts itself holds the potential for negotia-
tion, though not all features of political thinking – for instance,
oversimplification or excessive competitive zeal – are amenable
to such compromise (Freeden 2005: 127).
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While the theories surrounding realism and idealism are themselves not oversim-
plified, their application to politics would appear to be, and indicate what Freeden terms
‘a flight from the political’ (Freeden 2005: 113). Even those authors who seem to pick
up on the point, manage to turn it away from the political and into the dogmatic. Frost
indicates that he thinks there is something being missed in foreign policy, but, instead of
allowing for the ‘fluid structure’, creates his own dogma:
[b]y stressing that his policy had an ethical dimension he was, I
believe, merely making explicit what is implicit in all foreign
policies. I have long argued that it is not possible to understand
acts in the international arena or to act in it, without taking up an
ethical position - a position about right and wrong in world poli-
tics (Frost 1999).
In the belief that this idealist/realist split existed in the praxis, when in truth the
hard line split only exists within the theory, New Labour made the decision to adopt the
idealist position. Perhaps not everyone in the government did this, the difference be-
tween an ethical dimension and ethical foreign policy was clear to some. However, for
some, if the choice is between principled and unprincipled, why choose unprincipled?
This decision can perhaps be explained as only natural, as the Labour Party was so long
out of government and only had the theory of foreign policy, and some considerable
time to study it, and not the experience.
There seems to be confusion in area one and area three as to what is theory and
what is praxis. Cook himself does not appear to be aware of this state of affairs; so una-
ware, in fact, that he is adopting a theoretical approach that he seems rather wont to
claim that any sort of theoretical argumentation is missing the point. He claims in his
2001 speech on human rights that the concept of human rights ‘is not an abstract con-
cept’ (Cook 2001) and, famously, in his 1997 speech on this theme said not only that
these rights are self-evident but also that he is:
well aware that philosophers have spent many happy hours de-
bating whether these rights can indeed be universal rather than
relative, or whether they are rights rather than aspirations. For
myself, I take a more down-to-earth perspective (Cook 1997c).
The argument of relativism versus universalism is not addressed, despite Cook’s
own speeches bringing up the theme, but by rejecting the theory and the questions it
might generate, any discussion is thwarted. Cook takes the ‘down-to-earth’ approach
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(whatever that may be), and the questions as to the problems in his theory, whether he is
aware of it as a theory or not, are consigned to academic entertainment.
That said, the problem of the inability of the academic to align itself with the
praxis is illustrated in the following passage, indicative of the nature of the theory, as
Wheeler and Dunn set up the either/or of idealism or realism:
[t]he question whether Britain is pursuing a new ethical foreign
policy under Labour can be located within a broader debate
about the moral responsibilities which derive from membership
of an international community or international society. Should
state leaders follow a realist ethic which privileges the security
and welfare of their own citizens over claims of common hu-
manity? Or should ministers recognize that their moral respon-
sibilities do not stop at the water's edge? (Wheeler & Dunn
1998: 853-854).
Wheeler and Dunn seem to suggest that politicians should not be political, not re-
spond to circumstance and situation, but rather should decide on an ideology prior to
office and apply this come what may, that is, they advocate a rejection of the political. It
is little wonder that Cook is unimpressed by academia, although, conversely, he does
seem keen to utilise theory. In response to his philosopher quote, Jenkins wrote that
when ‘foreign ministers turn to philosophy, decent citizens should run for cover’ (Jen-
kins 1997a), but fails to mention what we ought to do in the event of foreign ministers
turning to history. In discussing the dispute over whether values and interests are
‘doomed to conflict in foreign policy’ Cook sums up with:
[w]hether that was ever true in the past I leave to historians to
debate. But those who advance that view are still living in the
past (Cook 2000b).
It seems Cook takes his ideas from theory, but seems to be in denial about this
fact. However, in doing so, Cook appears to make similar mistakes as the academics
and separates the political from politics even further and in putting the moral above the
political manages a flight from the political. With little practical experience of govern-
ment and with academia seemingly mirroring the mistakes, it is almost inevitable that
this will occur.
There are several conclusions which can be drawn from this analysis of the vari-
ous governmental departments. Firstly, the notion of the ethical dimension was not
linked to Cook alone. Cook did make the majority of speeches on this subject but this
was department-wide, and as we have seen above, government-wide policy. Various
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ministers and officials from each of the ministries examined, at one time or other, de-
clared their department’s policy linked into the concept of a foreign policy with an ethi-
cal dimension. Furthermore, this association continued beyond the first few scandals,
when it became clear that the ethical dimension was coming under increasingly negative
scrutiny – well over a year later in the case of the MoD. Thus, the arguments from the
previous chapter regarding anti-politics, instrumentalism, and tragedy can most likely be
applied to the entire government.
Secondly, Cook’s argument for a blurring of domestic and global affairs – the
domestic shall feed into the global and the global is domestic – has far-reaching conse-
quences. The result of this could be one of several things: all things becoming domestic
and thereby within the UK’s interests; the rejection of any relativist/universalist argu-
ment as British values and domestic issues have expanded beyond their borders; the
idea of a moral obligation to interfere in what were international affairs, which thereby
rejects the political. If the above transformation were to take place then there could be
no conflict between promoting British interests and a principled foreign policy, as they
would, somewhat self-righteously, be the same thing. The accusation of hubris made
previously by the application of the tragedy literature stands.
A third point, linked to the second, is a sense in which the international collapsing
into a notion of the national impinges upon the public/private distinction. This has a de-
politicising effect as issues are moved from the arena where there are possible solutions
to those where there are not.
A fourth point is that Cook seems to wish to argue that idealism and realism are
the same thing, thus saving his arguments from attacks from both these angles. Previous
Foreign Secretaries argue to the contrary that these separations exist but that the dog-
matic adherence to one set of principles or the other is not desirable. The submission to
one line over the other loses the flexibility of politics, is a flight from the political and
sets oneself up for a fall. In holding fast to idealism it will be more difficult to justify
the movement into what might be deemed realist action than would be the case if the
converse were to take place.
The fifth and final conclusion to this chapter is that there appears to be a rather
severe split between the praxis and theory of foreign policy as regards realism and ideal-
ism. Within the realm of politics a flexibility and fluidity is acknowledged by foreign
secretaries, although not by Cook; within the realm of political science a dogmatic ne-
cessity to adhere to one philosophy or the other is posited in defiance of the praxis and a
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choice must be made. Cook appears both to accept the theoretical argument and to ac-
cept a theory, but at the same time refuses to argue in the theoretical area. Both Cook’s
pronouncements and the discussion on ethical dimensions risk ignoring the praxis and
seem to reject the political. This has tremendous repercussions on the New Labour theo-
ry of humanitarian intervention, which will now be examined.
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8 New Labour and Humanitarian Intervention
Of special interest to this dissertation, focussed as it is on humanitarian interven-
tion, is the New Labour government’s claim to provide an ethical dimension to foreign
policy. This moral foundation, as has been shown in the previous chapter, was incorpo-
rated in several ways into the policy of government, perhaps widely enough for this to
be considered as government-wide. This notion of an ethical dimension to the policy
will have repercussions on any notion of humanitarian intervention.
What is at stake here is that if an ethically principled international order is sought
then, it can be argued, a de-politicisation of international affairs is risked as the political
is set aside in favour of a moral approach. The danger in this situation is that the moral
can generate answer based on theory which might have nothing to do with the political
situation, and chances denying political judgment. Political judgment, as indicated by
former Foreign Secretaries, cannot be tied exclusively to a theory, as not only do the
circumstances and praxis of international affairs not allow for it, but if verdicts are fash-
ioned in advance of facts then judgment or indeed politics can have very little to do with
them.
In adhering to an essentially academic theory but refusing to argue on this level,
New Labour ends up claiming that opponents in praxis are immoral and opponents in
theory naïve. New Labour itself seems unaware both that its praxis is based on highly
theoretical notions and of the dangers of attempting to occupy the moral high ground.
The analysis of New Labour’s speeches above has shown that concern about human
rights abuses in another state, under the conditions of accepting that the UK is a force
for good in the world, while blurring the distinction between global and domestic mean
that such abuses are therefore a British concern. These premises and this conclusion
make it almost impossible to avoid countenancing the idea of humanitarian intervention
in foreign policy praxis.
These conclusions from the documents, statements, and speeches would liable to
have a colossal and wide-ranging effect on New Labour’s idea of humanitarian inter-
vention even if there were no actual assertions concerning humanitarian intervention
itself. However, there are several primary sources within government during the 1997-
2001 period which explicitly deal with humanitarian intervention and they shall be
looked at in the next section.
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8.1 A CLEAR IDEA OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION?
The New Labour government was not dodging any discussion of humanitarian in-
tervention when it came to power: it would have been difficult to avoid the debate. In a
number of speeches the subject is broached directly and posited as highly problematic.
In his Guiding Humanitarian Intervention speech Cook declares that the:
question of when it is right to use or threaten force is perhaps the
most difficult issue with which political leaders have to grapple
(Cook 2000c),
but of more interest is his statement which he used, word for word, in two sepa-
rate speeches, over a year apart.
In his Human Rights – A Priority Of Britain's Foreign Policy speech at a meeting
of human rights NGOs, and his Foreign Policy And National Interest speech to the
Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, both occasions where he might
expect levels of serious questioning, Cook states:
[t]he biggest unresolved question in upholding universal values
is when is it right for the international community to intervene
and who decides that it is right? The United Nations Charter de-
clares that 'armed force shall not be used, save in the common
interest'. But what is the common interest and what defines it?
(Cook 2000b & 2001).
This is of particular interest not only due to its usage on two occasions, but on ac-
count of the points it contains. Firstly, this is not simply a case of when one should use
or threaten force, but involves the ‘upholding of universal values’, which are not placed
in question unlike all the other factors mentioned (Cook 2000b & 2001): the ‘why’ of
the intervention does not seem to be the problem for Cook – the ‘when’ and ‘who’ are.
Of relevance is the fact that the universal values are not placed in question, but rather
the interpretation of the universal values and the UN Charter are. The one difference
between the two paragraphs from 2000 and 2001 is telling. At the end of the part of the
2000 speech mentioned above Cook adds that ‘[w]e need to establish new rules of the
road’ (Cook 2000b).
If one does intend to be a force for good, and intends on having an ethical dimen-
sion then it is, as a matter of fact, a positing of a set of values (be they universal or not –
the New Labour collapse of domestic/global renders the distinction mostly irrelevant).
When these values are placed above the political then it is necessary for the political
mechanisms and methods to either change or be rejected. This rejection of the political
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would be the logical consequence of the thought, and with his statement above, this ap-
pears to be what Cook is implying: knowingly or not. The UN – a political mechanism –
is brought into the quote simply to show that it is not adequate to answer the (moral)
questions New Labour poses and must be changed for the better.
New international laws, charters, or rules of the road must, according to New La-
bour, reflect the universal values and to this end New Labour suggested, to different
agencies at different times, different guidelines which it wished to put in place. It is the-
se propositions which will give the insights into what exactly New Labour’s theory of
humanitarian intervention is and it is to these that we can now turn.
The speech on humanitarian intervention which is most often mentioned in the lit-
erature was not made by Cook, but by Tony Blair. Referred to as either the ‘Chicago
speech’ or the ‘Doctrine of International Community’ this speech approaches the same
subject matter as that above, and Tony Blair phrases the question thus:
[t]he most pressing foreign policy problem we face is to identify
the circumstances in which we should get actively involved in
other people's conflicts (Blair 1999).
The question is not if we should intervene at all, nor how or who should make the
decision: the question of whether or not one ought to intervene has been answered – the
question is when. This is not to allege that New Labour wishes to be rid of the principle
of non-interference all together: this is not the case. For New Labour as long as the val-
ues (which are universal and at the same time British) are adhered to, the principle of
non-intervention stays in force. It is only a violation of this moral principle which would
make it clear that the political principle sits beneath moral values in the hierarchy and
must defer to them.
Blair’s speech contains five principles. Much has been made of what is missing in
this list of principles (cf. Wheeler & Dunn 2004: 21, & Krakiewicz 2005: 5); however, I
intend to concentrate only on what is contained as opposed to what is not. This is due to
a quirk whereby Cook and Blair do not stick to the same numbers or versions of their
rules for humanitarian intervention, but give different accounts of their intended princi-
ples. Hence, on the theme of humanitarian intervention Blair presents five principles of
a doctrine in 1999. Cook, on the other hand, offers up a set of four ideas in his 2000
speech to the Royal Institute of International Affairs; six months later he expounds six
principles of a framework to the American Bar Association, before putting forward four
rules to a meeting of human rights NGOs in 2001. These last four rules of 2001 are
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identical to his first set of four in 2000. It is clear that these principles are not set in
stone and are being changed depending, perhaps, on audience or circumstances.
These rules and principles will be looked at in the following section and the core
guidelines examined and differences noted. However, as there are three distinct sets of
guidelines with three different numbers of principles, it is the incongruence between the
speeches themselves that are of most interest.
8.2 BLAIR: FIVE PRINCIPLES
The Chicago speech contains many of the points regarding the foreign policy of
New Labour indicated in the chapter above, further strengthening the position that the
ethical dimension of foreign policy was underlying much of government policy. The
speech’s five principles are in the context of a defence of the situation in Kosovo, a sit-
uation of which Blair says:
this is a just war, based not on any territorial ambitions but on
values. We cannot let the evil of ethnic cleansing stand. […] If
we let an evil dictator range unchallenged, we will have to spill
infinitely more blood and treasure to stop him later (Blair 1999).
For Blair it is the notion of values that makes this war just, and we have moved
from a political plane to a moral one. On this moral plane we are faced with the problem
of evil both as the evil of ethnic cleansing and the evil of a dictator. Politics faced with a
problem can look for a solution: morality faced with evil can have little choice but to
destroy the evil – how can one, especially one which claims to be moral, compromise
with evil? Morality compromising with evil is a failure of morality and one of the
weaknesses of this position is thereby exposed: negotiation, concessions, and concilia-
tion become impossible.
The Cold War provided a framework which was clear and straightforward, and its
demise is what has created the conditions for a new framework, so says Blair, and these
days:
our actions are guided by a more subtle blend of mutual self in-
terest and moral purpose in defending the values we cherish. In
the end values and interests merge. If we can establish and
spread the values of liberty, the rule of law, human rights and an
open society then that is in our national interests too (Blair
1999).
Here we see proof that many of the ideas examined in the previous chapter are al-
so being promoted by Blair himself. Some of the rhetorical devices examined above al-
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so occur: idealism and realism are merged into one another, and the nation-
al/international distinction disintegrates with the same consequences as posited previ-
ously, namely, if our values and interests merge, then wherever our values are attacked,
our interests are also attacked – our jurisdiction widens. Moreover, our self-interest is
not selfish self-interest: it is mutual self-interest. Even our notion of self has widened
outwards, one assumes, to incorporate those beyond our borders.
Furthermore, Blair does not seem to deny this conclusion and goes on to back up
this claim:
[i]f we wanted to right every wrong that we see in the modern
world then we would do little else than intervene in the affairs of
other countries. We would not be able to cope.
Any new rules however will only work if we have reformed in-
ternational institutions with which to apply them (Blair 1999).
All that is stopping all the wrongs in the world being righted is the inability to
cope. In truth we should be constantly intervening, if the moral is set above the political
then this is the logical consequence: this inference is not rejected by Blair. The moral
has no grounds for not intervening once it has intervened in a situation once, while the
political can pick and choose according to the circumstances.
As New Labour’s paradigm requires a shift from political to moral, this necessi-
tate the reform of institutions, as without this restructuring any action based on these
proposed values will be rendered illegal or incorrect by the system as it stands. As the
representation of the political, the unreformed institutions will most likely attempt to
prevent interventions based on morals alone. If one does not reform the institutions then
one will be compelled to reject them outright. When an intervention arises, a rejection
of an unreformed institution could weaken the moral position. A government advocating
foreign policy with an ethical aspect cannot be seen to act in contravention to what are
commonly accepted as rules or laws, rejecting what was set up to protect states, thus
reforming these institutions is the only option.
With Blair’s speech on humanitarian intervention already in agreement with the
conclusions drawn from the other questions of foreign policy in the chapter above, it
only remains to look at the five principles which can be paraphrased as follows:
1. Are we sure of our case?
2. Have we exhausted all diplomatic options?
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3. Are there military operations we can sensibly and prudently un-
dertake?
4. Are we prepared for the long term?
5. Do we have national interests involved? (Blair 1999)
This first principle is slightly strange when taken in conjunction with that which
has gone before. Blair expands the question by admitting that war is an imperfect in-
strument for ‘righting human distress’ but that ‘armed force is sometimes the only
means of dealing with dictators’ (Blair 1999). However, if the intervention is to right
human distress, then it may be the case that it is our distress which is the problem, not
the circumstances of the situation. There are always people in distress somewhere in the
world, and as Blair himself has said, we could intervene every minute of the day. Fur-
thermore, if one has yielded the political to the moral then there is no way to deal with
what Blair deemed the ‘evil’ of dictators (Blair 1999) other than to destroy them, only
the political could contend with the problem of dictators with compromise. In short,
with New Labour’s policy principle one will always be met: driven by morality, any-
thing judged evil must necessarily be destroyed. If intervention is based upon the exist-
ence of human distress, then interventions are potentially always possible. With these
criteria in place it is almost impossible for the New Labour government not to be sure of
their case.
The second principle is something of a weasel. To have exhausted all possible
diplomatic options is not achievable – there are always options which have not been at-
tempted. However, to claim that all diplomatic options have been exhausted is simply
another way of saying that the political is being abandoned and attempting to lay the
blame at the door of the opponent. Insofar as the political is being ceded to the moral
then this is the case from the outset. For if the moral is always placed above the politi-
cal, as it often will be in cases of humanitarian intervention, then this principle is satis-
fied before it is even asked, as the political is only useful insofar as it achieves the ‘cor-
rect’ moral response. If this moral response seems unlikely then there is little the politi-
cal can do and thus all diplomatic options to attain this goal will have been exhausted,
or at least rendered pointless.
The third principle of military options is left very vague – there are always sensi-
ble and prudent military operations which can be arranged. This principle does not dif-
ferentiate between military action and the threat of military action. Indeed, it is assumed
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from the outset that military action will be needed, something which the attempts to de-
fine humanitarian intervention in previous chapters showed is not undisputed. Further-
more, it is a mistake to assume that a military operation that looks sensible and prudent
on paper will remain so in the real world. Writing on the US involvement in the Iraq
war, Lieven and Hulsman write:
prudence applies especially to the launching of military opera-
tions. And it is now blindingly obvious that the launching of the
Iraq War violated the most basic rules of prudence, including the
elementary one, set out in official U.S. military doctrine, that
you must always have a Plan B in case things do not turn out ac-
cording to Plan A. As we now know, there was quite simple no
real plan to replace the Baath state that the United States was
going to destroy (Lieven & Hulsman 2006: 67).
Prudence in military and political matters is not a case of a point on a check-list
whereby if an action is regarded as prudent, then the action remains prudent ad infini-
tum. This type of prudence is liable to be forgotten in moral action on the international
stage. For while the political response is more likely to be prepared for the slings and
arrows of outrageous fortune, the moral response risks confusion the question ‘is this
action prudent?’ with the question ‘is this action right?’, and, as we have seen from the
second principle, with a moral response the answer is invariably yes.
Moreover, when dealing with what one has deemed evil one may not be morally
bound to be prudent. One may have an assessment of the situation, judge that there is
nothing one can prudently do to prevent a great evil, but as this would be more of a po-
litical judgment than a moral one this position would be rejected. A great loss of life in
order to stop a great evil may well be worth it if the politics of good intentions are at
work.
The fourth point is linked to the third point as being prepared for the long-term
risks sounds like lacking an exit strategy. Staying the course does not necessarily equal
prudence nor does it make a better rule for reformed international institutions. The sen-
sible and prudent option does not set out in advance how long a humanitarian interven-
tion should take. Humanitarian intervention appears to be a somewhat unstable action
which perpetually risks transforming into something else: a long-term humanitarian in-
tervention is unlikely to remain a humanitarian intervention for very long and could be-
come one of several possibilities including a war, a war by proxy, a peacekeeping mis-
sion, an occupation or whatever it happened to transform into.
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Indeed, Blair himself does not contradict this idea in his speech. On the contrary,
while he seems to imply that a moral humanitarian intervention and whatever it be-
comes thereafter will be over quite quickly, there is perhaps no need for an exit strategy
if one just remains in the state. As Blair himself says ‘having made a commitment we
cannot simply walk away once the fight is over’ (Blair 1999). A moral commitment will
ensure that one cannot walk away. Long term ‘morally’ is easier to commit to than long
term ‘politically’ on account of the unchanging nature of morality. A moral approach to
this principle will ensure it is always met. The financial or political situation in the in-
tervened upon state or on the home front are not considered
The final point appears rather meaningless. As Blair pointed out earlier in his
speech, as far as he in concerned values and interests converge. As we have also seen,
once this occurs and on account of the universal values involved, the national and inter-
national also collapse into one another, insofar as there are no values that are then not of
interest to the UK. Thus national interests collapse into the concept of values. On this
argument as soon as there are values involved there is a national interest involved. Ac-
cording to the statements and speeches New Labour has made on foreign policy, this
principle will always automatically be met for as long as the moral is put above the po-
litical and New Labour’s views on UK and universal values is as claimed.
What follows from the above analysis is that Blair has set up five guidelines to re-
form international institutions in order to deal with the new, post-Cold War situation,
but if the political has been rejected in favour of the moral then the criteria are met be-
fore they can even be posed. As such, one could carry out a humanitarian intervention
and declare it justified in almost all cases, if these were the guidelines. If faced with a
situation where the UK government has to ask itself if it ought to carry out a humanitar-
ian intervention, then, according to the Chicago Speech, and if the moral is placed
above politics, then the answer will almost certainly be in the affirmative.
8.3 COOK: FOUR RULES OR IDEAS
These four ideas of Cook’s were submitted to the UN Secretary-General as sug-
gestions as to how the international community should decide it is to act. Cook used
these four ideas in 2000 and repeated them word for word as four rules in 2001; this
may give them more weight than the other guidelines. Also by the year 2000 Cook is in
his third year of the job and should be much more aware of what it involves. He agrees
enough with his speech in 2000 to repeat parts of it in 2001. The 2000 speech has Cook
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discussing the idea of dirty hands and berating those who feel he should take the high
moral ground – this could be reflected in his rules, which are as follows:
1. Any intervention is by definition a failure of prevention. Force
should always be the last resort;
2. The immediate responsibility for halting violence rests with the
state in which it occurs;
3. When faced with an overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe
and a government that has demonstrated itself unwilling or una-
ble to halt or prevent it, the international community should act;
4. Any use of force in this context should be collective, propor-
tionate, likely to achieve its objective, and carried out in accord-
ance with international law (Cook 2000b & 2001).
The main point in the first rule is that force should be the last resort – this maps
onto Blair’s second principle of ‘[h]ave we exhausted all diplomatic options’ (Blair
1999) in the section above and as such is open to the same argument, namely that it is
simply a way of indicating that the political is being discarded.
The second rule or idea, that of the state in which the violence is occurring is re-
sponsible, in the first instance, for stopping it, is interesting on a number of points. First-
ly, it appears not to be contained within Blair’s principles. Secondly, it is of significance
that the first point is that force should be the last resort and not that the responsibility
lies with the state within which the problems occur. What this establishes is that the
threat of intervention and force from the international community is in place before the
responsibility of the individual states to combat whatever violence is taking place within
its borders. The state in which this violence is taking place need not agree that there is a
problem; it is simply told that it has the responsibility to sort out an internal problem by
an external power. Furthermore, an external state could decide that the responsibility
was not immediate or effective enough and launch an intervention on that basis. Thus,
the responsibility to stop the violence might belong to the state where it is occurring, but
if the UK and/or the international community does not think this responsibility has been
met then intervention can commence. Interestingly, a responsible government might still
be attempting political solutions but be judged unable to halt the human catastrophe of
which Cook writes in point three (Cook 2000b & 2001), but because of the definition in
Cook’s point one, namely, that an intervention is a failure of prevention ensures that the
existence of a crisis can, potentially, trigger an intervention at once. Politically there
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would be much to stop a state launching an intervention on this basis: morally, that is,
based on good intentions, very little.
Rule three follows on logically from the second point – should the government in
the state not react as one might wish then the international community should act.
Furthermore, if a humanitarian intervention is based on the moral as opposed to
the political, then the political move to compromise, appease, or assuage the situation
could be seen as being unwilling to prevent evil occurring. Indeed, compromising with
that which has been deemed in some way bad or evil is to align oneself with the evil: the
moral standpoint risks demonising the political. The result of this argument is that the
politics of good intentions can relegate all internal attempts to deal, politically, with a
problem as an unwillingness to halt or prevent the catastrophe. Once these points are in
place, and a moral response built in, the conditions are always met for an intervention.
The dictator who does not wish for an intervention will be dealt with, but also the politi-
cal state which does not adopt the moral approach.
It is worth noticing that it is not the UN posited as the actor, but the international
community. This may be a minor point, as these suggestions were presented to the Sec-
retary General of the UN and it may be argued that the UN is implied. However, as we
have seen above, the reform of the UN or any other institution which places the political
above the moral has been mooted by New Labour: it is not clear whether the interna-
tional community posited here is a political or a moral community and the answer might
require something other than the UN.
Moreover, the notion of the international community might give the suggestion
that there is political consensus on the matter being built into the argument, but this is
not the case. As has been pointed out above, the assumption of the moral is also an as-
sumption that these values are universal. This is a line of reasoning made explicit by
Carr where he points out that the:
Utopian [...] argues that what is best for the world is best for his
country, and then reverses the argument to read that what is best
for his country is best for the world, the two propositions being,
from the utopian standpoint, identical (Carr 1939: 96-7).
Only those nations who stop the infringement of the value are safe: those who dis-
agree (or are unwilling) are to be intervened against; those who agree but do not manage
to stop the infringement are also to be intervened against; those who politically ap-
proach the infringement also risk intervention. This is pointed out by Cook in same
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speech as he declares that not adhering to the universal values renders a government il-
legitimate:
[w]e will all need to make a concerted effort if we are to get
across the message that the real objective is not to pressurise le-
gitimate governments but to halt gross abuses by governments
that have forfeited their legitimacy (Cook 2001).
Thus those who place the political above the moral are also risking intervention by
those who place another system above it – by not adhering to the moral one risks one’s
political neck, as the moral, it seems, is what defines the legitimate.
The final rule seems to squash several ideas into the one principle. It contains the
ideas of collective force, proportionate force, having a good chance of success, and that
the force used be carried out in line with international law. These ideas share much with
the notion of just war. As such, it may be churlish to place them in question. However,
as we have seen, certain assumptions can change the shape of claims. Thus, the assump-
tion of universal values would take for granted that the force would be collective.
Whether it would be collective, and whether others would agree is an interesting point.
Collective force does not specify who would have to agree and one is unlikely to have
unanimous agreement. The parameters are broad enough to make them easier to achieve
than not.
The word proportionate is another weasel word – a concept which is unlikely to
be properly nailed down. Within the realms of the political, this is a word which alludes
to judgment and balance. However, were one to be of the opinion that one were on the
side of good and fighting a great evil, the risks and losses that one might be willing to
brook would be disproportionate to another looking from the political viewpoint. Simi-
larly, with the idea of the action being liable to achieve its objective – if one views the
opponent as an aberration to the universal order and one’s objective is to restore the bal-
ance then failure to restore universal order is unlikely to be brooked as conceivable.
Linked to the previous point, this goal could be so important that one could happily
throw everything at it in order to attain this balance. Again, the interpretation differs de-
pending on whether or not the moral is a dimension or an integral part of the policy.
Finally, when one is intending to change international law, then carrying out ac-
tions in accordance with it should not be a problem. As was mentioned above, the im-
pulse of the moral will be to change the legal and political to allow the moral to work,
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and if this does not occur then the moral would have no compunction in abandoning in-
ternational law. In short, this is easy to agree to and easy to override.
Once again, this set of rules, at first glance a list of demanding political challeng-
es, is rendered easily attainable by sacrificing the political to the moral whilst retaining
the stern rhetoric of politics. Any negative impact or unforeseeable consequences will
be rendered acceptable by good intentions.
8.4 COOK: SIX PRINCIPLES
Cook’s six principles appear in a speech given to the American Bar Association in
2000 entitled Guiding Humanitarian Intervention. Again, Cook claims these are part of
a framework submitted to the UN Secretary General. These six points are a version of
the four points mentioned previously to which Cook returns in his 2001 speech. How-
ever, as a speech dealing directly with humanitarian intervention and delivered to those
in the legal profession, it must be assumed that this will be a tightly argued piece of
public speaking.
The first feature to note is that the six points have not been expanded to include
any of Blair’s Chicago speech, but instead the four points which Cook has used before
are divided up differently. The six rules as mentioned in the speech can be paraphrased
thus:
1. Any intervention, by definition, is an admission of failure of
prevention. We need a strengthened culture of conflict preven-
tion.
2. We should maintain the principle that armed force should only
be used as a last resort.
3. The immediate responsibility for halting violence rests with the
state in which it occurs.
4. When faced with an overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe,
which a government has shown it is unwilling or unable to pre-
vent or is actively promoting, the international community
should intervene.
5. Any use of force should be proportionate to achieving the hu-
manitarian purpose and carried out in accordance with interna-
tional law.
6. Any use of force should be collective. No individual country can
reserve to itself the right to act on behalf of the international
community (Cook 2000c).
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His first point in the 2000 and 2001 speeches has been split into two separate ele-
ments and this disjointing requires further attention. Most of what has become point two
has been fully dealt with previously, but Cook goes into more depth as to how humani-
tarian intervention can manifest itself:
[i]ntervention may take many forms, including mediation, […]
sanctions, […] observer missions, […] and international con-
demnation (Cook 2000c).
Thus, Cook is amalgamating military and non-military intervention into the same
idea, but still referring to all these actions collectively not simply as intervention, but as
humanitarian intervention. Cook, as Graham in chapter three, seems to use the terms
intervention and humanitarian intervention interchangeably. Not only does this confuse
the issue somewhat, as one is never certain if humanitarian intervention is to be a mili-
tary operation or not, but this is also a situation against which, as seen in chapter five,
some actors, MSF, for example, argue.
Furthermore, Cook states that of all these various forms of intervention only
armed force is the last resort – these other types of intervention, we must assume from
what he says, are lesser forms and not the last resort. In his first rule Cook makes a point
of saying not only that any humanitarian intervention is a failure or prevention but that
any intervention is a failure of prevention. Yet in the same rule the emphasis is on a
‘strengthened culture of conflict prevention’ (Cook 2000c). The confusion with the
terms intervention and humanitarian intervention means that Cook is deeming media-
tion, sanctions, observer missions, and international condemnation as failures of preven-
tion.
While conflict prevention on a political level could well involve the many forms
of non-armed intervention which Cook lists and more, it is not necessarily the case that
these are failures of prevention. If this were the case then all politics could be deemed
failure of prevention insofar as politics attempted to resolve problems. There are two
possibilities here. The first is that Cook is making exactly the same mistake as Graham
and what he means here by intervention is armed intervention, which is entirely possi-
ble. The second possibility is that as soon as conflict, that is, the circumstances in which
politics can work, appears, it is to be combated by external intervention. This can be in-
terpreted as a rejection of politics: disagreement and conflict are to be actively avoided,
and when they occur it is of interest to the international community who can infer this as
failure. This rejection of the political is then compounded by making the international
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response a moral response. If the moral replaces the political, it does not mean there is a
greater lust for intervention, but there are certainly more opportunities for it.
Rules three and four are almost as they stood in the previous sub-chapter. One
change which at first appears minor but is actually of some significance is in rule four
where intervention is called for when a government is unwilling or unable to prevent a
catastrophe. The addition of the phrase ‘or is actively promoting’ (Cook 2000c) places
dictators seeking violent clashes on a par with political mediation which is not going
fast enough for those seeking a moral response. This has quite dramatic possibilities and
makes it more difficult to argue that Cook is simply confusing intervention and armed
intervention in his first and second rules, as it seems to quite actively promote the moral
above the political.
Rules five and six are created by splitting the last rule of the four. Cook mentions
that force should be proportionate (he also mentions that it must be likely to achieve its
objectives in this context) and mentions international law again in this framework. This
has already been covered above. However, the split is somewhat worthy of note as it
partitions off the aspects mentioned in just war theory and places them together in rule
five – only the collective aspect is separated out and put into rule six.
Particular emphasis is being placed on the avoidance of unilateralism, which is li-
able to be a hazard if the moral has displaced politics. If one is acting within the UN and
international law, unilateralism is unlikely to be a problem: if one is not, the problem
presents itself. Cook points out that the unilateralism would be tantamount to claiming
to act on behalf of all, another likely inference from such circumstances. Cook is keen
to prevent such thoughts, and dealing with this point separately would seem to give this
rule extra prominence. However, the same problem has been mentioned and is still pre-
sent: namely no international organisations are mentioned, only the nebulous ‘interna-
tional community’ and the claim that no ‘individual country’ can act on its behalf, but
two or three perhaps? Rule six prohibits political arbitrariness, but does not affect the
moral high ground. The other criticisms mentioned in the previous section still apply.
In keeping with the points already mentioned, whereby the boundary between the
national and the international becomes blurred, universal values and a moral response
allow other states to become involved at a much earlier stage, significantly, perhaps to
prevent the international community’s armed response from arriving too early. Once
again, what might at first appear to be a set of principles not too different from the status
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quo are, if applied from a moral perspective, lowering the bar to humanitarian interven-
tion.
8.5 PROBLEMS WITH NEW LABOUR’S THEORY OF HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION
New Labour, its foreign policy, and its view of humanitarian intervention have re-
percussions which are not necessarily intended by the New Labour government. Many
of the implications are only clear when the entire structure of the claims is examined.
However, it would seem that the theory is at least government-wide, in spite of claims
of departments and people being at odds over the idea of the ethical dimension in for-
eign policy. It does seem to appear quite regularly, moreover, in a similar form, in min-
istries, speeches, and documents. This bold statement of ethical intent was not able to be
consistently carried through, however, and this is due partly to what Kampfner puts
down to Blair, namely:
taking charge of Britain’s role in the world with less foreign pol-
icy knowledge or experience than almost any incoming Prime
Minister since the Second World War (Kampfner 2004: 8).
This claim can be levelled at the entire government, so long in opposition. In
brief, lacking experience in praxis, there was little the incoming government could do
but rely on theory. Norton calls Blair the ‘first truly rootless Prime Minister’ (Norton
2008: 90) and where a lack of experience and roots occurred, theory would obviously
provide roots and stability.
The theory itself, is not clean cut and as the comments by former Foreign Secre-
taries show, adherence to a theory, any theory, does not sit well in the world of foreign
policy, where flexibility, and not dogma, is needed. What is feasible or able to be influ-
enced within the boundaries of foreign policy is not knowledge a governing party with
little experience of government would necessarily possess. If we take Max Weber and
his Politics as a Vocation lecture and apply it to the New Labour theory of humanitarian
intervention then this point is covered when Weber claims that there are:
three pre-eminent qualities […] decisive for the politician: pas-
sion, a feeling of responsibility, and a sense of proportion (We-
ber 1948: 115).
It is this sense of proportion which successive Foreign Secretaries have gained,
whether they sought it or not. As was seen in the previous chapter, Callaghan spoke of
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‘recognising the inconsistency in dealing with different situations throughout the world’
and that ‘good is done by stealth (Callaghan 1997: Q114), and of recognising that ‘we
are frail and we shall constantly fail in certain areas’ (Callaghan 1997: Q108), while
Hurd alluded to ‘blending the world as you would like it to be with the world as it is’
(Hurd 1997a: Q79). There are no questions of interest here, nor of whether a govern-
ment is prepared for the long term or not in its foreign policy, but rather notions of frail-
ty, failure, and recognition of what one cannot change. The sense of proportion or an
admission of its limits is missing from New Labour’s account of humanitarian interven-
tion.
The post of Foreign Secretary is one of the more senior positions in government
and, indeed, New Labour appointed their most experienced parliamentarian. Nonethe-
less, the experience and sense of proportion were missing, supplanted by passion, but
not of the sort lauded by Weber. In fact, Weber points out the traps into which New La-
bour fell, resulting in a Weberian ‘deadly sin’:
[t]o be sure, mere passion, however genuinely felt, is not
enough. It does not make a politician, unless passion as devotion
to a ‘cause’ also makes responsibility to this cause the guiding
star of action. And for this, a sense of proportion is needed. This
is the decisive psychological quality of the politician: his ability
to let realities work upon him with inner concentration and
calmness. Hence his distance to things and men. ‘Lack of dis-
tance’ per se is one of the deadly sins of every politician (Weber
1948: 115).
Weber’s discussion of passion as a pre-eminent quality for a politician indicates
where New Labour’s lack of experience turns the virtues into vices:
passion in the sense of matter-of-factness, of passionate devo-
tion to a ‘cause,’ to the god or demon who is its overlord. It is
not passion in the sense of that inner bearing which my late
friend, Georg Simmel, used to designate as ‘sterile excitation,’
[…] an excitation that plays so great a part with our intellectuals
in this carnival we decorate with the proud name of ‘revolution’
[…] a ‘romanticism of the intellectually interesting,’ running in-
to emptiness devoid of all feeling of objective responsibility
(Weber 1948: 115).
Herein lies a New Labour problem; it cannot justify why it can carry out one in-
tervention, which it is passionate about, as a force of good, and not the other. Not hav-
ing this monopoly on right is why politics is well able to act in one case and not another,
and here we see Weber’s matter-of-fact passion compared with his sterile excitation.
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The mere fact that, as Blair points out above, under the conditions set out it is impossi-
ble to carry out all the humanitarian interventions in the real world, means that the deci-
sion to carry out the interventions that one does will come under intense scrutiny.
There is another problem of New Labour’s position on humanitarian intervention
which Weber alerts us to, namely his distinction between an ethic of ultimate ends and
an ethic of responsibility. In his introduction to Voegelin’s Political Religions, Barry
Copper pins Weber’s distinction down well:
Weber’s distinction between the ‘ethics of intention’ and the
‘ethics of responsibility’ contained the genuine and permanent
insight that the unforeseen consequences of moralistic action are
the responsibility of the actor. This insight, which could be for-
mulated in commonsensical terms as well, was important be-
cause it was developed in opposition to the ideological position
that if one cherishes certain ‘values’ with great conviction, the
‘sincerity’ with which they are held and the morally elevated in-
tentions that one makes public are sufficient to excuse any suf-
fering that might be caused by trying to put them into action.
Weber’s distinction made it clear that the ‘values’ that are as-
sumed to be so morally elevating are not only not scientifically
valid, they are ideological inventions (Cooper: 1985: xv-xvi).
Voegelin himself goes further and refers to responsibility and demonism in poli-
tics:
[t]he new sense of theoretical relevance could express itself,
therefore, only in the creation of the categories of ‘responsibil-
ity’ and ‘demonism’ in politics. Weber recognised the ‘values’
for what they were, that is, as ordering ideas for political action,
but he accorded them the status of ‘demonic’ decisions beyond
rational argument. Science could grapple with the demonism of
politics only by making politician aware of the consequences of
their actions and awaking in them a sense of responsibility
(Voegelin 2000: 99).
This ethics of responsibility is important enough for Weber to class it as one of his
three political virtues alongside passion and proportion, and, perhaps, it could be argued
that this is the central political virtue of Weber’s three. It is with this ethic of responsi-
bility, as Voegelin points out, that the demonisation of the opponent could be prevented,
or the consequences of adopting a moralistic standpoint are at least comprehensible.
With an ethic of responsibility the limits of action and influence are more likely to be
acknowledged: frailty and failure are more likely to be recognised.
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It should be pointed out that the mistakes which New Labour are being accused of
are neither new nor limited to any particular party or era. Elie Kedourie examined the
published diaries of Richard Crossman, Minister for Housing, Leader of the House of
Commons, and latterly Secretary of State for Social Services in Harold Wilson’s gov-
ernment, and concluded that the idealism of Crossman eventually has to give way to
something else, and this, very often, is simply the wish to stay in power. Kedourie con-
cludes his discussion with a quote from the diaries illustrating this change:
[a]nd so we take leave of the Minister, now nearing the end of
his political life. His mood one of mellow and lofty disillusion,
he surveys as from a great height the multitude over whose petty
concerns Providence has charged him with the duty of keeping
watch: […] ‘I now accept that the settled and just management
of society by a progressive oligarchy is the best we can hope
for’ (Kedourie 1984: 27).
This brings the contestability of politics into focus, despite its usurpation by the
moral. While the moral may attempt to claim an objective standpoint for its assertions
this is not an option for politics. Politics exists where there are disagreements and con-
flicts – without these, it might be argued, politics would disappear. Claiming that one
has right on one’s side does not support ones argument; rather it underlines the problem
of the moral in politics by demonising the opponents. This can be underlined by return-
ing to Max Weber, who states that if:
an action of good intent leads to bad results, then, in the actor’s
eyes, not he but the world, or the stupidity of other men, or
God’s will who made them thus, is responsible for the evil. […]
No ethics in the world can dodge the fact that in numerous in-
stances the attainment of ‘good’ ends is bound to the fact that
one must be willing to pay the price of using morally dubious
means or at least dangerous ones – and facing the possibility or
even the probability of evil ramifications. From no ethics in the
world can it be concluded when and to what extent the ethically
good purpose ‘justifies’ the ethically dangerous means and rami-
fications.
The decisive means for politics is violence (Weber 1948: 121).
That is to say that even the means to the just end involves decisions which could
contradict the end itself: the privileged position of objective right collapses, if it ever
existed, on the international stage. Indeed, in creating an immoral foe – for if one is do-
ing what is right those who oppose must oppose what is right – the moral cannot back
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down from bloodshed and disproportionate means. If a government is moral why would
it deign to allow the immoral government to continue after an intervention? As Weber
points out:
[h]e who seeks the salvation of the soul, of his own and of oth-
ers, should not seek it along the avenue of politics, for the quite
different tasks of politics can only be solved by violence (Weber
1948: 126).
The lack of a detached standpoint, the creation of an immoral antagonist, and the
right of one’s cause will invariably generate unforeseen, unwelcome, or contrary to ex-
pected results at some point and it is again Weber who indicates the problems when he
maintains that:
[w]hosoever contracts with violent means for whatever ends –
and every politician does – is exposed to its specific conse-
quences. This holds especially for the crusader, religious and
revolutionary alike […].
Whoever want to engage in politics at all, and especially in poli-
tics as a vocation, has to realize these ethical paradoxes. He
must know that he is responsible for what may become of him-
self under the impact of these paradoxes (Weber 1948: 124-5).
This is to say that just feelings and good intentions are not enough: while Weber’s
passion may well be found here, although in its negative form, the lack of a sense of
proportion mentioned above all impact on the result.
In The Politics of Good Intentions, Runciman applies Weber to the moralising of
New Labour and US neo-cons which led to the Iraq war. Accordingly, the responsible
politician:
knows that good does not always follow from good. Even ac-
tions undertaken with the best intentions will generate unintend-
ed consequences, and the mark of a responsible politician is how
they deal with these. The way to deal with them is to take re-
sponsibility for them, which means neither denying them nor
wallowing in them, but accepting them for what they are, the un-
intended but foreseeable consequences of any involvement in
the dangerous business of power politics. All politicians with re-
al power have dirty hands, because real politics can be a bloody
business. The trick for Weber is not to try to hide them, nor to
parade them through the streets, but just to get on with the task
in hand, in the knowledge that dirty hands, and a soiled con-
science, are the price that all politicians have to pay. Responsi-
ble politicians will suffer, but they should suffer in silence, be-
cause the test of politics is whether you can cope with the
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knowledge that you are not as good as you would like to be
(Runciman 2006: 38-39).
This theme was also picked up by Grainger in his 2005 book Tony Blair and the
Ideal Type, where a more straightforward connection between Weber and Blair was put
forward:
[t]o the enlightened and ardent Blair, avowedly pursuing an
‘ethical foreign policy’ in order to secure a re-ordering of the
world in the light of a global consensus, the ‘just war’ as a
means of international morality and justice, as the guarantor of
liberal democracy of liberal democracy and human rights, has
considerable appeal. For the victor of a ‘just war’ may impose
‘war guilt’ upon a defeated enemy, exact retribution from him
and enforce his recognition of and obedience to the right values
and, of course, demand ‘regime change’ (Grainger 2005: 32).
Grainger posits Blair as the charismatic politician for whom values are not simply
contained within and shape policy, but he requires that these values are accepted by oth-
ers, a goal so important that questions of proportion are unnecessary.
Looking more specifically at the claims made by the area three actors, and the ar-
guments from area two, we can see that even the, what may at first have appeared to be
excessively philosophical analysis has a bearing on New Labour’s foreign policy. If we
look at Blair’s claims that:
this is a just war, based not on any territorial ambitions but on
values. We cannot let the evil of ethnic cleansing stand. […] If
we let an evil dictator range unchallenged, we will have to spill
infinitely more blood and treasure to stop him later (Blair 1999).
Then it is clear that the area two theorising examined in chapter four is applicable
to area three politics. As Mouffe pointed out, a useful tool in securing one’s goodness
is:
through the condemnation of the evil in others. Denouncing oth-
ers has always been a powerful and easy way to obtain a high
idea of one’s moral worth (Mouffe 2005: 74).
It is much easier to prove that one occupies the moral high ground when there is
an immoral low ground dweller to point towards. Mouffe has also been at pains to indi-
cate that:
instead of being constructed in political terms, the ‘we’/’they’
opposition constitutive of politics is now constructed according
to moral categories of ‘good’ versus ‘evil’ (Mouffe 2005: 75).
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This seems to be very much the case in the Blair speech, if nowhere else. The
quote by Schmitt, referred to on a number of occasions in this thesis, that:
designating the adversary as political and oneself as non-
political (i.e., scientific, just, objective, neutral, etc.) is in actual-
ity a typical and unusually intensive way of pursing politics
(Schmitt 1976: 23),
also seems to fit seamlessly into this area three discussion, the terms used by the
New Labour cabinet such as, for example, ‘force of good’, so well-liked in the MoD, ‘a
moral duty to reach out to the poor and needy and to try to create a more just world’
(DFID 1997: 16) or the ‘ethical dimension’, or ‘human rights at the heart of our foreign
policy’ (Cook 1997a). Those on the opposite end of the scale are thus immoral, unjust,
deniers of rights, and the evil against which a force of good must battle, and in:
being reproached for immorality and cynicism, the spectator of
political phenomena can always recognize in such reproaches a
political weapon used in actual combat (Schmitt 1974: 67).
That is to say, area two discussion makes clear that designating one’s enemies as
immoral or unjust does not render New Labour moral or just. New Labour does not
simply focus on the ‘ethical dimension’, however, for as we have seen in this chapter,
humanitarian intervention is a consequence of this point of view, not simply for the
commentators, but for New Labour itself. As Cook makes clear:
(w)hen faced with an overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe,
which a government has shown it is unwilling or unable to pre-
vent or is actively promoting, the international community
should intervene (Cook 2000c).
And the force used is rectifying this is in order to achieve ‘humanitarian purpose’
(Cook 2000c). New Labour is invoking a universal morality for humanity and here
Schmitt and Koselleck show the unintended and paradoxical consequences of this
stance. Firstly, Koselleck’s realisation that the:
totality of the politically neutral claim of a fixed, eternally valid
morality necessarily turns political acts and attitudes, once they
are subjected to a moral test which they cannot pass, into total
injustice. Moral totality deprives all who do not subject them-
selves to it of their right to exist (Koselleck 1988: 152).
When combined with Schmitt’s similar but still profitable inference that to:
confiscate the word humanity, to invoke and monopolize such a
term probably has certain incalculable effects, such as denying
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the enemy the quality of being human and declaring him to be
an outlaw of humanity; and a war can thereby be driven to the
most extreme inhumanity (Schmitt 1976: 54).
It is now clear, if it were not before, where the area two discussions on the tragic
can be applied to New Labour’s foreign policy. Applying Schmitt and Koselleck to New
Labour above, we realise that an ethical dimension to foreign policy and humanitarian
intervention can actually result in extreme inhumanity, in the total absence of limits of
injustice and immorality, all in the name of justice and morality. As Frost comments in
Tragedy, Ethics and International Relations:
In those series of events that are construed as tragic, there is of-
ten an element of irony. What the actors intend does not come
about and quite often their acts cause an outcome antithetical to
their own judgement about what would constitute a good ethical
result (Frost 2003: 483).
The real use of the tragic in international relations is not simply putting into focus
the idea that what a government or a politician or a state wants is no guarantee of what
their actions will actually bring about, but also as a cap on the area one assumption that
deciding on an ideology or method in advance of facts is applicable to area three poli-
tics. What the tragic shows at area three generally, and with New Labour’s foreign poli-
cy in particular, is that an ideology, be it of a realist or idealist sort, is not a joker in the
hand, which, when unforeseen and/or unwilled consequences occur one is able to wield
and still deem them to have the national interest, human rights, or an ethical dimension
at their core, regardless. Moreover, Weber is clear that not only is no joker possible, the
hand will always be dirty, and the best one can hope for is a good poker face from one’s
politicians. The tragic shows that even with the best intentions, great plans, and good-
will to all mankind, terrible injustice can still occur. This is not a pessimistic outlook,
per se, it is simply an admission that mortal man is highly unlikely to attain perfection.
Thus:
what tragedy purports to show is just how not only do our ethi-
cal commitments sometimes not cohere, but sometimes positive-
ly conflict. The tragic view throws doubt on any suggestion that
our ethical commitments can be brought into harmony (Frost
2003: 487).
Which is to say that even with perfect knowledge of a situation, it is still not pos-
sible to do the ‘right’ thing as,
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tragedy involves a situation where duties are in radical conflict,
such that whatever is done will involve wrongdoing; by defini-
tion, this conflict cannot be wished away – the only way to pre-
serve integrity and honour is to accept the tragic nature of one’s
choice: that is, to acknowledge that to act is to do wrong (Brown
2007: 9).
And hence we are back at the idea of politics where conflict, diversity, or differ-
ence not only enable and require politics, but also acknowledge the notion of the tragic
(or, indeed, the comic).
New Labour’s ethical dimension in foreign policy and its theory of humanitarian
intervention reflect the problems which occur with area one theorising, and illustrate the
recent discussions of area two argument. Foreign policy demands flexibility and com-
promise, while the moral provides certainty and absolutes. Politics leaves politicians
with dirty hands, while morality in the political arena will not guarantee ones goodness,
it may give the appearance of it, and, if nothing else, put the blame on the immoral foe.
Politicians will invariably have to shoulder responsibility, an ethical dimension takes
this away as one’s intentions were good.
New Labour’s ethical dimension and humanitarian intervention doctrine was
based on ideology, not politics, nor even philosophy. For a party which had been so
long in the political wilderness, but which swept to power with such an overwhelming
majority, it was clear that ideas and not experience were not only what it would rely on,
but what it had been elected upon. Furthermore, discussions of humanitarian interven-
tion seem to entirely disregard any notions of the political and this despite the fact that
‘no situation is more purely political than the attempt of one nation to intervene in the
affairs of another’ (Rosenau 1969: 156).
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9 Conclusions
The conclusions that might be drawn from this examination are varied. The first is
a historical one that arises from the beginning of the thesis, which noted that following
the end of the Cold War an increase in optimism in certain intellectual circles coincided
with an increase in the number of projects claiming to be instances of humanitarian in-
tervention. This optimism coincided with an assumption by some authors that the con-
cept of humanitarian intervention was a new one, which had only appeared post-1989.
The attempted definitions of the concept by authors who made that assumption were as
much an endeavour to account for the advent of this novel idea as to clarify exactly
what the supposedly new idea actually involved. In this situation, it was hardly surpris-
ing that the definitions advanced revealed little agreement among the authors about
what they were in fact considering, let alone about the theories constructed around the
definitions.
A closer historical analysis of the concept revealed that the term ‘humanitarian in-
tervention’ as such has been with us since at least the late nineteenth century, the first
unambiguous usage found by the present author being by Edward S. Creasy in 1876.
The component elements in the phrase, however, have existed since the first half of the
nineteenth century, with disagreement and conflict surrounding them from the start.
Furthermore, many of the issues raised in its infancy remain embedded in the term.
Apart from a few anachronisms in language, the arguments for and against it over the
decades since this time might still be put today. Any claims that humanitarian interven-
tion is of recent appearance, then, are not only exaggerated, but show an unwillingness
to look at the history of the concept. The history of the concept has indeed been routine-
ly ignored in academic studies of this theme, and a greater sensitivity to its history
might prevent some arguments based on erroneous claims from surfacing at all. This
disregarding of the history of the term appears to occur in all three areas, albeit in dif-
ferent forms: the academic study of politics, where contemporary accounts give the im-
pression of ignoring historical analysis and treat the issues as being approached for the
first time; political philosophy, where the deeper, underlying questions are probed at the
expense of historical specifics; and practical politics itself, on account of agendas and
rhetoric. My first conclusion, then, is the need for greater historical awareness amongst
those writing on it.
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The second conclusion is the need to take explicit account of the political. As the
analysis of the three areas of politics, political science and political philosophy indicate,
much of the literature pertaining to humanitarian intervention explicitly or tacitly ig-
nores the political dimension. In this connection, it should be stressed that the incorpo-
ration of the political perspective is not intended to be a formula for some form of realist
militancy, of the kind found, for example, in Carl Schmitt. It is only to insist that situa-
tions of conflict would not disappear from the international order even if humanity con-
sisted entirely of angels. This conclusion throws the need to examine the concept of
humanitarian intervention through three different lenses into sharper relief. The one area
which is acutely aware of the political is area two, that of political philosophy, however,
it does not relate its arguments to the problem of humanitarian intervention, and the
conclusions do not seem to filter into areas one and three. The area of political science
gives the impression of generating theory, whilst the area of practical politics is inclined
to adopt theory, both without looking like they are bearing the notion of the political in
mind.
A third conclusion is that the difference between the moral and the political is
more philosophically problematic than some commentators appreciate. The border be-
tween the moral and the political has been porous enough in the past to allow for genu-
ine confusion, as the thesis indicated in relation to the academics who sought to inaugu-
rate political science as a subject distinct from moral philosophy. Authors who do not
appreciate the problem are likely to compound the mistakes of the past further. Much of
the discussion at the birth of the subject concluded that political science was a branch of
moral philosophy. This conclusion might not surprise philosophers, who tend to think,
or did in the past at least, of philosophy as the mother of all sciences, but might come as
a shock to the modern political scientist. In the present context, however, what is being
suggested is not so much that the boundaries between politics and morals are so very
faint that it is simple to move between them, as that authors who do so are simply not
aware of moving from one to the other. Thus, a political issue such as humanitarian in-
tervention is turned into a moral question, which is then placed back into real world pol-
itics: a political solution is either denied or subjugated to the ethical. Schmitt’s realisa-
tion of the potentially disastrous implications of this denial of the autonomy of the polit-
ical is the basis of his insistence that the moral or humane war risks being the most
bloody since opponents are denied membership of these categories. Opponents, that is,
are treated as immoral, inhumane, as well as being ugly and foolish. It is for this reason
Chapter 9 Conclusions
216
that a moralistic approach to humanitarian intervention risks being more terrible than a
political war over, for example, land, or resources. In a similar vein Koselleck points out
that a claim to political neutrality and a universally valid morality transforms the politi-
cal into the sphere of injustice. As he himself puts if, ‘[m]oral totality deprives all who
do not subject themselves to it of their right to exist’ (Koselleck 1988: 152).
The fourth conclusion arises from the discussion on tragedy. The recent debate is
useful as an indicator of what sort of problems political philosophy is concerned with.
In particular, it is a way of explaining the general problem of why the good intentions of
politicians so often result in bad, or unexpected, or entirely wrong outcomes. This as-
pect is almost entirely overlooked by both practical politics and political science. The
propensity of political science to produce theory based on ideologies of realism or ideal-
ism shows a lack of understanding of the problem, and, indeed, a lack of understanding
of its own limits. Practical politics fares no better at recognising its limits, and if politi-
cal science is unable to separate good intentions from politics in its theory, then practi-
cal politics applying this theory is liable to perform no better. The notion of the tragic
fails, however, to shed light on the specific limitations of humanitarian intervention in
particular. It merely throws the issues associated with it into sharper focus.
The fifth conclusion emerges from the study of New Labour and its ethical dimen-
sion to foreign policy, which raised the issue of the relation between theory and praxis,
and perhaps surprisingly for conclusions based on practical politics, is linked to the no-
tion of the tragic outlined above. Former Foreign Secretaries of both the major parties
seemed more aware of the problems which surround this relationship than academics.
The former Foreign Secretaries questioned by the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs,
for example, expressed concern that they and their predecessors were in some way
amoral or immoral because of the inescapable complexities of the world of concrete
policy which the New Labour ideal had failed to recognise. Thus both Hurd and Calla-
ghan spoke of the mixing of realism and idealism, and of never choosing blindly to fol-
low any doctrine. In practice, however, their lack of government experience left New
Labour ministers relying on political dogmas instead of on political phronesis. As Hurd
remarked:
I think the making of foreign policy is blending realism and ide-
alism. It is blending the world as you would like it to be with the
world as it is (Hurd 1997a: Q79).
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While Hurd and Callaghan knew that foreign policy is a mixture of realism and
idealism, New Labour at large did not.
The final conclusion goes beyond studies of humanitarian intervention and raises
questions about the academic study of politics in general. The issue of politics as a sepa-
rate academic subject follows on from conclusions four and five above, which are con-
cerned with the limits of politics and the inability of much practical politics and political
science to acknowledge the problem of theory versus praxis. As the analysis of inaugu-
ral speeches at the emergence of a discrete subject of politics showed, this failure of the
academic study of politics to be concerned with what it is and what it ought to be is a
fairly recent development. This thesis cannot hope to do more than simply draw atten-
tion to the issues, which are fundamental concerns. What can definitely be said, howev-
er, is that this thesis advocates neither a cynical realism nor a sanguine idealism in in-
ternational affairs. It is closer to sympathy for the work of Michael Freeden, which was
considered in chapter 3, and to that of Glen Newey, who has claimed that in liberal po-
litical philosophy, in particular, there is little attempt:
to address the real world of politics, often applying inappropri-
ate theoretical models to it when they do and liberal political
philosophers aim at the supersession of the ostensible subject-
matter of their discipline – that is, politics, they aim at a post-
political world (Newey 2001: 2).
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